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General Introduction 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1. Introduction 
Saudi Arabia is located in the south west of Asia. It is the largest country in the Arabian 
Peninsula, occupying 80 percent of the total area. ' It is bounded by seven countries and 
three bodies of water: Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan to the north, the Arabian Gulf, Qatar, the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman to the east; Yemen to the south; and the Gulf of 
Aqaba and the Red Sea to the west (see map 1). The size of the country as estimated by 
the Saudi government is 2,240,000 square kilometres, 2 and according to the 1991 
official census, the estimated population of Saudi Arabia is 16.9 million, 3 the vast 
majority of whom are Sunni Muslims. For administrative purposes, the country is 
divided into thirteen provinces. 4 Saudi Arabia's laws and regulations are entirely based 
on Islamic law, the Shari'a. 5 
The history of Saudi Arabia is often broken into three periods that follow the 
rise of Al Saud: the first, the second and third or modern Saudi states. 6 The modern 
Saudi state was established by King Abdulaziz Al Saud when he retook Riyadh, the 
1 Metz, (ed. ), Saudi Arabia: a Country Study, (Washington, Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress, 1993), p. 49. 
2 The Sixth five-Year Plan (1995-2000), Ministry of Planning, Archive of Ministry of Planning. 
3 The General Census of 1991, Ministry of Planning, Archive of Ministry of Planning. 
This division was reaffirmed in the Regulation of the Regional Authorities endorsed by the Royal 
Decree No. A/92 of March 1,1992 as well as by the Regulations of Provinces (as amended) endorsed by 
the Royal Decree of September 16,1993. Archives of the Council of Ministers. 
3 This was confirmed in the latest constitutional and administrative reform of Saudi Arabia in 1992, 
Article I of Chapter one, General principles, of the 1992 Basic Law of Government of Saudi Arabia, See 
Aba-Namay, "The Recent Constitutional reforms in Saudi Arabia", (1993) 42 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 295, at 303, Bulloch, The Shura Council in Saudi Arabia (London, 1993). 
For further details about Islamic law in general, see Khadduri, "Nature and Sources of Islamic Law", 
(1953) 22 The George Washington Law Review 3, Anderson, Islamic Law in the Modern World (New 
York, 1959). 
6 Al-Authaimin, The History of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, 1997) (in Arabic) p. 10. For more details see also 
Al-Authaimin, The History of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, 1995) ed. 6, vol. 1, (in Arabic) pp. 19-58. 
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capital of the Saudi state, in 1902,7 unifying the various weak and conflicting regions 
into one strong country. On September 23,1932, the various regions and parts of Saudi 
Arabia were formally unified and the foundation of the modern Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia was declared. 8 
Saudi Arabia became a member of the United Nations on June 26,1945.9 It is 
also a member of both the Arab League, created in 1944, and the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) which was established in May 1981 and is composed of six Gulf 
countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). 10 
Before the establishment of Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states, the 
concept of international boundaries as understood in international law did not yet exist. 
The inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula, who were tribal and nomadic people, used to 
move freely within an area encompassing Syria and Iraq to the north as well as the 
Arabian Peninsula itself; they never recognised political or legal boundaries' '(see map 
2). Emirs of these tribes instead regarded deserts or mountain areas as separators 
between their own and other jurisdictions. Indeed, there were no fixed, precise 
boundaries between these entities. Territorial jurisdiction depended on the loyalties of 
the Bedouin tribes to the rulers of various divisions. Strong political authority was 
lacking, continuous unrest was common, and natural resources were inadequate to 
7 Saudi Arabia observed on 5`s Shawwal 1419 AH (corresponding to 22nd January 1999 AD) the 
centenary celebrations of its existence as a state, according to the Arabic calendar, under the slogan, "100 
ears of unification and building", see Arab News, vol. XXIV, No. 58 dated 25.01.1999, p. 1. 
Royal decree No. 2716 dated 22.9.1932, Archives of Council of Ministers. The Royal Decree is also 
found in the Saudi official Gazette, Umm Al Qura, No. 406 dated 23.9.1932. 
9 The Royal Decree concerning the accession of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the International 
Organisation (the United Nations) was published in Umm Al Qura, No. 1075 of 12 October 1945. 
10 For further details about the GCC see generally Al-Garni, The Gulf Cooperation Council and the 
Challenges (Riyadh, 1997) (in Arabic). 
11 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981) p. 192. 
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sustain the unsettled population in most of the Arabia Peninsula. International 
boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula and its adjacent area, up to the nineteenth century, 
had never been heard of. 12 For four centuries, the whole area had been considered to 
form part of the Ottoman Empire. It is true that for a great part of that time the different 
provinces had been independent of the Ottoman Capital in Istanbul, but such a situation 
had, even so, never led to the establishment of boundaries in Central Arabia. 
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, in 
addition to Saudi Arabia, other states also emerged in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
adjacent area. Now, instead of one state, the Ottoman Empire, there were many states, 
but their territories and boundaries were ill-defined. The presence of the British Empire 
as a colonial power in some parts of the Peninsula and the areas adjacent to it made the 
settlement of the Saudi boundaries with its neighbours of particular importance in order 
to define each state's jurisdiction and sovereignty. 
2. Purpose of Study 
There is more than one definition of a "boundary", but all of them connote any limit line 
or object which separates one land from another. One of those definitions may be 
quoted in this context, as a pattern to clarify the point. "A "boundary" is defined as the 
imaginary line which divides two pieces of land from one another". 13 
The importance of international boundaries in modern times is derived from the 
fact that they separate one sovereignty from another or others, and, as a result, each state 
knows exactly to what extent its jurisdiction may be extended, what belongs to it and 
12 Glubb, War in the Desert (London, 1960) p. 62. 
13Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester, 1967) p. 9. 
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what belongs to others, what is the limit of each state's rights and duties and so on. 14 
Just as in domestic affairs a land in private ownership must be well defined in order to 
avoid any overlap between different lands which may lead, subsequently, to various 
kinds of disputes and controversies between the concerned owners, so must 
international boundaries be well defined in order to avoid international disputes. 
International boundary disputes are in general concerned with disputes between adjacent 
states over the line to be drawn between their areas of sovereignty. They are usually 
concerned with ambiguities inherent in the instruments creating the boundaries or 
problems in fixing the alignment on the ground. 15 Some delimited boundaries have not 
been demarcated at all, and others have been demarcated but because of poor 
maintenance the demarcation line has disappeared. 16 
The definition and settlement of international boundaries between Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbouring states and causes of their boundary disputes have been of particular 
interest to the author during his work in the Border Guard. Throughout his work, he 
experienced closely how these boundary disputes, before they were finally settled, 
constituted one of the major threats to international peace and security. Such a threat 
demonstrated clearly how important it was to settle and define international boundaries 
by peaceful means and not to leave any ground of dispute that may lead to armed 
conflict or the use of force in interstate relations. It was also found that all previous 
studies of the Saudi boundaries were carried out from purely geographical, political or 
historical viewpoints. There was a lack of legal study on the question of territorial and 
boundary disputes, as well as the methods of their settlement, in the light of the 
14 See, for example, Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867, at 883, the Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal 
case, 83 ILR 1, at 36. 
15 Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, op., cit., p. 78. 
16 Examples of both cases will be seen throughout the thesis. 
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principles of international law. Thus, he hopes by writing this thesis, which is, as far as 
he is aware, the first comprehensive legal study in this respect, to contribute to the 
literature available in this field. 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyse and assess the practice of Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbouring states with regard to the settlement of their land boundary 
disputes in the light of the principles of international law. To this end, it will first try to 
discuss the evolution of the Saudi boundaries along with the acquisition of the Saudi 
territory and to determine the basic factors responsible for the land boundary disputes 
between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states. Secondly, it will 
evaluate the peaceful methods which have been applied by Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbours in settling their boundary disputes. This study, however, does not extend to 
examine the settlement of Saudi Arabia's maritime boundaries with its neighbouring 
states. The reason for this is that the thesis focuses on international land boundaries, and 
to include maritime boundaries would broaden the subject and make it difficult to 
provide a proper discussion within the constraints of a PhD thesis. This is especially so 
as there are 10 states which share maritime boundaries with Saudi Arabia. 17 
3. Significance of the Study 
As mentioned earlier, for a long time, international boundaries as now known in 
international law did not exist in the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, even when the 
modern Saudi state was founded at the turn of the twentieth century, Western-style 
boundaries were not accepted by the people, who saw them as unsuitable for a nomadic 
people who had to move freely from place to place for grazing, hunting and other 
17 These states are: Iran, Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar. 
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sources of livelihood. In this difficult situation, Saudi Arabia succeeded in settling 
peacefully all its land boundaries with its neighbouring states before the end of the 
century. Consequently, international boundaries as understood in international law were 
established in the Arabian Peninsula to put an end to the state of warfare and unrest that 
had previously dominated the area. Now, each state has its own defined territory within 
which it exercises its authority and jurisdiction exclusive of others. The following 
paragraphs outline the significance of this study: 
(1) This study provides a contribution to international law by analysing the practice of 
Saudi Arabia and its neighbours in settling their boundary disputes and how they 
complied with, and were committed to, the general principles of international law, 
such as those governing territorial sovereignty, international boundaries and 
peaceful settlement of boundary disputes. It also contributes to Western literature 
about both the emergence and development of the Saudi territories and the evolution 
of its boundaries as a consequence. Further contribution is provided to an 
understanding of the acquisition of the territory of Saudi Arabia in the light of the 
rules and principles of international law, as well as its land boundary disputes, their 
causes and how they have been settled. 
(2) Although boundary disputes differ from each other and each case must be studied 
within its own circumstances and conditions, this study can help other researchers of 
boundary questions to understand the basic factors that are responsible for land 
boundary disputes in general and how such disputes can be settled. 
(3) Furthermore, this study will be of interest to third world countries as a source of 
information about the effective peaceful methods which are recommended to be 
applied by them in order to settle those land boundaries which have not yet been 
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defined. 18 Such recommendations are based on the analysis of the practice of Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbouring states regarding the application of the peaceful methods 
which have been applied by them for settling their land boundary disputes. 
4. Organisation of the Study 
The study is divided into three parts. Part one is concerned with the Saudi boundaries 
with its northern neighbours, namely, Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan. It is divided into two 
chapters. Chapter I examines the evolution of these boundaries and the causes of 
boundary disputes. Chapter II discusses the methods which were applied by Saudi 
Arabia and these states in order to settle their boundary disputes. Part two is designated 
to examine the Saudi boundaries with its eastern neighbours, namely, Qatar, United 
Arab Emirates and Oman. It, too, is divided into two chapters, following the same 
structure as that of part one. Part three is about the Saudi boundaries with its only 
southern neighbour, Yemen. The same structure is applied as in the previous two parts. 
At the end of this thesis, a general conclusion is drawn. In this general conclusion the 
peaceful methods applied by Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states for settling their 
land boundary disputes are assessed. In addition, the practice and attitude of Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbours as well as their contributions to international law are also 
evaluated. Some recommendations regarding effective peaceful methods of defining 
international boundary disputes and ways of maintaining such definition are suggested 
where appropriate. 
'a There are several territorial and boundary disputes in the third world such as, for example, the territorial 
dispute between Iran and UAE over three islands in the Arabian Gulf, the territorial and boundary 
disputes between Iraq and Kuwait, the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and many others. 
7 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
PART I 
NORTHERN BOUNDARIES 
Chapter I 
The Evolution of the Northern Boundaries and Boundary 
Disputes 
1. The Evolution of the Northern Boundaries 
In the north of the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Jordan were parts of the Ottoman 
Empire, which was the last Islamic Caliphate, until the First World War (1914-18). 
During the War in 1916 Britain, France and Russia signed the Sykes-Pico Agreement of 
19161 by which the region north of the Arabian Peninsula was divided between Britain 
and France, leading to the establishment of independent governments in Syria and Iraq. 2 
Moreover, the San Remo Conference of 19203 was considered to have made significant 
developments regarding the evolution of international boundaries in the area. 4 In the 
Conference, agreement was reached on the implementation of the Sykes-Pico 
Agreement and on putting the new Arab states under the mandate systems through the 
' (IOR: LP&S/18/B259), official documents reproduced in Tuson and Quick (eds. ), Arabian Treaties: 
1600-1960 (London, 1992), vol. 1, p. 195. 
2 Fulton, France and the end of the Ottoman Empire, in Kent, (ed. ), The Great Powers and the End of 
Ottoman Empire (London, 1996), 2nd ed. p. 164. 
3 In Ridwan, The International Boundary Disputes in the Arab World (Beirut, 1999) (in Arabic) pp. 21- 
23. 
Ridwan, The International Boundary Disputes in the Arab World, op., cit., p. 23. 
s The mandate system was established by the League of Nations (Article 22 of the Covenant) after the 
First World War for dealing with the colonies of the defeated states of Germany and Turkey and place 
them under mandate. These territories would be governed by the mandatories on behalf of the League. 
When the United Nations replaced the League of Nations after the Second World War, the system of 
mandate was replaced by the trusteeship system (chapter XII of the UN Charter). For further details, see 
Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship, (1948) vol. I, pp. 598-911. 
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Allied Supreme Council. Under this system, Syria and Lebanon were mandated to 
France, 6 while Britain controlled Iraq and Palestine. 7 The mandate system introduced 
the phenomenon of international boundaries, which were, in reality, zones that had 
width and length, as the boundaries of the mandatory states remained the same as those 
before the mandate until they were finally defined in due time. 8 Thus, international 
boundaries evolved among these newly emerged states as well as among the said 
foreign powers. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, the 
Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula broke away and their 
political status was settled. 9 In the Arabian Peninsula, however, four other sovereign 
rulers had emerged from the First World War in addition to King Hussain of Hijaz, 
namely, Ibn Saud, Ibn Al-Rashid of Jabal Shammer, Imam Yahya of the Yemen and 
Idrisi of Asir. 10 Five new states emerged to the north of the Peninsula, among which 
were Iraq and Jordan. ' 1 As part of the Ottoman Empire, in 1917 Iraq was conquered by 
British forces and became a British mandate in 1920. Jordan, on the other hand, 
became a British mandate when it was part of Palestine in 1920. The Council of the 
League of Nations later confirmed this status in 1924.12 With regard to Kuwait, it had 
already been under the British direct control since 1899.13 
6 France, however, first intervened in Lebanon in 1860 to protect the Christian minorities. The same area 
was given to France by the Allied in 1920, see Duncan Hall, "The International Frontier", (1948) 42 AJIL 
42, at 56. 
7 Kent, Great Britain and the end of the Ottoman Empire, in Kent, (ed. ), The Great Powers and the End of 
Ottoman Empire (London, 1996) 2"d ed. p. 187. 
8 Duncan Hall, "The International Frontier", op., cit., pp. 53-55. 
9 Mansfield, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors (New York, 1973) p. 85. 
10 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939, The Imperial Oasis (London, 1983) p. 26. 
11 Ibid 
12 For further details regarding Iraq and Transjordan see, Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States 
(London, 1948) chapter II and chapter VI. 
13 The text of the 1899 Anglo-Kuwaiti Treaty by which the latter became a British colony is found in 
(IOR: L/P&S/10/606), an official document reproduced in Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), Arabian Treaties, op., 
cit., vol. 1, p. 557. 
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After the conclusion of the First World War in 1918, the British became the 
strongest power in the area and, as a result of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, 
decided to remain in it through the medium of the mandates of Iraq, Jordan and 
Palestine. Because of the British promises of Arab independence, as well as the Arab 
revolt for independence, 14 a compromise had to be found between the British desire to 
stay and the pressure to leave. 15 These developments spelled the end of the classic age 
of imperialism, and a new age was born. As a consequence, Iraq gained its 
independence before the Second World War (1939-45) and became an independent state 
by means of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930,16 which was concluded on terms of 
complete freedom, equality and independence. 
The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 resulted in the birth of the 
decolonisation process. Indeed, the UN Charter offered a two-pronged approach to 
colonial problems, namely, the trusteeship system17 and the Declaration Regarding 
Non-Self-Governing Territories. 18 The trusteeship system offered the maximum amount 
of direct supervision of the UN through the trusteeship council. 19 The Members 
controlling territories agreed to develop self-government in order to assist in the 
progressive development of free political institutions20 and, as consequence, in 1946, 
the United Kingdom recognised the independence of Jordan. Kuwait, however, did not 
14 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939, The Imperial Oasis, op., cit., p. 24. 
1s Ibid. 
16 In Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), Arabian Treaties, op., cit., vol. 1, p. 417. 
17 This system replaced the League of Nations mandate system. 
18 In Chapters XII, XIII and XI of the UN Charter respectively. For a critical study of these systems, see 
Key, "The Politics of Decolonisation: The New Nations and the United Nations Political Process", (1967) 
21 International Organisation, 786. 
" Chapter XIII of the UN Charter. 
20 Article 74 (b) of the UN Charter. 
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gain its independence until 1961 due to the discovery of oil in the area and Britain's 
desire to control Kuwait for this reason. 21 
When the Arab Ottoman provinces in the Arabian Peninsula broke away from 
the Ottoman Empire after its collapse, their administrative boundaries formed the 
international boundaries between them. It was, however, widely accepted that these 
boundaries were zones rather than precise lines of demarcation, as neither the leaders 
nor the inhabitants, who were tribal and nomadic used to move freely from one region 
to another searching for means of living, wanted to confine themselves within precise 
defined international boundaries as understood in international law. 22 The conflict 
between these new political entities over the sovereignty of certain territories stimulated 
the intervention of the British Empire in the area to conclude treaties with them, in order 
to protect its interests in India23, as the railway which linked the Mediterranean with the 
Arab Sea and then the Ocean passed across the territories of the entities. Such interests 
would have been at risk if these political entities had been in conflict because this 
railway was very important for British trade, and any unrest in the area would put 
British interests at risk. To avoid this, the British supported these entities and helped 
them to establish and stabilise their sovereignties over their regions and, as a result, 
recognise each other's boundaries. 24 
From the above, it could be said that the evolution of international boundaries in 
the Arabian Peninsula resulted both from the intervention of the great powers in the area 
and from Arab nationalism, which stimulated the autonomy of the Arab entities in the 
21 For further details about the British colonies and the decolonisation process in the Arabian Gulf see, 
McIntyre, British Decolonization, 1946-1997 (London, 1998) chapter 5. 
22 Ridwan, The International Boundary Disputes in the Arab World, op., cit., p. 15. 23 See infra, 1& part II, chapter I. 
24 Ridwan, The International Boundary Disputes in the Arab World, op., cit., p. 15. 
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region. Indeed, instead of one Islamic state, the Ottoman Empire, there came to be 
several Arabic Islamic entities and the Islamic concept of a state was replaced by Arab 
nationalism. 25 Therefore, according to the principle of uti possidetis, the boundaries 
of the Ottoman provinces became the de facto international boundaries of these new 
entities or states. 6 It should be noted that this remains the case, under inter-temporal 
law, for historic acquisitions, although it is now displaced by the ban upon aggression 
under the 1928 Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact) 27 and article 2(4) of the UN 
Charter, as will be discussed in detail shortly. According to the principle of uti 
possidetis, the administrative divisions of the Spanish Empire in South America, which 
existed at the date when the movement for independence broke out, were deemed to 
constitute the boundaries for the newly independent successor states. 28 The concept 
of the principle appeared in two manifestations, namely, uti possidetis juris and uti 
possidetis de facto. 29 The former referred to a legal line founded upon legal title, 
which was the rule adopted by the successor states to the Spanish Empire, while the 
latter was an interpretation founded on factual possession, maintained by Brazil, which 
was the successor to the Portuguese colony on the continent. 30 The effect of the 
principle, therefore, is to transform the internal administrative boundaries of an empire, 
25 The Islamic concept of a state is based entirely on a religious criterion because Islamic Law was 
designed to govern the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims, regardless of all other criteria which 
are taken into account by the relevant principles of current international law. Islamic law, therefore, 
divides the world community into two categories, namely, one Islamic state and other non-Islamic states, 
for further details see, Joffe, Concepts of Sovereignty in the Gulf Region, in Schofield, (ed. ), Territory 
Foundation of the Gulf States (London, 1994) p. 79. For further details regarding Arab Nationalism, see 
Tibi, Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State (London, 1997) 3ed ed., chapters II and III. 
26 For further details regarding the Principle see, Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uri 
Possidetis Juris Today", (1996) 67 BYIL, 75, at 100, Kocs, "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 
1945-1987", (1995) 57 The Journal of Politics, Issue 1,159, at 195, ICJ Reports, 1986, p. 554. regarding 
the Burkina Faso-Mali frontier dispute case, The Rann of Kutch case, regarding the boundary dispute 
between India and Pakistan over what was known the Great Rann of Kutch or the Rann in 1968 (1968) 7 
ILM633, Wetter, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration", (1971) 65 AJIL 346. 
27 "The Paris General Treaty for the Renunciation of War"(Pact of Paris), United Kingdom Treaty Series, 
(1929) Cmd 3410. 
28 Cukwurah, The Settlement of Boundary Disputes in International Law (Manchester, 1967) p. 112. 
29 Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uri Possidetis Juris Today", op., cit., p. 100. 30 Ibid 
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such as a boundary between two or more colonies within an empire, into settled 
international boundaries at the time independence is achieved. Therefore, the external 
boundaries of post-colonial states would be legally settled if they were clearly defined at 
the time of independence. 31 
The question of uti possidetis was discussed by the International Court of Justice 
in the African context in the Burkina Faso-Mali frontier dispute case. 32 The parties 
submitted the case to the Court by a special agreement specifying that the settlement of 
the dispute should be based upon respect for the principle of the "intangibility of 
frontiers inherited from colonisation". 33 The Court noted that this principle had 
developed into a general concept of contemporary customary international law and was 
unaffected by the emergence of the right of people to self-determination. 34 Moreover, 
reference was made to the principle in the Asian context in the Rann of Kutch case, 35 
regarding the boundary dispute between India and Pakistan over what was known the 
Great Rann of Kutch, or the Rann, in 1968. The Tribunal had to examine the 
sovereignty of the state of Sind, the predecessor of Pakistan, and of the state of Kutch, 
the predecessor of India, over the disputed area before the independence of India and 
Pakistan in 1947, when both states were under British control. 36 It had also to examine 
the boundary at the critical date, the date of the independence of India and Pakistan, 
between their predecessors, the province of Sind and the state of Kuch. Such 
examination of both the sovereignty of the predecessor states over the disputed area and 
their boundaries emphasised the significance of both the principle of uti possidetis and 
31 Kocs, "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945-1987", (1995) 57 The Journal of Politics, Issue 1, 
159, at 195. 
32ICJReports, 1986, p. 554. 
33 Ibid., at p. 557. 
34 Ibid, at p. 565. 
35 The Rann of Kutch case, (1968) 7 ILM 633, Wetter, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration", (1971) 65 AJIL 
346. 
36 Ibid., at 665-678. 
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the principle of the stability of boundaries. It was noted by the Chairman of the Tribunal 
that it was "not open to the Tribunal to disturb a boundary settled in this manner by the 
British Administration and accepted and acted upon by it, as well as the state of Kuch, 
for nearly a quarter of a century"31. On this basis, the Tribunal decided by majority that 
Pakistan had made out a clear title to the Rann. 38 Moreover, in the Temple of Preah 
Vihear case39 concerning a boundary dispute between Cambodia, as one of the 
successors of France, Indo-China and Thailand, the International Court of Justice stated 
that sovereignty over Preah Vihear depended on a boundary treaty concluded in the 
period 1904-1908 between France and Siam, as Thailand was then called. 40 Here, the 
Court and the parties operated on the basis of the principle of uti possidetis, as it was 
accepted that the boundary between the two states was that existing at the time of the 
independence of Cambodia41, and that that boundary was based upon a series of Franco- 
Siamese treaties, as interpreted in the light of particular practice. 42 The application of uti 
possidetis, therefore, cannot be denied either within the framework of decolonisation or 
in the context of independence from already independent states, which is outside the 
traditional decolonisation process as long as the administrative boundaries had been 
well defined before the independence. Indeed, In the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, 
43 
regarding the dispute between the two countries over the sovereignty of Greater Hanish 
island in 1998, the Tribunal declared that the principle of utipossidetis could be applied 
only where a precisely defined line existed. 4 Indeed, in the absence of defined lines or 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., at 704. For the Tribunal decision concerning the precise alignment of the boundary line between 
the two states, see ibid., at 690-693. 
39 ICJReports, 1962, p. 6. 
40 Ibid., at p. 16. 
a' Thailand had always been independent. 
42 For states' practice, see Ibid., at pp. 22-5 and 28-32. The same point was made by the Arbitration 
Tribunal in the Taba case. For further details see 80 ILR 36. 
47 Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, (1999) 114 ILR 7, Antunes, "The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: First Stage- 
the Law of Title to Territory Re-averred"(1999) 48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 362. 
as Ibid, at 32 (para. 96). 
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in the presence of disputed lines the principle "ceases to be of use". 45 The Tribunal in 
the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, therefore, rejected the applicability of the principle in the 
Middle East shortly after the conclusion of First World War. 46 However, in the Qatar- 
Bahrain case47 concerning their dispute over the sovereignty of some island in the 
Arabian Gulf, Bahrain, relying on the decision of 11 July 1939 of Great Britain that the 
Hawar Islands belonged to Bahrain and not to Qatar, argued that the principle of uti 
possidetis is applicable in this case on the ground that both Qatar and Bahrain were 
former protectorates of Great Britain. 48 Qatar, however, opposed Bahrain's argument 
and maintained that the principle of uti possidetis did not apply to the present case 
because the two states were neither colonies nor protectorates of Great Britain, and 
therefore, there was not any State succession, and consequently there was no "colonial 
heritage" any more than there was a "clean slate". 49 Although the Court declined to rule 
on the applicability of the principle of uti possidetis, 50 it awarded sovereignty of Hawar 
islands to Bahrain on the ground that the 1939 British decision was not an arbitration 
that attained a resjudicata character, but a valid political decision that binds the parties. 
Judge Al-Khasawneh in his separate opinion, although agreed with the majority view, 
supported the Tribunal's view in the Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration regarding the 
inapplicability of the principle of uti possidetis in the Middle East. 51 
It can be deduced from the above discussion that the principle of uti possidetis 
could not be applied in the case of Saudi Arabia and its neighbours because of the 
45 Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today", op., cit., p. 153. 
46 Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration, (1999) 114 ILR 7 at 33-4 (phase one, para. 99). 
47ICJReports, 2001. 
48 Ibid., para. 103. 
491bid., para. 105. 
so Ibid, para. 148. 
51 Ibid, separate opinion of Judge A1-Khasawneh in Qatar-Bahrain case, para. 9. 
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absence of any defined boundaries at the time when the Ottoman Empire collapsed 
following the First World War. 
Let us now turn to examine the evolution of the northern Saudi boundaries with 
Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait. Generally speaking, the evolution of the international 
boundaries of Saudi Arabia paralleled the gradual acquisition of the state territory, or 
rather, the acquisition of the territory of the Ottoman provinces, and developed in a 
series of stages over time as the state's territory developed. The northern Saudi 
boundaries evolved as a result of the acquisition of the territory of Jabal Shammer, 
Wadi Sirhan, Jauf and the frontier near Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait in 1921.52 It should be 
noted that not all portions of the Saudi-Jordan boundaries evolved at this stage. Indeed, 
the utmost northwestern part, which was called the Hijaz-Jordan boundary, 53 did not 
evolve until four years later, when Hijaz was conquered. 54 As a result of the evolution 
of the northern Saudi boundaries, the Saudi state was brought into direct confrontation 
with its new neighbours, the Ashraf-ruled states of Iraq and Jordan and their British 
allies in Kuwait. This confrontation, as will be seen shortly, gave rise to boundary 
disputes between Saudi Arabia and these states, as evidence shows that most of the 
borderland territory between them was acquired by the Saudi state by way of 
conquest. 55 The losing states claimed the acquired territories on the ground that they 
were under their control before the acquisition, while Saudi Arabia claimed that it had 
acquired what had been part of the first and second Saudi states. 56 However, the 
52 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 37. 
53 See infra 4, (the Saudi-Jordan boundary dispute). 
54 Abu-Dawood, and Karan, International Boundaries of Saudi Arabia (New Delhi, 1990) p. 34. 
55 Ibid. For further details, see, Glubb, War in the Desert (London, 1960) pp. 52-55, Troeller, The Birth of 
Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud (London, 1976) pp. 13-19, Helms, The Cohesion 
of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., pp. 102-8. 
56 A memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 13 June 1920, an official document 
reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957 (London, 
1988) vol. 9, p. 46. 
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question is whether international law recognizes a title asserted by conquest. Since both 
the Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy 
(Pact of Paris) of 192857 and UN Charter have prohibited the use of inter-state force, 
acquisition of territory by force alone is no longer valid. Article 2(4) of the Charter 
provides: 
"All Members shall refrain in their relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purpose of the United 
Nations. " , 58 
In addition, the Security Council's Resolution 242 emphasized the "inadmissibility of 
the acquisition of territory by war", and in 1970 the UN General Assembly adopted the 
Declaration on Principle of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation among states, which provides that: 
"The territory of a state shall not be subject of acquisition by another 
state resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial acquisition 
resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as 
legal. "59 
However, although conquest is no longer legal today, 60 it was historically, as 
already mentioned, important and certainly operative in the nineteenth and early 
57 United Kingdom Treaty Series, (1929) Cmd 3410. Article 1 of the Pact contained a declaration by the 
parties that they condemned "recourse to war of the solution of international controversies", and 
renounced war "as an instrument of national policy". 
58There are, however, some exceptions to the prohibitions of the use of force, namely, the use of force in 
individual and collective self-defence in enforcement action taken by the Security and in enforcement 
action taken by regional organizations under the Security Council's authority. The most important point 
regarding these exceptions or the legal use of force is that their aims are to maintain and restore 
international peace and security. These aims stand in contrast to the acquisition of another state's territory 
by force. With regard the aforementioned exceptions see, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
5 General Assembly Resolution 2625 dated 1970, see Djonovich, (ed. ), United Nations Resolutions, (vol. 
XIII 1970-1971) (New York, 1976) p. 337. 
60 When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and the Iraqi regime announced that Kuwait had been annexed to 
Iraq on the ground of historical right, almost all the world community rejected that view. The Security 
Council adopted Resolution 662 deciding that the declared Iraqi annexation of Kuwait "under any form 
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twentieth centuries as a method of acquiring territory. Indeed, under traditional 
international law, as reflected in the practice of states in the pre-1914 period, the 
acquisition of territory by conquest was regarded as valid to give title as long as it was 
followed by complete subjugation and the intention and ability to hold the territory as 
its sovereign. 61 At that time, war was not outlawed and so territory could legitimately 
have been acquired by force. This is expressed by Andrews who states that this can be 
demonstrated by the historical fact that, at some stage, virtually every corner of the 
world has been annexed or subjugated by another state. 62 Indeed, it was by right of 
conquest that the European powers acquired the greater part of the continent of America 
from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. 63 Likewise, the great European powers 
engaged in colonial expansion in Asia acquired by right of conquest vast stretches of 
territory occupied by people who were not regarded as full members of the civilized 
society of states. 64 Shaw suggests that such states, or certain non-state entities, were 
considered capable in international law of holding title to territory and transferring it to 
other parties. Therefore, their territories were not treated as terra nullius, acquirable by 
occupation, but as territories the sovereignty of which could be acquired only by cession 
or conquest, in virtue of the presence of pre-existing territorial sovereignty implicitly 
recognised as such by Europeans. 65 
and whatever pretext has no legal validity and is considered null and void'. States and international 
organisations were called upon not to recognize the annexation and to refrain from taking any action that 
might be interpreted as indirect recognition. For further details, see McCoubrey and White, International 
Law and Armed Conflict (Aldershot, 1992) chapter 9. In addition, numerous states and regional 
organisations issued statements calling for the restoration of the territorial integrity of Kuwait, see (1990) 
44 YBUN, UN Publications, pp. 190-97, see also Umm al Qura, No. 3319 dated 18 August 1990 if. 
61 Korman, The Right of Conquest (Oxford, 1996) pp. 7-8 and pp. 94-98.. 62 Andrews, The Concept of statehood and the acquisition of territory in the nineteenth century, (July 
1978) 94 The Law Quarterly Review 408, at 409. 
63 Ibid., p. 410. 
64 Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law (London, 1926) 
p. 28. 
or., cit., p. 28. 
6 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa (Oxford, 1986) pp. 44-45. 
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It should be noted here that according to the doctrine of inter-temporal law, 66 the 
act of conquest, or any other act, must be assessed against the law of the time when it 
was performed, and not against "the law in force at the time when the dispute in regard 
to it arises or falls to be settled". 67 Thus, in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland case, 
68 the Permanent Court of International Justice, when examining the sovereignty of the 
Greenland, took into consideration the differing standard of international law in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. 69 Therefore, the acquisition of territory by conquest 
in the pre-1914 period should be assessed against the law applied at that time, when war 
was legitimate and conquest could give legal title as long as it was followed by 
complete subjugation and the intention and ability to hold the territory as its sovereign. 
The acquisition of the territory of Saudi Arabia was strongly supported by 
several factors. First, the Saudis believed that they had a historic right to the territory 
which was under the control of the first and the second Saudi states. Secondly, the 
inhabitants of the region, who had endured Bedouin and Ottomans raids, saw a good 
chance to put an end to foreign occupation, which was represented by the Ottoman 
Empire. So, such inhabitants submitted to the Saudi rulers and showed their allegiance 
to them. 70 Thirdly, the Ottomans were weak, not only in this area, but also almost 
everywhere else and, as a result, the region might have been taken from them by the 
British who were in Bahrain, Qatar, the Trucial States (now UAE) and Oman, which 
shared boundaries with the Saudi state. Finally, as long as all the above areas were part 
of the Arabian Peninsula, any political developments in any one of them would 
66 For historical background of the emergence of the doctrine see, Elias, The International Court of 
Justice and some Contemporary Problems (London, 1983) chapter 6. See also, Waldock, "Disputed 
Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies", (1948) 25 BYIL 311, at 320-1. 
67 Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867, at 883. 
68 Eastern Greenland Case, PICJ Reports, (1933) series AB, No 53, p. 151. 
69 PICJReports, (1933) series AB, No 53, at 154-5. 
70 Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom (London, 1969) pp. 24-27. 
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certainly affect the others. Thus, the presence of the British in the area would threaten 
the Saudi aims, which were based on Islamic revival and national unification. 7' 
Furthermore, the conquest was followed by effective control of the territory by 
the Saudi state, as well as peaceful display of the state's authority. Support for this 
assertion is found in the radical change which King Abdulaziz brought about in the 
basis of economic and social life in his environment, in a manner which had no 
precedent in his country. He considered that the inhabitants should enter the stage of 
agriculture and settlement instead of roving around in search of pasture and water and 
that they should have a permanent means of livelihood instead of depending on 
marauding. The successful implementation of his social and economic programme 
helped him later to liberate and unify the provinces of Arabia and to establish the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as an independent state with an area of over 1.8 million 
square kilometres. 72 
Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Case confirmed that: "a continuous and 
peaceful display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title". 73 He also emphasized that 
possession must be maintained by a display of state authority. 74 In the Clipperton 
Island75 dispute between France and Mexico over an uninhabited island, the arbitrator 
71 The Saudi state was first founded in 1744 when Sheik Mohammad ibn Abdul Wahaab, the founder of 
the religious reform movement, the Wahaabi movement, who came from Al-Uyaynah in central Najd, 
entered into an alliance with Emir Muhammad ibn Sa'ud, the ruler of Diriyah in central Najd and the 
leader of what may be called the political reform movement. According to the religious movement's 
principles, the faith of Islam had to be returned to the purity of its original form as stated by the Prophet 
Muhammad and practised by his companions and followers. Both movements worked side by side to 
change the prevailing religious and political situations and to establish, as a consequence, a new strong 
government to work together to alter the situation by, on the one hand, restoring the real spirit of Islamic 
faith, and on the other, establishing a modern Islamic country able to restore peace and security in the 
region. For further details, see Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia (London, 1981) p. 77, Rentz, 
Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia, in Hopwood, (ed. ), The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politic, (London, 
1972) p. 56, Metz, Saudi Arabia: a Country Study (Washington, 1993) p. 14. 
72 Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom, op., cit., p. 28. 
73 Island ofPalmas Case, op. cit. at 876. 
74Ibid., pp. 908-11. 75 Clipperton Island Case, (1932) 62 AJIL 390. 
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emphasized that "the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary 
condition of occupation". 76 The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland 77 held that Denmark regarded itself as possessing 
sovereignty over all Greenland and displayed and exercised its sovereignty rights to an 
extent sufficient to constitute a valid title to sovereignty. 78 Therefore, the Danish claim 
to sovereignty was based upon peaceful and continued display of the state authority and 
the court awarded sovereignty to Denmark on this basis. 79 The Permanent Court of 
International Justice, by that decision, established two main elements for the occupation 
to be effective: 
(1) The intention or will to act as sovereign; 
(2) Some actual exercise or display of authority. 80 
The doctrine of effectiveness81 has displaced the earlier doctrines of discovery 
and symbolic annexation as in themselves sufficient to generate title. 82 However, in the 
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the Court, by establishing the aforementioned 
elements, affirmed that occupation must be effective in order to create a title. In other 
words, occupation is not sufficient by itself to create a title; it must be followed up by 
building settlements on the territory, accompanied by some formal act which announces 
that the territory has been taken possession of, and that the possessor intends to exercise 
its sovereignty over it. 83 In the Minquiers and Ecrehos case84 regarding the dispute 
76Ibid, p. 393. 
77 Eastern Greenland Case, P1CJReports, (1933), series AB, No 53,151. 
78 Ibid., at 185. 
79 Ibid. 
S0 Ibid,. at 171. 
$` "Island of Palmas Case", op., cit., at 875-6. 
82 For more details about the doctrine see in general, Heydte, Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and 
Virtual Effectiveness in International Law, (1935) 29 AJIL No. 3,448. 
B3 Oppenheim, International Law (London, 1958) vol. 1, Si" ed., pp. 55-6. 
841CJReports, (1953) p. 47; 20 ILR 94. 
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between United Kingdom and France over the sovereignty of a group of islets and rocks 
in the English Channel, although the International Court of Justice examined the history 
of the region since 106685, its decision was based primarily on relatively recent acts 
relating to the exercise of jurisdiction and local administration as well as the nature of 
legislative laws regarding the disputed territory. On these grounds, the sovereign acts of 
the United Kingdom in respect of the islets outweighed any such activities by the 
French authority and therefore, British sovereignty was upheld and the claims of France 
were dismissed. With regard to this point, Jennings argues that the main problem is the 
definition both of the degree and kind of possession effective to create a title, and of the 
area of territory to which such possession must be said from time to time to apply. 86 
Nonetheless, effective control varies with regard to the circumstances of the case, such 
as the geographical nature of the region87 and whether or not competing claims exist. 88 
Support for this is found in the Island of Palmas case, where Judge Huber stated that 
effective control "cannot be exercised at every moment on every point of the territory. " 
89 In the case of Saudi Arabia, the effective control exercised by the Saudi state varied 
from one place to another, according to the importance of the place and whether it was 
close to or away from the core of the state. An example of such control is the social and 
economic programme mentioned earlier, which aimed to settle nomadic peoples in 
permanent houses and to teach them how to cultivate the land, instead of making a 
living by grazing camels and sheep and enduring an unsettled life in a desert country. 
Furthermore, the programme meant to replace the Bedouin's individualism with a 
" The date of the conquest of England by William, Duke of Normandy when England became united 
with the Duchy of Normandy, including the Channel Islands. 
86 Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (Manchester, 1963) p. 20. 
87 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at 877. 
88 Eastern Greenland Case, PICJReports, (1933) 151. 
89 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at 877. 
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recognition of the state and its requirements. 90 Each settlement was built near a water 
source to serve farming purposes as well as daily needs. The settlers were provided with 
assistance to build a mosque and to construct houses instead of living in tents made of 
goat's hair. To each settlement, a man of religion was assigned to act as teacher, whose 
function was not only to teach the settlers the commandments of the Muslim law, but 
also to exhort them to cultivate the land, to adhere to the morals of Islam, to respect 
human life and property and to give up raiding and robbery as a means of living. 91 The 
effective control of the Saudi state over its territory is also demonstrated by the 
regulations and rules set up by the Saudi government at every stage of the unification of 
the Saudi territory. During 1927, for example, King Abdulaziz issued a series of 
regulations by which several reforms and public administrations were established in 
order to provide public services to the Saudi population. 92 In addition, in 1928, a royal 
decree was issued to establish a legislative assembly. 93 In 1932 another regulation 
provided for the establishment of a Council of Ministers to be generally responsible to 
the king for the administration of the state as a whole with individual ministers 
responsible for the administration of separate ministries. 94 
It could be said from the above discussion of the effective control exercised by 
Saudi Arabia that it had the will and intention to exercise sovereignty over its territory, 
as it acted as sovereign and displayed actually the state's authority. The aforementioned 
legislative and administrative reforms set up by the Saudi government were among the 
90 Ibid., p. 29. 
91 Ibid., pp. 29-31. 
92 Such reforms and administrations as the Education, the Health, the Commission of enjoining goods and 
forbidding evil, the Shari'a Courts and many others, see Umm Al Qura, No. 108 dated 7.1.1927, No. 113 
dated 11.2.1927, No. 140 dated 19.8.1927. 
93Umm Al Qura, No. 208 dated 18.12.1928. 
94 Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: its People, its Society, its Culture (New Haven, 1959) pp. 112-115. 
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most obvious forms of the exercise of the state sovereignty over its territory. 95 Both the 
effective control exercised by Saudi Arabia over its territory and the peaceful display of 
the state's authority were sufficient to create a title. 
Saudi Arabia was recognised by both the Ottoman and the British Empires in 
1914 and 1915 respectively. On May 15,1914 the Ottoman government signed a treaty 
with the Saudis, 96 to regularise their reciprocal relations in Al-Hassa region. The treaty 
recognised Abdulaziz as the ruler of Najd97 and Al-Hassa (now the eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia). 98 It also imposed other terms on him, especially in foreign relations and 
financial matters99 in order not to allow Abdulaziz to contact their rival in the area, the 
British Empire. However, the advantage of this treaty was the Ottomans' recognition of 
the third Saudi state. On December 26,1915, the first treaty between the British 
government and the Saudi state was signed. 100 This Treaty recognised the territorial 
sovereignty of Abdulaziz and the independence of the Saudi state, 101and was very 
important to the Saudi state, as it was the first international treaty affirming Abdulaziz's 
international status. As far as international law is concerned, recognition is very 
important for a new state to become an international person. 102 However, there are two 
theories as to the nature of recognition, namely, the constitutive and the declaratory 
theories. 103 According to the former theory, it is the act of recognition of other states 
which creates a new state and endows it with legal personality. '04 The latter theory 
95 Eastern Greenland Case, PICJ Reports, (1933) 151, at 173. 
96 (IOR: L /P&S/10/385), in Tuson & Quick, Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 19-23. 
97 Najd or Central Arabia is the region where the Saudi state was first founded when King Abdulaziz 
captured Riyadh, the capital of the Saudi state in 1902. The Saudi state was known as Najd when Hijaz 
was out of the state, and Abdulaziz was known as Sultan Najd. 
98 Article 1 of the 1914 Ottoman-Saudi Treaty. 
99 Article 9 of the 1914 Ottoman-Saudi Treaty. 
100 (IOR: L/P&S/10/387), in Tuson & Quick, Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 29-40. 
101 Article 1 of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty. 
102 Oppenheim, International Law (1958) op., cit., pp. 125-6. 
103 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford, 1990) 40' ed. pp. 88-9. 
1°4 O'Connell, International Law, (1970) 2"d ed., vol. 1, p. 129. 
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maintains that a new state acquires capacity in international law, not by virtue of the 
consent of other states but by the fact of its existence and its own efforts and 
circumstances. 105 Saudi Arabia, however, was granted de jure recognition by its 
predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, and Britain, the most powerful country in the region. 
Such recognition of the Saudi state by the British and the Ottoman Empires was very 
important as evidence of effective control of the Saudi state over its territory. It is an 
affirmation of the existence of a specific factual state of affairs. 106 Not only did this 
international recognition involve a means of creating rules of international law in terms 
of practice and consent of the two Empires, but it also validated the acquisition of the 
territory by the Saudi state. It can clearly be seen that the acquisition of the Saudi 
territory, therefore, rests upon the interplay of effectiveness, sovereignty and 
recognition. 
From the internal perspective, King Abdulaziz was strongly supported by the 
inhabitants, who welcomed his rule after their sore experiences with other rulers who 
had set up regimes of violence and repression. 107 The role of the tribe was very 
important with regard to acquisition of territory in the Arabian Peninsula because a ruler 
claimed the right of a tribe's territory if the tribe had pledged its allegiance to him. 
Therefore, relying on both the inhabitants' allegiance and loyalty and the Saudi military 
capacity, in June 1924, Abdulaziz held a conference of tribal and military leaders in 
Riyadh. The conference agreed on a military advance to Jordan, Iraq and Hijaz. 108 
Attacking Hijaz was allowed by Islamic law because of Al-Ashrafs refusal to allow 
105 Ibid., p. 129. 
106 See the Eastern Greenland Case, PICJReports, (1933), at 46,51-52. 
107 Apart from Abdulaziz's two rivals, namely, Ibn Al-Rashid of Hail and King Hussain of Mecca, the 
local Emirs and Sheikhs, as well as the inhabitants of most of the of cities and villages of the region 
welcomed Abdulaziz's rule and submitted to him without resistance. For further details, see Assah, 
Miracle of the Desert Kingdom, op., cit., pp. 20-27&pp. 47-55. 
108 Rihani, Modern Najd and its dependencies (Beirut, 1954) 2nd ed. pp. 365-7. 
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Muslims from Najd to perform pilgrimage, 109 one of the pillars of Islam. After taking 
Hijaz, one of Abdulaziz's first duties was to ensure the safety of the pilgrimage and to 
show that the pilgrims would fare better under his jurisdiction than they had under that 
of the Ashraf. 110 By doing so, the Sauds began to fulfil the promises they had made 
when they first started to unify the country. The Sauds devoted and committed 
themselves to alter the unacceptable situation, from which the Arabian Peninsula as a 
whole and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina and other shrines and sacred places in 
particular had suffered for a long time. ill 
In 1925, Abdulaziz sent a circular note to the Governments of Egypt, Iraq, 
Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan in which he declared: 
"I do not desire to make myself master of Hijaz or to take dominion 
over it. The Hijaz is a trust placed in my hands until the moment 
when the Hijazis shall elect a ruler from among themselves- a ruler 
who shall regard himself as a servant of the Islamic world and shall 
work under the control of the Moslem (Muslim) peoples. "' 12 
Acting on this suggestion, a council of Meccan notables offered the title of King of Hijaz 
to the Sultan of Najd, provided that he ruled in accordance with the Quran and the 
Sunna of the Prophet. Thus, on January 8th, 1926, Abdulaziz became King of Hijaz, 
Sultan of Najd and its dependencies. ' 13 Three months later, he received de jure 
recognition as King of Hijaz from the governments of the United Kingdom, France, the 
USSR and the Netherlands. '14 In April 1926, King Abdulaziz issued invitations to a 
Muslim conference in Mecca. The conference, which opened on June 7t1i, 1926, and was 
'09 Abdulaziz, King Abdulaziz and the Kuwait Conference: 1923-1924 (London, 1993) p107. 
110 See Umm Al Qura, No. 7, dated 23.1.1924 under the title, Security in Hijaz: Past, Present and Future. 
111 Abdulaziz, King Abdulaziz and the Kuwait Conference: 1923-1924, op., cit., pp. 108-109. 
112 Seton-Williams, Britain and the Arab States, op., cit., p. 187. 
113 Umm Al Qura, No. 55, dated 15.1.1926. 
114 Umm Al Qura, No. 111 dated 28.1.1927. 
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attended by sixty delegates, was a sign that King Abdulaziz's fait accompli was 
gradually coming to be recognised by other Islamic Powers. ' 15 
Furthermore, in 1927, Great Britain signed the Treaty of Jeddah with King 
Abdulaziz. 116 This Treaty was very important for the Saudi states in several respects. 
First, under Article 1 of this Treaty, "His Britannic Majesty recognises the full and 
absolute independence of the Kingdom of His Majesty the King of Hijaz and Najd and 
its Dependencies". Secondly, as King Abdulaziz acquired the territories mentioned in 
Article I by conquest, it could be said that the Article recognised the territories that 
Abdulaziz had acquired by way of conquest so far. Finally, King Abdulaziz was able to 
free himself and his country from the limitations imposed by the treaty concluded by 
him with Britain in 1915, mentioned earlier. According to Article 9 of the Treaty of 
Jeddah, "the treaty concluded between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King 
of the Hijaz and of Najd and its Dependencies on the 26th December, 1915, shall cease to 
have effect as from the date on which the present treaty is ratified. " This recognition of 
the unrestricted sovereignty of the remaining parts of the mother country, along with 
termination of the old treaty of protection, were great achievements of the Saudi state. 117 
On September 22,1932, King Abdulaziz issued a royal decree No. 2716 dated 
22.9.1932 unifying all the provinces of the state established by King Abdulaziz "in 
115 For more details about the Conference see Umm Al Qura, No. 75, dated 11.6.1926. pp. 1-4. 
116 The Text of the Treaty of Jeddah and the letters of ratification exchanged are found in Umm Al Qura 
No. 145 dated 23.9.1927, pp. 1-3, see also Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, 
No. 10. 
'" This Treaty was renewed twice: the first time was on 3 October 1936 for seven years and some of its 
Articles were amended in the favour of the Saudi state, the second time was on 3 October 1943 without 
any amendment. This time the two parties agreed on the automatic prolongation of the Treaty every seven 
years unless either party expressed his desire for the termination or the amendment of the treaty on six 
months notice, see (PRO: FO 371/20059)&(PRO: FO 371/35160), in Tuson & Quick, Arabian Treaties 
op., cit., vol. 4, p. 389 & p. 529 respectively. See also Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Riyadh, vol. I, No. 43&57 respectively. 
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compliance with the wish of the general public' 18 and for the desirable purpose of 
unifying the parts of this Arab Kingdom". 119 The name of the Kingdom of Hijaz and its 
Dependencies was changed to that of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Thus, Saudi Arabia 
was the first Arab State to achieve political independence. 120 As a result of the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its government succeeded the Ottoman 
government in the regions which were under the normal suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Empire, such as Al-Hassa and Hijaz and the area surrounding them. 
State Succession in international law means "the replacement of one state by 
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory. " 121 This 
replacement in responsibility for international relations is connected with the special 
position of newly independent states and means replacement in the sovereignty over a 
given territory. 122 Therefore, Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states could only 
acquire from their predecessors as much territory as the latter possessed and could 
establish themselves only within the boundaries of the former sovereign. 123 This is the 
principle of continuity of state boundaries. 
The basic idea was expressed in the Island of Palmas case, 124 when Judge Huber 
had to decide whether Spain (the predecessor state) had sovereignty over Palmas at the 
time of the coming into force the Treaty of Paris of 1898 by which Palmas was ceded to 
118 The wishes and desires of the general public were expressed in many letters and cables sent to king 
Abdulaziz by local tribes' sheiks and emirs, in which they asked the King to change the name of the 
Saudi state to the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia". For more details about these letters and cables see Umm Al 
Qura, No, 404,405,406 and 407 dated 9.9.1932,16.9.1932,23.9.1932 and 30.9.1932 respectively. 
119 Umm Al Qura, No. 406, dated 23.9.1932. 
120 Assah, Miracle of the Desert Kingdom, op., cit., p. 34. 
121 Article 2(1/b) of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 
122 Tyranowski, "Boundaries and Boundary Treaties in the Law of State Succession", in Thesaurus 
Acroasium of the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki, 
National and International Boundaries, (Thessaloniki, 1985) 459, at 466. 
123 O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law (Cambridge, 1967) vol.!!, 
p. 273. 
124 Island ofPalmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867. 
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US (the successor state). 125 In this case, however, it was decide that Netherlands, not 
Spain had sovereignty over Palmas before the ceding date and therefore, title was given 
to the Netherlands. 126 As a result, the USA could not acquire title to Palmas, and could 
instead only establish itself within the boundaries of Spain, its predecessor state. Thus, 
when new states emerge they always conserve some elements of their predecessors, and 
therefore, there is a certain de facto continuity because two of the four elements of 
statehood, namely, population and territory remain when new states emerge. 127 
Moreover, in the context of Europe, the Final Act of the Conference on the 
Security and Cooperation in Europe of August 1975128 introduced two principles, 
namely, the inviolability of frontiers129 and the territorial integrity of states. 130 
According to the principle of the inviolability of frontiers, boundaries between states 
cannot be changed by means of threat or use of force. 131 These two principles seem to 
reaffirm the principle of continuity of state boundaries which already exist in 
international law as will be seen in the next paragraphs. Once international boundaries 
are created in accordance of international law, they are protected and assume finality 
and permanence. The only authorised territorial changes are those that take place 
peacefully through mutual consent of the states concerned. 132 In the context of 
succession of states, the principles of inviolability of boundaries and territorial integrity 
of states mean the continuity of state boundaries regardless of all changes of 
'25 Ibid., at 880. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Mullerson, "The Continuity and Succession of States, By Reference to the Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia", (1993) 42 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 473, at 475. 
128 "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act" (1975) 14 ILM 1292. 
129 Principle III, ibid., p. 1294. 
130 Principle IV, ibid. 
131 Piotrowicz, "The Relationship Between The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe-the Helsinki Final Act- and the Order-Neisse Line Legal Regime", in Thesaurus Acroasium of 
the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki, National and 
International Boundaries, (Thessaloniki, 1985) 896, at 903. 
132 Tyranowski, "Boundaries and Boundary Treaties in the Law of State Succession", op., cit., pp. 468-9. 
29 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
sovereignty. 133 However, any territorial changes are effected in conformity with the 
rules of general international law. 134 Indeed, what is established on the basis of the 
consent of states concerned can only be modified by the exercise of such consent. As 
the international Court of Justice declared in the Temple of Preah Vihear case, 
"When two countries establish a frontier between them, one of the 
primary objects is to achieve stability and finality. This is impossible 
if the line so established can, at any moment, and on the basis of 
continuously available process, be called in question, and its 
rectification claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a 
clause in the parent treaty is discovered. Such process could continue 
indefinitely, and finality would never be reached as long as possible 
errors still remained to be discovered. Such a frontier, so far from 
being stable, would be completely precarious". 135 
As far as the devolution of treaty rights and obligations from a predecessor state 
to a successor state is concerned, it may be automatic or at the option of the new states, 
as the case may be. On a considerable number of occasions the devolution of treaty 
rights and obligations has been the subject of agreements between the predecessor and 
the successor states. 136 However, Article 8 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the 
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties137 provides that such agreements cannot, of 
themselves, become the obligations of the successor state towards other states, while 
Article 9, regarding unilateral declarations, emphasises that such a declaration by the 
133 
Ibid. 134 Ibid., p. 469. 
135ICJReports, 1962, at p. 34. 
136 For further details, see generally, O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International 
Law, op., cit., pp. 352-73. 
137 This Treaty entered into force on 6 November 1996. 
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successor state alone cannot, of itself, affect the rights and obligations of the successor 
state and third state. 138 
Dealing with the "moving treaty-frontier rule", 139 Article 15 of the Vienna 
Convention provides that where an existing state acquires territory which is not itself a 
state, the treaties of the predecessor state cease to be applicable with regard to the 
acquired territory, while the treaties of the successor state extend to the acquired 
territory. This Article seems to reaffirm the practice of states in this regard. For 
example, when the US annexed Hawaii in 1898, its treaties were extended to the islands 
and Belgium was informed that US-Belgium commercial agreements were thenceforth 
to be applied to Hawaii also. 140 Similarly, after the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France 
in 1919, a Belgian court held in 1925 that after 1919 German treaties would not apply to 
Alsace-Lorraine, while French treaties would thereafter be extended to that territory. 141 
These rules were applicable to the territory acquired by Saudi Arabia because such 
territory was not a state by itself. This means that the treaties of the predecessor state, 
the Ottoman Empire would cease to be applicable to the territory acquired by Saudi 
Arabia, and the treaties of Saudi Arabia, the successor state, were to be extended to the 
acquired territory. 
Saudi Arabia, as a newly independent state, 142 was deemed to benefit from the 
"clean slate" rule underlined by Article 16 of the 1978 Convention. This rule provides 
138 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Parliamentary Papers, 
1979-80, Cmnd 7760. 
139 This basic principle has been applied to cases of cession according to which, when territory undergoes 
a change of sovereignty, it passes automatically out of the treaty regime of the predecessor sovereign into 
the treaty regime of the successor sovereign. See Tyranowski, "Boundaries and Boundary Treaties in the 
Law of State Succession", op., cit., pp. 502- 6. 
140 O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal Law and International Law, op., cit., pp. 377-78. 
141Ibid., p. 379. 
142 Article 2(1/f) of the 1978 Vienna Convention defined the new independent state as a successor state, 
which was a former dependent territory, i. e. a colony. 
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that a successor state "is not bound to maintain in force, or to become part to, any treaty 
by reason only that, at the date of the succession of states, the treaty was in force in 
respect of the territory to which the succession of states relates". Therefore, Saudi 
Arabia was a "clean slate" at the time when it succeeded the Ottoman Empire, and, 
therefore, was not bound by any treaty in force at the time of succession. 143 
The "clean slate" rule does not apply to boundary treaties, however, as they are 
among those treaties which are not affected by the succession of states and which thus 
bind the successor state automatically. This is expressed in Article 11 of the 1978 
Vienna Convention, which declares that a boundary established by a treaty and 
obligations and rights established by a treaty and relating to the regime of a boundary, 
are unaffected by the succession. This Article applies only to boundaries established by 
treaties, so boundaries established by other means, such as, for example, by recognition 
or acquiescence are not covered. 144 Article 12, however, provides that a succession of 
states does not, as such, affect rights and obligations relating to the territory established 
by treaty with regard to other states. Examples of such rights and obligations might 
include port facilities, rights of transit and others. Saudi Arabia, therefore, was bound by 
the boundary treaties concluded between its predecessor and other states, such as the 
1913-14 Anglo-Ottoman Conventions which will be discussed in detail in the next 
sections of this chapter and second chapter. These Conventions defined the Saudi 
boundaries with Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and South Yemen. These boundaries were 
not affected by state succession, and, therefore, were binding on Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbouring states as the successors of both the British and the Ottoman Empires. The 
143 Mullerson, "The Continuity and Succession of States, By Reference to the Former USSR and 
Yugoslavia", op., cit., p. 474. 
144 Shaw, "The Heritage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today", op., cit., at 91. 
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validity of these Conventions, however, might have been affected by other reasons such 
as ratification, for example, as will be seen shortly, but not by state succession itself. 
This exception to the "clean slate" rule was accepted by the International Court 
of Justice in both the Tunisia/ Libya case145 concerning the continental shelf and the 
Burkina Faso/Mali frontier dispute case. 146 In the former case, the International Court 
of Justice stated that "this rule of continuity ipso jure of the boundary and territorial 
treaties was later embodied in the of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of 
States in Respect of Treaties". 147 The Arbitration Commission established by the 
International Conference on Yugoslavia148 stated that all external frontiers must be 
respected in line with the principle laid down in the UN Charter, in General Assembly 
Resolution 2625(XXV) and in the Helsinki Final Act. 149 It also noted that this principle 
underlies Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention. 150 Practice relating to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union confirms the obligatory nature of this rule. Indeed, 
following the dissolution of the Union, although Estonia, while defining its maritime 
boundary with Finland, held the position that it was not a successor of the former Soviet 
Union, both states accepted that the provisions of the old Finland-Soviet Union treaties 
in this issue would be applied. 151 Similarly, the Estonia-Latvia- Sweden maritime 
145 ICJ Reports, 1982, at 18. 
toe ICJReports, 1986, at 554. 
147 ICJ Reports, 1982, at 66. 
148 The Conference was convened by the European Community and its Member states within the 
framework of European Political Cooperation in a Declaration of August 1991. The Conference was to 
bring together the Yugoslav Federal Presidency and Federal Government, the Presidents of the six 
Yugoslav Republics and representatives of the European Community and its member states. For further 
details on the Arbitration Commission, see "The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on 
Yugoslavia", (1993) 92 ILR, 162, see generally on the Arbitration Commission, Craven, "The European 
Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia", (1995) 66 BY1L 333. 
149 See Opinion No. 3 of "The Arbitration Commission of the European Conference on Yugoslavia", 
(1993) 92 ILR 162, at 170-1. 
150 Ibid 
151 Franckx, "The 1998 Estonia-Sweden Maritime Boundary Agreement: Lessons to be Learnt in the Area 
of Continuity and/or Succession of States", (2000) 31 Ocean Development and International Law, No. 3, 
269, at 271-2. 
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boundary agreements confirmed that the maritime boundary established by the old 
Soviet Union constituted a de jure boundary. 152 The 1998 Estonia-Sweden Agreement 
delimiting their boundaries was a copy of the old boundary agreement between Sweden 
and the Soviet Union, with some slight changes. 153 
State practice before the 1978 Vienna Convention had always shown support for 
the idea of the sanctity of boundaries, which was repeated by the Convention. For 
example, when Texas became independent in 1840, its boundary with the United States 
was recognised to be that established in a treaty of 1828 between the United States and 
Mexico. Similarly, when Prussia annexed Hanover in 1866, it accepted the latter's 
boundary with Netherlands, which had been defined by treaty. '54 State practice in this 
field is furnished by the territorial inheritance of the new states which gradually 
emerged in Africa and Asia. The United Kingdom, for example, in her devolution 
agreements with the new states of Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Uganda, consistently recognised that, in matters concerning "obligations and 
responsibilities", "reciprocal rights and benefits", only applicable treaties could devolve 
upon the new states. '55 Although the original alignments of the respective state 
boundaries might subsequently have been modified by act of new states, the fact still 
remains that at the "critical date" 56 of independence, none of the new states was in any 
doubt that it inherited what the parent state had possessed. '57 
152 Ibid., at 273-4. 
1,53 Ibid., at 274-5. 
154 O'Connell, The Law of State Succession (Cambridge, 1956) p. 50. 
155 Cukwurah, The Statement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, op., cit., pp. 107-8. 
156 For more detail about this term, the "critical date", see Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in 
International Law, op., cit., pp. 31-35, Island of Palmas Case, op., cit., at p. 875. 
157 Cukwurah, The Statement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, op., cit., pp. 107-8. 
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The boundary dispute between Iraq and Kuwait is also explainable on the 
ground of state succession. Iraq's claim of sovereignty over the whole of Kuwait for the 
first time in 1938 was justified by the Iraqis on the ground of succession. Iraq argued 
that Kuwait had been part of the province of Basrah in the Ottoman Empire, to which 
Iraq had succeeded on its establishment in 1921 and as a result, Kuwait had always 
formed an integral part of Iraq and had wrongfully been separated from it. 158 When 
Kuwait became independent in 1961 and applied to join the United Nations, Iraqi 
leaders claimed sovereignty over the whole of Kuwait for the second time. 159 This claim 
was rejected by the Arab League and most of the nations of the world, which recognised 
the independence of Kuwait which had been a de facto independent state. 160 
As far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, its succession took place when the Saudi 
territory broke off and became an independent state. With regard to the critical date of 
the emergence of Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states, it could be said that it was 
after the First World War with regard to Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait. With regard to Saudi 
Arabia, it first emerged as an independent state in Najd (central of Saudi Arabia) in 
1902 before it succeeded the Ottomans. It then gained most of its territories, as 
mentioned earlier, by way of conquest during the existence of and after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
At the time of the succession, there was no mutual boundary agreement between 
Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states in the north, either those which emerged out of 
the Ottoman Empire, or those which were British mandates. It could, however, be 
158 It was not entirely clear whether or not the Ottoman Empire claimed sovereignty or suzerainty over 
Kuwait. For more details about the question of Iraq and Kuwait in this regard see Mendelson & Hulton, 
"Iraq's Claim to Sovereignty over Kuwait" in Schofield, (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States 
(London, 1994) pp. 126-128. 
'59 Mendelson & Hulton, "Iraq's Claim to Sovereignty over Kuwait" op., cit., p. 140. 160 Ibid. 
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argued that defined territory is the fundamental concept of international law, as over 
such a territory a state has sovereignty and exercises its jurisdiction over its subjects to 
the exclusion of other states. Judge Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Case161 stated 
that: 
"The development of international law has established this 
principle of the exclusive competence of the state in regard to its 
own territory in such a way as to make it the point of departure in 
settling most questions that concern international relations. ""' 
Indeed, defined territory is one of the four qualifications which a state, as a person of 
international law, should possess. This was expressed in Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention of 1933 on the Rights and Duties of States, signed by United States and 
certain Latin American countries which provides: 
"The state as a person of international law should possess the following 
qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a 
Government; and (d) a capacity to enter into relation with other 
states. "163 
Although it is widely accepted now that each independent state has its own territory 
within which it exercises its jurisdiction and sovereignty, 164 there are some exceptions 
with regard to (b) and (c) above. As to (b) a defined territory, the increase or decrease of 
a state territory does not change the identity of that state. Indeed, in 1990, the Yemen 
161 Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867, at 875. 
162 Island ofPalmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867, at 875. 
163 165 League of Nations Treaty Series 19. 
164 Many of the fundamental principles of international law are concerning with maintaining and 
protecting the territorial exclusivity of the state. This was expressed in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, 
which states that "the organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members". 
Moreover, the use of force is forbidden against "the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state. " The sovereign equality of all states was also mentioned in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. See General Assembly 
Resolution 2625 dated 1970, in Djonovich, (ed. ), United Nations Resolutions, (vol. XIII 1970-1971) 
(New York, 1976) p. 337. 
36 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
Arab Republic, or North Yemen, and the People's Democratic Republic or South 
Yemen agreed to be unified under the name, the Republic of Yemen. 165 Moreover, 
Israel's boundaries have been a subject of dispute for over forty years, and it is widely 
recognised as a state. As to (c) a Government, the temporary exile of the government, 
for example, while the aggressor state in a military occupation does not affect the 
existence of the state. One of the most recent examples of a government in exile was the 
Kuwaiti government, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. During his exile in Saudi 
Arabia, the Emir of Kuwait attended both the Arab League meeting on 10 August 
1990166 and the Gulf Cooperation Council meeting, held in Qatar on 22 December 
1990167. The Emir of Kuwait received in his residence in exile, and was received by, 
some heads of state. 168 
The reason for the absence of defined boundaries between Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbours when succession took place was the nature of the inhabitants' life, which 
prevented the application of defined boundaries to separate people from each other. 
Furthermore, because the gaining of the territory and exercising of the sovereignty by 
the local rulers depended on the allegiance of the tribes, neither their territories nor their 
spheres of jurisdiction were stable and fixed. They used to extend and shrink according 
to the tribes' allegiance. Therefore, their boundaries overlapped most of the time. 
Territorial and boundary claims were accordingly based on the allegiance of the tribes, 
rather than the terms of a treaty or adjudication. However, Saudi Arabia succeeded the 
Ottoman Empire several decades before its neighbours under the British mandate gained 
their independence and then succeeded the British Empire. Taking into consideration 
'65 Al-Bilad, No. 9480 dated 23 May 1990. 
'66 Al-Bilad, No. 9549, dated 11 August 1990. 
167 Umm a! Qura, No. 3338 dated 28 December 1990. 
169 Umm al Qura, No. 3318 dated 10 August 1990, 
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the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention, the boundaries between Saudi Arabia on the one 
hand and its neighbouring states on the other were de facto boundaries. 
2. The Saudi-Kuwait Boundary Dispute 
After years of negotiations, the British and Ottoman Empires concluded the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention on 29 July 1913.169 This was a block of agreements aimed 
at resolving the outstanding differences between the two Empires in Arabia, as well as 
to define their respective interests in the region. One of the issues which was dealt with 
by the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was the definition of the Saudi-Kuwait 
boundaries as part of the definition of the two Empires' spheres of influence in the 
region. 
The Convention established two semi-circles with twenty and forty mile radii 
respectively, drawn from the centre point of the city of Kuwait, The first semi-circle 
was defined by Article 5 of the Convention. It represented the inner zone of Kuwaiti 
authority, and was bounded by what was known as the Red Line, with Khawr Zubayr 
and Grane forming the northern and southern coastal limits (see map 9). Certain islands, 
including Warba and Bubiyan, were also designated as belonging to Kuwait. Article 6 
defined the second semi-circle as the outer zone, which was wider than the first one and 
bounded by the Green Line. Thus, the Red Line defined the Saudi-Kuwaiti boandary, 
while the Green Line defined Kuwait's northern boundary with Iraq. In the inner or Red 
circle, the ruler of Kuwait had total autonomy, while in the' outer or Green circle, he had 
rather more nebulous control, but was allowed to collect tribute from the tribes in the 
169 (IOR: UP&S/18/B381) official documents reproduced in Tuson & Quick, (ed. ), Arabian 
Treaties: 1600-1960, op., cit., vol. I, pp. 91-138. 
38 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
area. 170 The Convention, which was signed by Sir Edward Grey on behalf of the British 
Government and Hakki Pasha on behalf of the Ottoman Government in London, was 
never ratified because it involved complex issues, such as the question of the Baghdad 
Railway and Shatt al-Arab, which were locked into the international economic and 
political scene. 171 For example, the Baghdad Railway deal could never be concluded 
without the consent of Germany, and the Shatt al-Arab navigation had to be agreed 
upon by Russia, because both Germany and Russia would be affected by such deals. 172 
As far as international law is concerned, ratification expresses a state's consent 
to be bound by the treaty. 173 It is only required when the treaty so specifies. 174 If the 
provisions of a treaty do not express the requirement of ratification before the treaty 
becomes legally binding, such a treaty becomes binding by signature. 175 This optional 
procedure was designed to facilitate international agreement between states whose 
executive branches of government may be disabled from contracting without legislative 
approval. 176 There is nothing to prevent states from ratifying a treaty on the day on 
which it is signed; however, parties to a treaty may benefit from the interval between the 
signature of the treaty and the exchange of documents of ratification, as such an interval 
allows extra time for consideration, once the negotiations process has been 
completed. 177 By providing for ratification, the feelings of public opinion have an 
opportunity to be expressed with the possibility that a strong negative reaction may 
170 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 206. 
171 For more details see Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers (London, 1991) pp. 65-99. 
'72 Ibid. 
173 Article 14 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
174 Article 16 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
175 Blix, "The Requirement of Ratification", (1953) 30 BYIL 352, at 380, See McNair, The Law of 
Treaties, 1961, p. 133. 
176 See O'Connell, International Law, op., cit., vol. 1, p. 222 & p. 224. 
'77 Blix, "The Requirement of Ratification", (1953) 30 BYIL 352, at 356-7. 
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result in the state deciding not to ratify the treaty under consideration. 178 If ratification is 
necessary for one side it is usual to require it of the other or others, and it is the 
exchange of ratification that completes the transaction. 179 In the Ambatielos case, 180 for 
example, the International Court of Justice had to interpret a Declaration of 16 July 
1926 between the United Kingdom and Greece, on the ground that the provisions of the 
Declaration constituted provisions of a Treaty of the same date between the same 
parties, a Treaty which contained an express provision making the Court competent to 
interpret it. While the Declaration did not expressly specify the procedure by which it 
was to come into force, 181 the Treaty expressly provided for ratification. 182 The 
International Court of Justice decided that the Declaration was part of the Treaty and 
made a statement which is of particular interest regarding the necessity of ratification 
when required by the parties, it stated that: 
"The ratification of a treaty which provides for ratification, as does the 
Treaty of 1926, is an indispensable condition for bringing it into 
operation, It is not, therefore, a mere formal act, but an act of vital 
importance". 183 
The International Court of Justice intended to express that ratification should not be 
regarded as a stereotypical formality, as it is rather of great judicial importance. 
As the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was signed by the parties subject to 
ratification which never took place, it did not become binding on the concerned parties, 
179 Ibid. 
179 Fitzmaurice, "Do Treaties Need Ratification? " (1934) 15 BYIL 113, at 115-16. 
180 ICJ Reports, 1952, p. 28. 
181 Ibid., p. 36. 
182 Ibid. 
183 Ibid., p. 43. 
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and as a result, the Red Line defined by it was void. Indeed, the approval of the parties 
to the Convention was very important in order for them to be bound by it, as it 
concerned a vital issue, namely, the definition of their boundaries, that is to say, the 
definition of their sovereignty and jurisdiction. Generally speaking, the party or the 
parties to a treaty may choose not to ratify it after it has been signed by the 
representatives, because they may want to reconsider their positions and come up with 
different thoughts regarding their boundaries. Another reason for non-ratification could 
be that the parties' representatives might exceed their powers or instructions, and 
therefore, the boundary defined by a treaty does not reflect the desire and will of the 
party or parties. 
In the case of the Red Line between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, however, it was 
widely accepted that it was based on the power of the Amir of Kuwait, Mubarak, to 
impose order and levy taxes on his surrounding tribes. 184 This means that the Saudi- 
Kuwait boundary which was defined by the Red Line was based on the actual exercise 
of authority of the state of Kuwait over the territory within the Red Line, and therefore, 
was realistic. In the light of this, it could be argued that the territory which was left for 
Saudi Arabia beyond the Red Line had either been under effective control by the Saudi 
state, and therefore, was its territory, or it had been terra nullius, and therefore was open 
to be acquired by any state. The Saudis, however, claimed the territory beyond the Red 
Line on the ground that it had been their ancestral territory during the First and the 
Second Saudi states. 185 
184 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p. 171. 
'" In a memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 13 June 1920, an official document 
reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., 
vol. 9, p. 46. 
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If the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention had been ratified, then, according to 
both the principle of state succession and the principle of uti possidetis, discussed 
above186, the Red Line defined by the Convention would have been legally accepted as 
the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Evidence, however, shows that the 
Saudi-Kuwait boundaries defined by the Red Line were straight lines, drawn on the map 
in order to solve temporally tribal problems rather than being permanent international 
boundaries, as understood in international law. As the British themselves admitted: 
"The boundaries which did not give Koweit {Kuwait} quite so 
much as Mubarak {the Amir of Kuwait} claimed, were straight 
lines drawn on the map to include certain {water} wells which 
according to the best evidence available, were used by the 
Koweit {Kuwait} tribes. Such lines in fact mean very little. 187 
Therefore, this unratified Convention which contained the definition of the boundaries 
between the two predecessor Empires, although was controversial and had no legal 
effect from an international law viewpoint, gave rise to boundary disputes between 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The dispute resulted from the British assertion that the 
Convention was binding upon Saudi Arabia and the Saudi refusal to accept this 
assertion. This dispute led, consequently, to another economic dispute, as the relations 
between the two states were strained for economic reasons resulting from territorial and 
tribal problems in the absence of defined territory. The dispute between them continued 
to worsen after the conclusion of the First World War, and hostilities broke out between 
the two countries. These clashes were occasioned by the Kuwaiti leader Shaikh Salim's 
186 See supra 1. 
187 IO UP&S/10/925, letter from Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Secretary of State, to Mr Churchill, 25 January 1921, 
an official document quoted in Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 207. 
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assertion of his jurisdiction over the tribes of Aujman, Mutair and Awazim within the 
area assigned to Kuwait by the Red Line and the refusal of the Saudi ruler, Abdulaziz, 
to accept this assertion. 188 Again, if the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention had been 
ratified, there would not have been any doubt of its being binding on the successors, and 
then such refusal by Abdulaziz would have been a violation of the boundary agreement 
inherited from his predecessor. However, taking into consideration the effective control 
exercised by the state of Kuwait, which was the basis of the Red Line, it could be 
argued that if the case had been referred to an international tribunal, the decision would 
have been in Kuwait's favour on the ground that it had sovereignty over the disputed 
area at the time of colonisation. 189 
In 1920, Salim, in order to press his claims, announced his intention to build a 
fort at Dauht Balbul, on the coast just north of Jabal Manifah, "to signify that this was 
his southernmost boundary"190Ibn Saud objected, claiming that Dauht Balbul was 
within his territory. 191 As a result, war erupted between the two sides in which the 
Kuwait army was completely defeated. 192 By that time the Treaty of Versailles had 
already been concluded (signed on June 28,1919). Although the Treaty created the 
League of Nations after the First World War in hopes of preventing future wars and 
aggression, the League system did not prohibit war or the use of force, but it did set up a 
procedures designed to restrict it to a tolerable level. 193 Therefore, it could be said that 
188 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia. Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p. 170. 
189 See, for example, Island of Palmas Case, (1928) 22 AJIL 867, Eastern Greenland Case, PICJReports 
(1933) series A/B, No 53,151. 
190 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours (London, 1956) p. 251. 
19' A letter from Ibn Saud dated 1 February 1919, to the British Political Agent in Kuwait, in Schofield 
and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, p. 7. 
192 In a memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 13 June 1920, reproduced in 
Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 26- 
31. 
193 Articles 10-16 of the Covenant of League of Nations. 
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war was not yet outlawed and title to territory could be acquired by conquest. When 
Abdulaziz won this war, he extended his territorial claim to include the whole territory 
up to the walls of Kuwait town, 194 basing his claim, as usual, on the extent of his 
forefathers' territories during the First and the Second Saudi states. Salim based his 
claim on the Red Line, which was based, as mentioned earlier, on Mubarak's power to 
impose order and levy taxes on his tribes. 195 In other words, while Abdulaziz based his 
claim on historical rights, Salim based his on Article V of the 1913-Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention by which the Red Line was defined, as well as on effective exercise of state 
authority. Historical claims, however, have been raised throughout history. 196 Iraq, for 
example, sought to justify its invasion and annexation of the neighbouring state of 
Kuwait in August 1990 on the ground that it has a historical right over the Kuwait. The 
response of the United Nations demonstrated that such arguments were unacceptable to 
the world community as a whole. 197 Another example could be Morocco, which has 
made extensive claims to Western Sahara as historically belonging to the old Moroccan 
Empire. In the Western Sahara case, 198 the International Court of Justice accepted the 
existence of historical legal ties between the tribes of the area and Mauritania and 
Morocco, but declared that they were not of such a nature as to override the right of the 
inhabitants to self-determination and independence. 199 A more recent example would be 
the historical claim made by Yemen in its dispute with Eritrea over the sovereignty of 
the Greater Hanish island in 199820° Yemen argued, in relation to its incorporation in 
194 In a memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 13 June 1920, reproduced in 
Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, p. 45. 
195 Ibid., p. 46. 
196 See Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, op., cit., pp. 76-8. 
197 See supra footnote No. 51 on the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. 
198 Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports 1975, at 39. 
'99Ibid, pp. 41-44. 
200 Antunes, "The Eritrea-Yemen Arbitration: First Stage-the Law of Title to Territory Re-averred "(1999) 
48 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 362. 
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the former Ottoman Empire that this did not deprive it of historical title to its territory. It 
also took the view that after the final fall of the Empire and the independence of Yemen 
in 1918, title reverted inevitably to Yemen. The Tribunal had to examine extensively 
Yemen's sovereignty over the island during the time of the Ottoman Empire until the 
date of the independence of Yemen. It found that the Imam of Yemen had neither 
sovereignty nor jurisdiction over the Red Sea coast where the island is located, and the 
Ottoman governor had exercised jurisdiction over the coasts until 1917.201 On this basis, 
the Tribunal did not accept the historical claim of Yemen, and its argument that 
sovereignty over the island in dispute reverted to Yemen after the fall of the Ottoman 
Empire. 02 In the light of this, it could be said that the effective exercise of authority by 
Kuwait overrode the historical claims made by Abdulaziz. 
Abdulaziz was informed that His Majesty's Government recognised the territory 
within the inner boundary defined by the Red Line in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention as unquestionably belonging to Kuwait 203 Some time later, Abdulaziz 
asserted that Salim had no jurisdiction at all over Jariya or any of the country claimed 
by him and maintained that he was unaware of any boundaries as laid down by the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention. 204 He then sent a letter to be signed by Salim, in which he 
would give away all the country he had claimed east and west of Jariya. 205 However, 
Salim did not sign Ibn Saud's ultimatum, but instead signed a document in which he 
201 Ibid., at p. 366. 
202 lbid 
. 203 In a memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 13 June 1920, an official document 
reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., 
vol. 9, p. 47. 
204 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 252. 
205 Ibn Saud's letter to Salim, the ruler of Kuwait, dated 21 June 1920, in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), 
Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957 op., cit., vol. 9, p. 49. 
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declared that Jariya was a common property. 206 At the same time, Salim was 
disappointed when he was told by the British that the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention 
had been drawn up under conditions which no longer obtained, that he was not a party 
to this Convention, and that, in any case, it had been superseded by Article 6 of the 
1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty which provided that the Saudi-Kuwait boundaries would be 
defined later. 207 According to international law, termination of or withdrawal from a 
treaty may take place by consent of all the parties. 08 In particular, a treaty may be 
considered as terminated if all parties conclude a later treaty, which is intended to 
supplant the earlier treaty, or if the latter treaty is incompatible with its provisions. 209 As 
far as the 1913-Anglo-Ottoman Convention is concerned, accepting for reason of 
discussion the British argument that it was valid despite non-ratification, it could be said 
that it was terminated and superseded by the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty which was 
concluded between Saudi Arabia, as a successor of the Ottoman Empire and Britain. 
This termination of the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Conventions with regard to the Saudi- 
Kuwait boundary had ignored the actual exercise of the authority of the state of Kuwait 
over the disputed territory. As a result, the disputed area had become open for fresh 
negotiations which might lead to fresh boundaries, as will be seen later in the second 
chapter. 
3. The Saudi-Iraqi Boundary Dispute 
When the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was concluded, the territory that includes 
206 In a letter from Salim, the ruler of Kuwait, to Ibn Saudi (no date), in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), 
Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, p. 53. 
207 Memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 17 July 1920, an official document 
reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., 
vol. 9, p. 59. 
208 Article 59 of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
209 Article 59 of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
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the present Saudi-Iraqi boundary was part of the Ottoman Empire's internal territory, far 
away from the boundary lines (see map 9). Yet, when the Saudi boundary with Iraq 
evolved in 1921,210 the new Saudi state was brought into direct confrontation with its 
neighbours, the Ashraf (the rulers of Iraq). The dispute between the two states was 
almost entirely economic, resulting from territorial and tribal problems. 211 For example, 
local tribal troubles interrupted the natural migration, which had taken place from time 
immemorial in autumn by tribes of northern and northeastern Saudi Arabia towards 
Kuwait and Iraq to obtain the necessities of life. 212 This led subsequently to several 
attacks and counterattacks between different tribes in the area. 213 Such tribal troubles 
emphasised the differences between European and Central Arabian attitudes towards 
political authority and jurisdiction. Whereas the former depends on a defined territory, 
the latter relies on the concept of the tribe. Such differences of attitudes made it difficult 
to make such people, who had to move freely from one region to another in search of 
the means of sustenance, recognise fixed boundaries through the desert, by which they 
were to be confined. 
It was not until 1922 that the Saudis and Iraqis, at Muhammera on the Shatt al 
Arab, concluded a Treaty called the Treaty of Muhammera. 214 The Treaty was signed by 
delegates from Saudi Arabia and Iraq in the presence of Sir Percy Cox, the High 
Commissioner in Iraq on 5v' May. Two years earlier, during the preliminary discussions 
between Cox and Ibn Saud, there had been a disagreement: Cox advocated fixed 
boundaries while Ibn Saud, aware of the problems of nomadic people, objected to 
210 See supra chapter II, 4.3. 
211 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p. 174. 
212 Ibid 
213 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 266- 214 (IOR: I1P&S120/CIS8E), in Tuson & Quick, (ed. ) Arabian Treaties, op., cit., VOL. 4, pp. 55-64, 
Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. 1, No. 1. 
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boundaries based on territorial rather than on tribal lines. 215 Therefore, the Treaty did 
not make any reference to the boundaries between the two states; rather, it appointed a 
joint committee to establish them. 16 However, Article 1 of the Treaty decided the 
allegiance of the tribes and provided for punishment of raiding tribes and the safety of 
pilgrim routes. This decision of the tribes' allegiance was the basis on which their 
boundaries were defined as will be seen in the second chapter of this part. 
King Abdulaziz refused to ratify the Muhammera Treaty because he claimed 
that his representatives to the negotiations had made unwarranted concessions about the 
Amarat and Dhafir tribes which were claimed by both Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 217 Another 
reason for the refusal to ratify the Treaty might be that King Abdulaziz was suspicious 
because the new Saudi state was surrounded by the Ashraf rulers218 who had assumed 
219 control in Hijaz to the west of Najd, Jordan and Iraq to the north. 
According to international law, if ratification is refused, as in the case of the 
Muhammera Treaty, no treaty has been concluded, but a mere mutual proposal to 
conclude a treaty has been agreed to. 220 In other words, the signing of a treaty 
establishes "a provisional status"221 between the signatories, which will terminate either 
by non-ratification or when the treaty becomes effective on ratification. As a 
consequence, the Muhammera Treaty was not binding on the Saudi state, and therefore, 
215 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 204. 
216 Article I of the Muhammera Treaty. 
217 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud ofArabia: His People and His Land (London, 1928) p. 59. 218 The three Ashraf rulers were King Hussain of Hijaz, his second son Abdullah Amir of Jordan and his 
third son, Faisal King of Iraq. 
219 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 267. 
220 See Oppenheim, International Law, (1958), op., cit., pp. 903-4. 
221 See "Reservation to the Convention on Genocide" (1951) Advisory Opinion, ICJReports 1951,15, at 
28. 
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Saudi Arabia was not bound by what had been agreed on by the representatives in the 
Treaty. 
The Muhammera meeting was useful in bringing the parties together, but it left 
open the question of how far their jurisdiction extended. King Abdulaziz, however, 
subsequently ratified this Treaty when the boundary between Saudi Arabia and Iraq was 
defined, as will be discussed in the second chapter of this part. Abdulaziz decided to 
ratify the Muhammera Treaty subsequently because the Treaty became of less 
importance in terms of the settlement of the boundary dispute between the two states. 
Before the settlement, the Muhammera Treaty was very important, as it decided the 
allegiance of the tribes on which the boundary definition would be based. If Abdulaziz 
had ratified the Muhammera Treaty, he would have been bound by it and would have no 
other choice but to agree to the boundary definition. When Abdulaziz did not ratify the 
Muhammera Treaty, he freed himself from any obligations with regard to the settlement 
of the boundary dispute between his country and Iraq, and was in a position to discuss 
different boundary lines. Such settlement, nonetheless, was based on the Muhammera 
Treaty, as will be seen when this issue is discussed in detail later, although Abdulaziz 
fought for a different boundary line. 
Although the boundary between the two states was to be based on the location of 
pasture and water wells used by the said tribes, due to the nature of the nomadic 
people's annual migrations, the Saudi delegation categorically refused to fix any 
boundary with Iraq. Explaining this decision, Lieutenant General Sir Glubb, who had 
much experience in southern Iraq during the 1920s as British Commander of the Iraqi 
Desert Police, stated that: 
"The Nejed delegates were far more vividly aware than were 
Iraqis or the British that the very existence of nomadic tribes 
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depended on their power to migrate and graze freely.... in some 
years the greater part of Nejed might be afflicted with drought, 
[so] it was essential for the very survival of the Nejed tribes that 
they be able to move northwards towards Iraq or Syria in search 
of some desert area where rain had fallen. Conversely the 
northern tribes might at times be obliged to migrate for the 
whole season to Nejed. To draw a hard and fast frontier across 
the desert waste seemed to the Nejedis to threaten the very 
existence of those tribes... constituted a great part of Ibn Saud's 
"222 armed forces. 
King Abdulaziz also opposed the defining of any land boundaries, however, as he was 
intent on claiming everything that had belonged to the first Saudi state at the time of its 
maximum extent, on the ground that his ancestors had taxed the tribes as far north as 
Aleppo. A personal meeting, however, between him and Sir Percy Cox was arranged at 
Uqair in Al-Hassa in November 1922 in order to overcome the problem. This was the 
first step towards the defining of the Saudi-Iraqi boundaries, as will be seen in detail in 
the second part on the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with Iraq. 
4. The Saudi-Jordan Boundary Dispute 
The Saudi-Jordan boundary area, like those of Iraq, was part of the Ottoman Empire's 
internal territory, far away from the boundary lines defined by the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention (see map 9). It was also, like those of Iraq and Kuwait subject to raids and 
counter-raids between the tribes who lived in that area. 223 The area in dispute between 
the two countries was Wadi Sirhan (Sirhan Valley) to the north of Jabal Shammer, 
which occupied (along with its major oases, Jauf and Sakaka) a strategic position on the 
222 Glubb, War in the Desert, op., cit., pp. 62-3. 
223 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p. 174. 
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British defence corridor, cutting off Iraq from Jordan. At the end of the Wadi were the 
salt villages or Qurayat A- Milh which were also referred to as Qaf. All tribes from both 
Saudi and Jordan territories grazed throughout the major Wadi and the four subsidiary 
Wadis that enter it from the west 224 Abdulaziz claimed the Wadi on the grounds that 
Al-Rashid had controlled it, and therefore, he was heir to their possession by right of 
conquest, 225 while Jordan claimed that the Wadi was part of Syria and therefore 
belonged to Jordan, which was also part of Syria. 226 The British High Commissioner in 
Palestine, Sir Herbert Samuel, who was also responsible for Jordanian affairs, disputed 
the Saudi claim to Jauf in the interest of Jordan. 227 The Colonial Secretary in London, 
however, refuted Samuel's contention and stated that Jauf belonged to Nuri Al-Sha'lan 
of the Ruwala tribe, who had accepted Ibn Saud's lordship over Jauf according to his 
information and had agreed to hold it on his behalf. 228 This latter view seems to be in 
harmony with the concept of allegiance of the tribes which, as mentioned earlier, 229 
determined the acquisition of the tribes' territory. 
This concept was reflected by the allegiance of Nuri Al-Sha'lan, a tribal emir in 
the area. His allegiance since the end of the First World War had been something of an 
open question. For example, he gave allegiance to Faisal, the ruler of Iraq, between 
1919 and 1922 and, after Faisal's expulsion, to the French in Damascus, then he turned 
to Abdullah of Jordan and later to Ibn Saud 230 These changes in the tribes' allegiance 
224 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 212. 
223 There is a dispute over whether or not Al-Rashid controlled Wadi al- Sirhan and Jauf. Nuri Al-Sha'lan, 
the Shaik of the Ruwala (one of the tribes of the area) claimed to have taxed the people of the area in 
return for his protection. Al-Rashid, however, once again took control in 1918 until he was expelled by 
Ibn Saud in 1921, see Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 223, footnote, 26. 
226 In Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, 
pp. 459-60,511-19. 
27 Ibid. 
228 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., pp. 190-1. 
229 See supra 1. 
230 Ibid., p. 191. 
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made it quite difficult to establish fixed boundaries, thereby contributing to the ongoing 
boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours. 
Fearing that Ibn Saud might attack Jordan, the British sought to draw Jordan's 
boundaries with the Saudi state. According to their proposal, the boundary line would 
cut the Wadi Sirhan between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. 231 This boundary would make 
Jordan contiguous with Iraq in order to form a solid line of British protectorates from 
Persia to the Mediterranean. 232 Ibn Saud objected to the British line and suggested that 
the boundaries should be drawn so as to include the whole Wadi in his territory. This 
would cut off Jordan from Iraq and thus Abdulaziz would achieve one of his primary 
aims. When no agreement was reached, another Ikhwan233 attack took place in the 
disputed area between Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Other conflicts arose when Iraq 
continued to house some tribes from Shammer in the north of Saudi Arabia, who sought 
refuge in Iraq and transferred their allegiance to the Iraqi ruler. King Abdulaziz called 
for their expulsion from Iraq and claimed that his authority over them transcended state 
boundaries. 234 
In addition to the Wadi Sirhan dispute, another dimension was added to the 
Saudi-Jordan boundary dispute when Abdulaziz captured Hijaz, namely, the question of 
Ma'an and Aqaba, which belonged to Hijaz before it was captured. Abdulaziz claimed 
sovereignty over these two villages on the ground of state succession. As a result, the 
cause of this dispute was somewhat different from that of the Wadi Sirhan dispute. It 
did not involve the question of the allegiance of the tribes but, rather, was related to 
231 Note that the British abandoned the idea of incorporating Jauf into Jordan. 
232 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p. 192. 
233 "Ikhwan" (Brothers) formed the nucleus of the army on which King Abdulaziz later depended to 
liberate and unify the remaining region of what is now Saudi Arabia, see Assah, Miracle of the Desert 
Kingdom, op., cit., pp. 29-31 234 Ibid. 
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state succession and the conflict over sovereignty before the succession, which had been 
ambiguous for a long time. 
The sovereignty over these two villages can be traced back to the late nineteenth 
century when Aqaba was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for the first time. In 1910 
the Ottomans incorporated Aqaba into the Damascus Vilayat (districts) in addition to 
Ma'an which had been ruled by the Ottomans from Damascus since the late nineteenth 
century. 235 During the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire, the Arab forces 
occupied Ma'an and Aqaba. Since then, both places had been regarded by the Ottomans 
as outside Hijaz, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. Nonetheless, since the 
conclusion of the First World War, Ma'an and Aqaba were, practically, part of the 
Kingdom of Hijaz, ruled by King Hussain who, in addition to his son Faisal, laid claim 
to the area. After Faisal's expulsion from Damascus, the question of the ownership of 
Ma'an and Aqaba became a particular interest of King Hussain and his son Abdullah, 
who was used by the British to rule Jordan, which they no longer considered to be part 
of Palestine (although it was administered by the Palestine mandate). 236 
However, when the British forces were withdrawn from the area east of Jordan 
in 1919, the local administrative arrangements were left confused. While the British 
Political Agent in Palestine proclaimed in 1920 that the whole area east and west of 
Jordan was under the control of the Palestine mandate, a local governor was appointed 
in Ma'an by Faisal. At the same time, King Hussain instructed his governor in Aqaba to 
extend his jurisdiction over Ma'an, which he effectively governed with no objection 
from Britain. In 1922 Hussain gave only administrative rights over Aqaba and Ma'an to 
235 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939, The Imperial Oasis, op., cit. p. 41. 
236lbid, p. 42. 
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Abdullah, while legal possession remained with Hijaz. Britain, however, announced on 
a number of occasions that Jordan's boundary would extend to the west, to include 
Aqaba in its territory. 237 This unilateral declaration by Britain did not give Jordan the 
right to possess Aqaba and Ma'an, because Jordan had only administrative rights over 
them, while their possession remained with Hijaz. 
King Hussain claimed the sovereignty over Aqaba and Ma'an and based his 
claim on its occupation during and after the War. Occupation under international law is 
restricted to extension of sovereignty over territory which is not under rule or belonging 
to another state, 238 i. e. terra nullius. The concept of terra nullius has changed over time, 
reflecting how law has followed on meekly from power. In Roman Antiquity, any 
territory which was not Roman was terra nullius,: in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries, any territory which did not belong to a Christian sovereign was terra nullius, 
and in the nineteenth century, any territory which did not belong to a "civilised" State 
was terra nullius. 239 It is widely accepted, however, that uninhabited areas and areas 
inhabited by relatively few persons totally lacking in any kind of social or political 
organisation are considered to be terra nullius. As Lindley explained in 1926: 
"If the territory is uninhabited or inhabited only by a number of 
individuals who do not form a political society, then the acquisition 
may be made by Occupation. If the inhabitants exhibit collective 
political activity which, although of a crude and rudimentary from, 
possesses the elements of permanence, the acquisition can only be 
made by way of Cession or Conquest or Prescription. "240 
237 Ibid., pp. 41-2. 
23' Oppenheim, International Law, (1958), op. cit. p. 555. 
239 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, op., cit., p. 33. 
240 Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law, op., cit., 45. 
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Indeed, in the Western Sahara Case, 241 the International Court of Justice held that 
Western Sahara was not terra nullius because it was inhabited by socially and 
politically organized tribes of nomads during the period of colonization (1884). 42 In the 
light of the above, Aqaba and Ma'an were not terra nullius, as they were inhabited by 
people who, although nomadic, were able to develop some kinds of social and political 
activities in the region, as illustrated from the history of the two villages just mentioned. 
As a consequence, Hussain's claim of Aqaba and Ma'an on the basis of occupation 
cannot be accepted. It could, however, be argued that Hussain possessed Aqaba and 
Ma'an by virtue of the exercise of his authority over them when they became part of the 
Kingdom of Hijaz after the War. Indeed, in the Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 243 
which has already been considered in more detail244, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice held that the Danish claim to sovereignty was based upon peaceful 
and continued display of the state authority and it awarded the sovereignty to Denmark 
on this basis. 245 
When Abdulaziz captured Hijaz in 1924, he claimed sovereignty over Ma'an 
and Aqaba on the ground that he succeeded King Hussain in Hijaz, while Britain 
expressed on a number of occasions that the question of Ma'an and Aqaba was to be 
settled by negotiations. 246 The British government warned Abdulaziz against any attack 
on the area under its mandate247 and its Office in Jerusalem sent a telegram248 to the 
241 Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports 1975,12. 
242 Ibid., at 42. 
243 Eastern Greenland Case, PICJReports, (1933), series A/B, No 53, p. 151. 
244 Supra 1. 
245 Ibid., at pp. 176-7. 
246 Foreign Office 371/10013, E 9019/5747/91, a telegram from Cybher to Mr. Bullard dated 20'h October 
1924, p. 21, see also Foreign Office 371/10013, a telegram dated 30'h October 1924 from the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, p. 45. 
247 Foreign Office 371/10013, E 11148/5747/91, a letter sent from the Colonial Office dated 10"' 
December 1924 to King Abdulaziz. 
248 Foreign Office 371/10013, E 11149/5747/91, a letter from the British Government Office in Jerusalem 
dated 18 October 1924 to the British Representative in Amman, pp. 86-7. 
55 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
British Representative in Amman suggesting a boundary line between King Ali of 
Jeddah, 249 when he was about to fall, and Jordan. According to the proposed boundary 
line, Aqaba and Ma'an, which were under the de facto administration of Hijaz, were to 
be transferred to Jordan. If a treaty to this effect had been concluded then Jordan would 
legally have been able to claim Aqaba and Ma'an as its territory, because they had been 
transferred to it by a boundary treaty between it and the Kingdom of Hijaz (the 
predecessor of the Saudi state). According to the 1978 Vienna Convention which was a 
codification of pre-existing international customary law and states' practice before and 
after it, a successor state succeeds in international law to the treaty obligations of the 
predecessor state with respect to the boundaries defined by the treaty. These boundaries 
are unaffected by the succession. However, Britain, in July 1925, unilaterally claimed 
250 jurisdiction over Ma'an and Aqaba until the boundary was finally delimited. 
249 King Ali was, earlier, appointed Constitutional Sovereign of Hijaz after his father's abdication 
responding to the demands from the notable of Mecca and Jeddah, see Toynbee, "The Islamic World 
Since the Peace Settlement", Survey of International Affairs 1925 (London, 1927), vol.!, pp. 299-300. . 230 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 218. 
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Chapter II 
The Settlement of Northern Saudi Boundary Disputes 
In the Arabian Peninsula, as in many other areas of the world, external powers have 
imposed states' boundaries, and local interests and wills have been completely ignored 
and overridden by arrangements between the colonial powers. 251 Such colonial 
boundaries were believed to have devolved on Britain's former colonies, as successor 
states to Britain, with respect to each other, as well as to whichever of them shared 
boundaries with Saudi Arabia, as a successor state to the Ottoman Empire. 252 As will be 
seen shortly, throughout most of the history of definition of territories in the Peninsula 
and its adjacent areas, Britain had been the sole arbiter of boundaries, as the Ottoman 
Empire had been for some time before Britain and before its collapse. As a 
consequence, such arrangements for defining states' boundaries were made between the 
two rivals, the British Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The result was western-style 
boundaries of straight lines, meant in the first instance to define the two Empires' 
spheres of influence in the region. 253 
The northern Saudi boundaries with the British mandates of Iraq, Kuwait and 
Jordan were defined in the early twentieth century as a result of direct negotiations 
between King Abdulaziz and Great Britain along with representatives of the countries 
concerned. Both Ibn Saud and Great Britain attempted to settle their outstanding 
differences which had originated from Britain's delimitation of nation-states and 
boundaries in the post-World War I mandate period. 
251 Wilkinson, "Britain's Role in Boundary Drawing in Arabia: a Synopsis" in Schofield, (ed. ), Territorial 
Foundation of the Gulf States, op., cit., p. 95. 
2521bid 
253 Ibid., pp. 95-6. 
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Parties to a dispute are not obliged to resolve their dispute at all, whether the 
dispute is a serious legal conflict or a simple political disagreement. However, parties to 
a serious dispute are urged to seek settlement of their dispute by peaceful means. Article 
2(3) of the UN Charter provides that "all Members shall settle their international 
disputes by peaceful means". 54 Indeed, the principle has been developed by the 1970 
Declaration on Principles of International Law, which includes the use of peaceful 
methods for the settlement of international disputes. Article 33 (1) of the Charter 
describes the methods by which international disputes may be settled. The Article, 
however, gives the parties to such disputes the freedom to choose the method that is 
most suitable and convenient for them. It states that: 
"The parties to any disputes, the continuance of which is likely to 
endanger the international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other means of their own choice. " 
It must be stressed, in this context, that the above peaceful means, as will be seen 
throughout this study, are not in any order of priority. Furthermore, the parties to a 
dispute have the duty to continue to seek a settlement by other peaceful means agreed 
by them, in the event of failure of one particular method. On the other hand, nothing can 
preclude the conjunction use of two or more of such peaceful methods. Indeed, that may 
be useful in some cases. 
zsa It should be noted that Article 2 of the Pact of Paris of 1928 obligated the parties to the treaty to settle 
their disputes by pacific means. See United Kingdom Treaty Series, (1929) Cmd 3410. 
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1. The Ugair Conference of December 1922: The Settlement of the 
Saudi Arabian Boundary Dispute with Iraq and Kuwait 
King Abdulaziz and Sir Percy Cox agreed to meet at Uqair in Al-Hassa, in the eastern 
province, in November 1922. In fact, it was King Abdulaziz who had suggested meeting 
the High Commissioner. 255 The purpose of the meeting was to settle the boundary 
dispute between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and to fix a boundary between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. Iraq was represented by Sabih Bey, the Iraqi Minister of Communications and 
Works, Saudi Arabia by King Abdulaziz, and Kuwait by Major J. C. More, the Political 
Agent in Kuwait. Sir Percy Cox, who acted as mediator in this Conference, explained to 
the parties how "earnestly desirous was His Majesty's Government, the friend of both 
parties, that an agreed and amicable settlement should be reached". 256 Such mediation 
by Britain in the person of Cox would provide a framework for the settlement of the 
boundary of Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states. The 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conferences for Pacific settlement of International Disputes laid down many of the 
rules governing mediation as a peaceful means of settlement of international disputes 257 
Article 2 of the Conference laid a duty upon the parties to serious disagreement or 
dispute to resort to good offices or mediation, as far as circumstances allow, before 
having recourse to arms. 
The Saudi-Kuwait boundary dispute was discussed at a special meeting between 
King Abdulaziz and the Sheikh of Kuwait's representative, Major More, in the presence 
of Cox who was supposed to act as a mediator. However, throughout the talks, Major 
255 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud [Saud] ofArabia: His People and His Land, op., cit., p. 59. 
2s6 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., pp. 270-2. 25' From Article 2 to Article 8 of the Hague Conference. 
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More said nothing to protect the interests of the Sheikh of Kuwait 258 As a result, the 
Saudi-Kuwait boundaries were entirely determined by Cox, with some suggestions and 
agreement by King Abdulaziz, in whose favour the settlement was made. Cox 
dominated negotiations because both Abdulaziz and the Sheikh of Kuwait were in need 
of Britain's economic aid and they did not want to lose such aid by rejecting Britain's 
proposed boundaries. Britain took advantage of this and put pressure on the parties to 
accept the boundary settlement. 
With regard to the settlement of the Saudi-Iraq boundary dispute, negotiations 
between King Abdulaziz and Cox were first held in a private Conference, which was 
followed by both open and secret sessions, attended by Sabih Bey, the Iraqi 
Delegation. 259 Both parties, however, made unrealistic demands for each other's 
territory. Sabih Bey claimed a boundary only 19 kilometres north of Riyadh, 260 which 
would have included Hail, Medina and Yanbo in the north and west of present-day 
Saudi Arabia, as well as Hufuf and Qatif (now part of the Saudi eastern province). King 
Abdulaziz, on the other hand, fought for a tribal, or anthropogeographic, boundary 
based on wells and grazing ground rather than a fixed and arbitrary boundary drawn on 
the desert. 261 Indeed, a fixed boundary was considered by King Abdulaziz to be 
impracticable because of the significance of the human features involved. He claimed 
sovereignty over the tribes of Amarat and Dhafir, which had been stated to be within 
Iraqi territory in the Mohammera Treaty, mentioned earlier262, basing his claim on the 
ground that they had belonged to his ancestors. He therefore insisted that his boundary 
258 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 276. 
259 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud [Saud] ofArabia: His People and His Land, op., cit., pp. 75-6. 
260 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 277. 
261 Ibid. 
262 See supra chapter 1,3 (the Saudi-Iraqi boundary dispute). 
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should extend right up to the Euphrates. 263 It seems that the reason behind these 
demands was that the negotiations were dominated by economic, rather than political 
issues. British companies were focusing on the prospect of discovering oil and obtaining 
concessionary rights in the area. Indeed, parallel negotiations regarding oil concession 
took place between King Abdulaziz and oil companies, some of which were even 
backed by Cox himself. 264 
When Cox pointed out that King Abdulaziz's claim was completely infeasible265 
on the ground that he claimed tribes that were assigned to Kuwait in the Muhammera 
Treaty, Abdulaziz was able to make concessions. He proposed a more flexible plan by 
which he would abandon his claim to the Amarat and Dhafir tribes in order to safeguard 
the rights of his own tribes to water and pasture. 266 He suggested that each tribe would 
lay claim to its traditional wells and pastures, which were very well known by the 
people of the desert. These claims would be proven by the wasms (tribal marks) which 
each tribe had to put on their own belongings, and any wells which were common 
property should be declared neutral. Any dispute over the sovereignty of these wells 
could be referred to the ahl al-khibra, "people of experience" in the desert. 267 The Iraqi 
delegates, however, did not accept Abdulaziz's suggestion and, as a result, there was no 
263 Dickson did not mention King Abdulaziz's claim on the tribe of Amarat. He only mentioned his claim 
on the Dahfir while Rihani mentioned both tribes, Amarat and Dhafir. See Rihani, An Sa'oud [Saud] of 
Arabia: His People and His Land, op., cit., pp. 60-1, Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., pp. 
272-3. 
264 In the same period there were negotiations about oil concessions in the region between British 
companies and King Abdulaziz and other Arab leaders. For further details see Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud [Saud] 
ofArabia: His People and His Land, op., cit., pp. 79-89, Longrigg, Oil in the Middle East (London, 1961) 
2nd edition, pp. 98-100. 
265 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., pp. 273-4. 
266 Rihani, Modern Najd and its dependencies, op., cit., p. 313. 
267 This Arabic phrase "ahl al-khibra" was translated as "people of wisdom" by Dickson, who spoke the 
Arabic language, in his book referred to here and all other sources which used the material from 
Dickson's book. It seems to me that the correct translation of this Arabic phrase is, "people of 
experience", people who are experts in the desert and know it very well. Although the two translations are 
very close, the Arabic phrase, actually, has nothing to do with wisdom. See Dickson, Kuwait and her 
Neighbours, op., cit., p. 273. 
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flexibility in the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Both parties held their 
positions and refused to make any further concessions. Unsurprisingly, the negotiations 
soon reached an impasse. 
From the above, it could be said that this Conference was unusual, as Cox, 
instead of acting as a mediator was able to deal on behalf of two (Iraq and Kuwait) of 
the three parties involved. Thus, Cox and Abdulaziz were the only real negotiators. The 
evidence of this is found in Cox's decision to determine the Saudi boundaries himself, 
not only with Iraq but also with Kuwait, when no agreement had been reached by the 
sixth day of the Conference. Dickson, the Political Agent in Bahrain, who was present 
and acted as a translator and aid during the negotiations, reports: 
"Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of 
Arabia a boundary line from the Persian (Arabian) Gulf to Jabal 
Anaizan, close to the Transjordan (Jordan) frontier.. . he drew out two 
zones, which he declared should be neutral and known as the Kuwait 
Neutral Zone and the Iraq Neutral Zone". 268 
So, Cox did not act as a mediator but rather as an arbiter. A third party acting as a 
mediator might intervene to reconcile the claim of the contending parties and to advance 
his own proposals and to interpret, as well as to transmit, each party's proposal to the 
other in order to bridge the gaps and reach an acceptable solution. 269 It is true that the 
mediating party has a more active role and participates in the negotiations and directs 
them in such a way that a peaceful solution may be reached, 270 but not to such a degree 
that he may impose the settlement himself. Indeed, the mediator's proposals, which are 
268 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 274. 
269 Article 2 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conference for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. 
270 Waldock International Disputes: The Legal Aspect (London, 1972) pp. 83-84. 
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not of binding affect upon the parties, are made informally and on the basis of the 
information supplied by the parties. 271 
The parties, however, signed on 2 December 1922 two Protocols which were 
known as the first and the second Uqair Protocols. 272 These Protocols were appended to 
the Muhammera Treaty, to which King Abdulaziz, when ratifying the two Protocols, 
agreed to put his signature. The First Protocol defined the Saudi-Iraqi boundary. Iraq 
was given a large area of the territory claimed by King Abdulaziz. It was, furthermore, 
given most of the wells, while Saudi Arabia was deprived of them. 273 The Protocol, in 
addition, created a neutral zone between the two countries (see map 3). With regard to 
administration of this neutral zone, Article 3 of the first Uqair Protocol stipulated that 
this zone would remain ungarrisoned and that the tribes living on the borders between 
the two countries would have access to grazing and water in the area. In fact, Cox 
established these neutral zones because he believed, as others did, that oil existed in 
them and when it was exploited, as he declared, "each side shall have a half-share. "274 
Abdulaziz accepted this boundary because he was compensated for the area taken from 
him and given to Iraq. Indeed, two-thirds of Kuwait's territory was given to him and he 
was also promised that Qoraiyat ul-milh near Jauf would be assigned to Saudi Arabia in 
the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with Jordan. This later promise was expressed in 
a cable sent by Cox to Churchill, the Secretary of State at the time. 
Amin Rihani, a Lebanese poet and historian, and a close friend to King 
Abdulaziz, who assisted Cox with translations several times during the Conference, 
271 Article 6 of the 1899-1907 Hague Conference. 
272 (IOR: LP&5/20/Cl S8E), Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, No. 2&3. The 
texts of two Protocols are also found in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary 
Documents, 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 377-9. 
273 Article 2 of the First Uqair Protocol. 
274 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 275. 
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offered an interesting contemporary insight into British methods and the reasoning 
behind their actions. Quoting Cox's cable, which he translated for King Abdulaziz, he 
wrote: 
"This is a part of the compensation made to him [Sultan Abdulaziz] 
for conceding to Iraq his right of sovereignty over the Amarat and 
Dhafir. We take from Ibn Saoud [Ibn Saud] to satisfy Iraq, and we 
take from Trans-Jordania [Transjordan] to placate Ibn Saoud. s275 
In any dispute settlement, however, it is inconceivable that all parties will have exactly 
what they claim, as there will always been a winner and a loser, whatever the outcome 
of the negotiations might be. This is precisely what happened at the Uqair Conference, 
Saudi Arabia lost some territory to Iraq and gained some from Kuwait, while Iraq was a 
winner and Kuwait was a loser. Indeed, according to the second Protocol, which defined 
the Saudi-Kuwait boundary, Kuwait was deprived of almost two-thirds of the territory 
that had been given to it according to the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention276 (see map 
4). Kuwait, however, should not have lost this territory because evidence shows, as 
already discussed, 277 that the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was based on the 
exercise of effective control by Kuwait over the territory and the tribes claimed by 
Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, the Emir of Kuwait, although unhappy with the two-thirds 
taken from him and given to Abdulaziz, 27ß ratified the agreement because, when he was 
invited by Cox to send a representative, he replied that the Political Agent, Major More, 
was aware of his views and interests. 279 All the parties eventually accepted the 
275 Rihani, Ibn Sa'oud of Arabia: His People and His Land, op., cit. p. 79. 
276 See supra chapter 1,2 (the Saudi-Kuwait boundary dispute). 
277 See supra chapter I, 2 (the Saudi-Kuwait boundary dispute). 
278 This was expressed by the Emir of Kuwait to Cox when the latter went to tell him about the boundary 
definition, in Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 275. 
279 Public Record Office, Colonial Office/730/26/ despatch No. 877, December 20,1922 quoted in Finnie, 
Shifting Lines in the Sand (London, 1992) p. 61, footnote, 17. 
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agreement because they all wanted to gain Britain's trust for it for both economic and 
political reasons. Iraq and Kuwait were British colonies, while Abdulaziz did not want 
to lose the subsidy that Britain was giving him to support his people and his country (oil 
had not yet been discovered). 280 This subsidy was in fact used by Abdulaziz to finance 
his military campaigns to gain more territory in the Arabian Peninsula. 281 
The boundaries imposed by Cox were based on arbitrary, mathematical 
principles rather than geographical or tribal ones. This new style of European standard 
boundary was not suitable for the desert life and its inhabitants. Indeed, it ignored the 
geographical distribution of the population, and tribal life. In view of this point, 
Dickson comments: 
"This arbitrary boundary of Western type between Iraq and Najd was, 
in my opinion, a serious error. It resulted in Ibn Sa'ud [Sultan 
Abdulaziz] for the first time in history, restricting the annual 
movements of Najd tribes towards the north.. . 
he. . . 
decided on 
diverting his people from their old and time-honoured communication 
with Iraq and Kuwait, trying instead to force to get the necessities of 
life and daily requirements from Uqair, Qatif and Jubail, his ports on 
the Persian [Arabian] Gulf. "282 
As a result, these boundaries were not accepted by the inhabitants of Saudi Arabia, who 
were deprived of their rights of grazing and their access to the wells. This defect in 
boundary making brought tribal raids to the fore again. Indeed, it resulted in friction 
between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and was one of the factors which caused the Ikhwan 
280 Abdulaziz used to have a monthly subsidy from the British Government of 5000 Pounds, see, 
Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939, The Imperial Oasis, op., cit. p. ] 8&p. 53., Kelly, 
Eastern Arabian Frontier (London, 1964) p. 112. 
281 Ibid 
282 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., pp. 276-7. 
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rebellion. ß3 Dickson, who had experience of tribal life, favoured tribal boundaries over 
fixed ones. He criticised Cox's decision to adopt the latter by stating: 
"A much better solution than that decided upon at Uqair would have 
been the adoption of Ibn Sa'ud's suggestion for a frontier based on 
tribal boundaries. When I was Political Officer of the Muntafiq, I had 
bitter experience of the futility of the old Turkish arbitrary boundaries 
between liwas, and found relief from inter-liwa tribal fighting only 
when I was able to persuade Sir Percy Cox to allow me to adopt tribal 
boundaries. He would have done well to follow the same plan at 
Ugair. "2sa 
Glubb also supported the idea of tribal boundaries instead of fixed ones, but he accepted 
that fixed boundaries were inevitable because they defined the authority and jurisdiction 
of the neighbouring states. 285 Such fixed boundaries became a fact later, when Saudi 
Arabian's boundaries with its neighbours were settled. Therefore, the idea of tribal 
boundaries became impracticable and the inhabitants of the area where Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbours were founded accepted fixed boundaries. This change of attitude 
towards tribal boundaries and fixed boundaries resulted in a change in the inhabitants' 
lifestyle, since they had to accept being confined within a state's territory. 
At least the drawbacks of a Western-style boundary in a nomadic society were 
partly offset by the neutral zones which contained some very good pastures and wells, 
and which tribes from all three states used. Moreover, the neutral zone between Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait was the only practical solution to the potential discovery of oil there 
283 King Abdulaziz's new policy of conciliation was one of the factors that stimulated the Ikhwan to 
rebellion against King Abdulaziz. For a full account of the Ikhwan rebellion see Helms, The Cohesion of 
Saudi Arabia, op., cit., chapter 8, Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., chapter 13. 284 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., p. 277. 285 Glubb, War in the Desert, op., cit., p. 109. 
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and the inevitable dispute that would arise as a result 286 Indeed, these neutral zones, 
which also aimed to prevent inter-tribal clashes, were so important for the settlement of 
the Saudi boundaries with Iraq and Kuwait that some writers have argued that, without 
them, these boundary questions would never have been settled. 287 
It is clear from the above that Britain used its power in order to impose the 
boundary settlement between Saudi Arabia and its northern neighbours, with few 
suggestions from the concerned parties. It is widely accepted that the power of the 
mediator has an evident impact on the parties and a powerful mediator is likely to 
achieve success. In the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965, both 
parties accepted the mediation of the Soviet Union, which was motivated by political 
interests, because war had already broken out and neither side had the power to go 
further and impose its own solution unilaterally. 288 In the Saudi case, it could safely be 
said that although Cox exceeded his power as a mediator, he succeeded in settling the 
boundary dispute between these nomadic societies. The Uqair Conference, therefore, 
resulted in the acceptance of the principle of the boundary demarcation between the 
Arab states. Indeed, for the first time in history, an international boundary, as 
understood in international law, was drawn on maps and established in the Arabian 
Peninsula. 
286 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., p 181. 
287 See for example Blake, "Shared Zones as a Solution to Problems of Territorial Sovereignty in the Gulf 
States" in Schofield, The Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States, op., cit., pp. 200-210, Rihani, The 
Modern Najd and its Dependencies, Cairo, 1991, p. 313, Glubb, War in the Desert, op., cit., pp. 103,118 
and 187. 
288 Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge, 1991) 2°d ed., p. 31. 
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2. The Kuwait Conference (1923-1924): an Attempt to Settle the Saudi 
-Jordan Boundary Dispute 
Although the first Uqair Protocol defined the Saudi-Iraq boundaries, the trouble and 
inter-tribal raids on these boundaries continued because of the nature of the inhabitants' 
life, as they did not recognise fixed boundaries yet. 289 Furthermore, the Saudi-Jordan 
dispute over Wadi Sirhan, mentioned earlier, 290 and the raids and counter-raids that 
took place there, made the British Government think of organising the Kuwait 
Conference in 1923.291 Britain chose Colonel Knox, the British Political Resident in the 
Gulf, to chair the Conference, the aim of which was to settle the boundary disputes 
between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Jordan and Hijaz292 on the other, as much as 
to discuss the outstanding issues between Saudi Arabia and Iraq regarding the Shammer 
tribes who sought refuge in Iraq. 293 These Saudi refugees were part of the Ikhwan, who 
rebelled against Abdulaziz for his new policy of conciliation with his neighbours. They 
fled to Iraq in order to avoid Abdulaziz's punishment, and conducted violent raids into 
Saudi territory. Small parties of them set out to steal camels from Saudi territory. 294 
King Abdulaziz was willing to settle all the outstanding problems between 
himself and his neighbours by amicable means. Responding to Knox's invitation, he 
declared that: 
289 For full accounts of these tribal raids and clashes see generally, Glubb, War in the Desert, op., cit., 
chapter III &IV. 
290 See supra chapter I, 4 (the Saudi-Jordan boundary dispute). 
291 Abdulaziz, King Abdulaziz and the Kuwait Conference: 1923-1924, London, Echoes, 1993, chapter, 4, 
Wahbah, The Arabian Peninsula in The Twentieth Century (Cairo, 1967) pp. 261-2, (in Arabic). 
292 Hijaz, to the west of Najd, was not mentioned earlier as a separate entity because it did not survive. A 
few months after the conclusion of the Kuwait Conference, King Abdulaziz recaptured Hijaz and annexed 
it to his country. See supra chapter I, 4. 
293 A letter sent by Knox to King Abdulaziz inviting him to the Conference, The Green Book, The Kuwait 
Conference, pp. 4-5, Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
294 For further details about the Najdi refugees, see Glubb, War in the Desert, op., cit., chapter V titled 
"the Ikhwan refugees". 
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"Nothing would give me more pleasure than to be in agreement and 
on friendly terms with my neighbours. I have, therefore, agreed, with 
the utmost pleasure, to take part in the conference to be held either in 
Bahrain or in Kuwait". 295 
In the same letter to Knox, King Abdulaziz showed his concern that the neighbouring 
three countries, which were all ruled by the Ashraf, should not form blocs against him. 
Therefore, he stipulated that each party should speak for himself and discuss his own 
issues. When the British government accepted King Abdulaziz's conditions296, he 
nominated his representatives to the Conference and wished the Conference all 
success. 297 
The three Ashraf rulers, on the other hand, initially refused to attend the 
conference until King Abdulaziz had returned Jabal Shammer, which had been 
recaptured in 1921, to Al-Rashid. Some time later, however, responding to British 
requests and pressures, Emirs Abdullah of Jordan and Faisal of Iraq did agree to send 
their representatives. King Hussain of Hijaz refused to attend the Conference because 
Britain had not consulted him in advance. 298 
The Kuwait Conference was finally convened on 17 December 1923 after 
several postponements. The British policy, to which the Conference adhered, was that 
Emir Abdullah of Jordan would relinquish Qaf in return for acquiring Aqaba, that King 
295 The Green Book, op., cit., pp. 5-6. 
296 A telegram sent by Knox to King Abdulaziz, The Green Book, op., cit., pp. 6-7. 
297Ibid, pp. 5-6. 
298 Foreign Office E 1622/4/91, the document is a letter from the Colonial Office dated 9 February 1924. 
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Abdulaziz would withdraw from Al-Karmah and Turbah in return for Qaf, and that 
King Hussain Hijaz would give up all his claims in the area north of Al-Mudawwara. 299 
As far as the Saudi refugee problem is concerned, it will be considered here 
because it was related to the Saudi-Iraq boundary dispute which was settled in the Uqair 
Conference. The Iraqi delegates submitted their demands in the first session, according 
to which an agreement would be concluded between the two states to prevent tribal 
raids. 300 Moreover, they demanded that King Abdulaziz would not communicate 
directly with Iraqi officials and tribal leaders. 301 In the second session, however, the 
Saudis submitted their demands which concentrated on the extradition of both the Saudi 
criminals who fled to Iraq and Shammer tribes who sought refuge in Iraq and carried 
out raids against Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory. 302 The Iraqi delegates initially 
objected to the Saudi Arabia demand for the return of the Saudi refugees. They stated 
that extradition would be contrary to tribal tradition and hospitality. It was also pointed 
out that the return of refugees would not only have been against international practice 
but would also have been impractical, as Iraqi coercion would simply drive these 
refugees to settle on the Turkish-Iraqi border. 303 Saudi Arabia proceeded to suggest that 
raiding be classified as an extraditable offence. 304 
During the negotiations, Knox was under the jurisdiction of the Colonial Office 
and reported directly to the Colonial Secretary. He acted as a mediator, and informed 
299 Foreign Office 686/ 135, a telegram dated 18 November 1923 sent by the Foreign Office to the British 
Representative in Jeddah. Copies were sent to Bushire in Iran, Baghdad, Jerusalem and Knox. 
300 The Green Book, op., cit., pp. 22-3. 
301 Ibid. 
302Ibid, pp. 23-5. 
303 Foreign Office Document 686/135, dated 18 December 1923. 
304 Foreign Office 686/135, in a report sent by Knox to the Colonial Office in London dated 18 December 
1923, also reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853- 
1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 426-7. 
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the Conference that the British government would not want to be an arbiter of 
differences between the parties and that that his mediation efforts as a chairman of the 
Conference and a British representative would always be at their disposal. 305 He tried 
during the Conference sessions to reconcile the two parties' differences and to offer 
some suggestions in order to make a move in the negotiations. As a result of Knox's 
efforts, negotiations between the two parties went well in most of the Conference 
sessions and, by the tenth session, the gap between the parties was about to be bridged 
and the parties were about to reach an agreement. 306 The Iraqis abandoned their claim, 
which stipulated that their agreement depended on a satisfactory agreement being 
achieved between Saudi Arabia and Hijaz before it became Saudi territory. However, 
negotiations were deadlocked, partly because of the refusal of the Iraqis to accept the 
extradition of the Saudi refugees and partly because the Saudi delegation went back on 
their undertaking that the matter would be decided upon by tribal tribunal. As a result, 
the Conference was adjourned so the two delegations might return home in order to 
consult their governments for new instructions. 307 However, when the Conference was 
reopened on 25 March 1924, the Iraqi delegation protested at the raids launched by the 
Ikhwan against some Iraqi tribes in the border. Thus, the Kuwait Conference failed to 
settle the problem of the Saudi refugees. 
As far as international law is concerned, although refugees are not explicitly 
mentioned in the definition of protected persons in Article 4 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, they benefit from that protection as civilian persons. This assumption is 
305 Foreign Office 371/9996 this was indicated in the instructions of Devonshire, the Secretary of State for 
Colonial Affairs, which were sent to Knox in 8 January 1924. 
306 From the tenth conference session on 18 January 1924, in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian 
Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 539-42. 
307 Foreign Office 271/9996, a report from Knox to the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 21 
January 1924. 
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based on Article 73 of the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, which provides for the protection of 
refugees by the state where they seek refuge. Furthermore, Article 32 of 1951 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees provides for non-expulsion of refugees 
except in accordance with the due process of law. With regard to the extradition of 
criminals, states, in general, do not extradite criminals in the absence of a treaty or a 
municipal law, which empowers them to do so. 308 Extradition, however, may take place 
in the absence of a treaty but as an act of grace and comity, rather than of obligation. 309 
In the light of the above, Iraq was obliged neither to return the Saudi refugees nor to 
extradite the criminals, because Saudi Arabia at that time had no extradition agreement 
with Iraq. For Iraq, however, these refugees were to be protected, having fled from 
Saudi Arabia for one reason or another, as war was ongoing in Saudi Arabia for the 
unification of the various parts of the country. The Saudi demand, therefore, was not 
only contrary to both international law and the practice of states but also contrary to 
Iraq's legislation, based on Arab customary law and tribal traditions, which considered 
refugees as part of the tribe with which they sought refuge. 
Let us now turn to consider the attempt to settle the Saudi-Jordan boundary 
dispute which, up to that time, 310 centred on the conflict over the sovereignty of Wadi 
Sirhan. 311 Both parties claimed the Wadi312 and Jordan maintained that there would be 
308 Shearer, Extradition in International law (Manchester, 1971) p. 22. 
309 Ibid. 
310 The question of Ma'an and Aqaba was not discussed in the Kuwait Conference because at that time 
they were under Hijaz control before the latter was captured by Ibn Saud, see supra chapter 1,4. 311 See supra part I, 4. 
312 Ibid. 
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no peace unless the Saudi Arabia government relinquished Wadi Al-Sirhan, Jauf, 
Sakaka and all the territory of Hijaz. 313 
Because of the strategic position of Wadi Sirhan, neither Emir Abdullah of 
Jordan nor King Abdulaziz was able to give it up. As the two parties' claims and 
demands conflicted, Knox, with the intention of removing the obstacles blocking the 
negotiations, suggested that there should be a plebiscite in Wadi Sirhan. 314 King 
Abdulaziz agreed, with the proviso that there was also one for the settlement of the 
Najd-Hijaz boundaries, which he was sure to win. 315 Emir Abdullah refused and 
suggested that the Wadi would be a neutral or buffer zone. 316 Emir Abdullah wanted the 
Wadi to be anything except Saudi territory, while King Abdulaziz wanted exactly the 
opposite. In addition to these suggestions, other suggestions were put forward by Knox 
in order to encourage the parties to reach an agreement, such as dividing the Wadi 
between them and establishing a buffer state in the Wadi under the leadership of Nuri 
Al-Sha'lan of the Ruwala tribe. 317 The Conference continued with more disagreement 
than accord and both parties rejected each other's claims and suggestions. Both parties 
insisted on their demands and were not able to make any concessions. It could be 
argued that although the Wadi was, strategically, very important for both Saudi Arabia 
and Jordan, it was less important for the British than the Saudi-Kuwait boundary, as it 
did not contain oil. Therefore, Britain, unlike in the Uqair Conference, left the parties to 
313 The Green Book, op., cit., pp. 38-9, see also Rihani, Modern Najd and its dependencies op., cit., p. 
312, note that Knox warned Iraq and Jordan from speaking on behalf of the ruler of Hijaz, an official 
documents reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853- 
1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 515-9. 
314 An official document reproduced In Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary 
Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 478-9. Rihani, Modern Najd and its dependencies, op., cit., p. 
322. 
315 Ibid., that was regarding the dispute over Al-Karmah and Turbah between Najd and Hijaz, 
316 Ibid. 
317 See supra Part 1,4. 
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decide matters themselves and did not want to act as arbiter. However, it could, equally, 
be argued that it was good of the British to leave the matters in the parties' hands, 
regardless of the reason for this. 
It is obvious from the above that the reason for the failure to reach agreement is 
that the tension was very high between the parties and the atmosphere was far from 
optimistic. There was no good faith or trust between the parties as they were suspicious 
of each other. King Abdulaziz was concerned about the united stance taken by the 
Ashraf, so he demanded that the representative of Jordan would speak on behalf of his 
government only and that the point of difference between the two countries should be 
precisely defined. 18 Good faith, however, is one of the principles of international law 
according to which negotiating parties should act. 319 The principle is mentioned in the 
Charter of the United Nations, which calls upon the Members to fulfil in good faith their 
international obligations. 320 As a legal principle, it must be applied where relevant, as it 
must be observed in all the obligations connected with negotiation, formation and 
performance of treaties. 321 It therefore requires that parties should be able to place 
confidence in each other while negotiating or concluding a treaty. Indeed, in 1903, after 
three of Venezuela's many creditors had staged blockade of her ports, Venezuela sent a 
representative to Washington with full power to negotiate with the creditor Powers. In 
the course of negotiations, the Venezuelan representative proposed to the 
representatives of the blockading Powers that "all claims against Venezuela" should be 
38 The reply of the Najd delegation to Jordan's demands, put forward in the meeting of 26 December 
1923, an official document reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary 
Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 9, pp. 515-9. 
319 See generally Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals 
(Cambridge, 1987) pp. 105-109. 
320 Article 2 (2) of the United Nations Charter. 
321 O'Conner, J. F. Good Faith in International Law (Broofield USA, 1991) pp. 123-4. 
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offered special guarantees 322 A controversy arose as to whether the words "all claims" 
referred to all claims of the allied and blockading Powers, or to all the claims of every 
country, creditor of Venezuela. The Permanent Court of Arbitration decided that: 
"The good faith which ought to govern international relations imposes 
the duty of stating that the words `all claims' used by the 
representative of the Government of Venezuela in his conference with 
the representatives of the allied Powers.... could only mean the claims 
of these latter and could only refer to them"323 
In case of doubt, however, words are to be interpreted against the party, which has 
proposed them, and according to the meaning that the other party would reasonably and 
naturally have understood. 324 
Another reason for the failure of the Kuwait Conference was the continuing 
border raids and counter-raids between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and its Ashraf 
neighbours on the other, during the negotiations. In this case, each party might have 
hoped to win the war and so acquire more territory from his neighbour. This is exactly 
what happened in the Falklands dispute, for instance, where the aims of the parties were 
diametrically opposed. 325 While Argentina's objective was to rule the islands, Britain 
was prepared to relinquish sovereignty only on condition that the wishes of the 
inhabitants were respected. The mediation took place before the battles between the 
Argentine Air Force and the Royal Navy had indicated who had the military advantage 
322 Venezuela Preferential Claims Case (1904), 1, HCR. p. 55, at p. 61, note 1, quoted in Bin Cheng, 
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, op., cit., p. 107. 
323 Ibid. p. 108. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, op, cit., p. 39. 
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and, as a result, both sides still had substantial hopes of a military solution and in that 
situation, the mediation had little chance of success. 326 But this is not always the case, 
as war between the disputed parties may encourage them to settle their dispute by 
peaceful means. This is illustrated by the mediation of the Soviet Union in the dispute 
between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965. Both parties accepted the mediation 
because they were exhausted after they had tried military actions and were looking for 
some alternative for a hope to settle their dispute. 327 Although this mediation was 
unsuccessful, it was accepted by the parties as a method for settlement, because parties 
to any dispute always try different methods with the hope to find an acceptable solution. 
Another reason for the failure of the Kuwait Conference might have been 
Knox's support of Jordan's demands328 an action, which might have interpreted by the 
Saudi delegation as partiality towards Jordan, making them more resistant towards such 
demands. This support might also have led the Jordanian delegation to perceive some 
sympathy from the British and they might have thought that with such support they 
could win the case against Saudi Arabia without making any concessions. The mediator, 
however, should be neutral and cautious about his behavour during the negotiations in 
order not to be accused of being biased and then rejected by the parties to the dispute. 
Indeed, mediation may be objected to if one or other of the parties believes that any 
potential mediator would tend to be biased against itself and in favour of the other state. 
This was partly the case with regard to the Kuwait Conference which, as a consequence, 
dissolved on 12 April 1924 without any agreement. 329 
326 Ibid 
327 Ibid., p. 31. 
328 Foreign Office 371/9996, p. 3117, in a telegram dated 29 December 1923 sent by Knox to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies in London. 
329 Helms, The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 215. 
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3. Haddah and Bahrah Negotiations of November 1925 
As a result of Abdulaziz's victory in the Hijaz war and the possibility of his threatening 
the other Ashraf countries of Jordan and Iraq, Britain decided to open negotiations with 
him in order to settle the outstanding issues between him and the said countries. 330 
Abdulaziz, for his part, had always favoured the amicable settlement of the boundary 
disputes between his country and his neighbours. Evidence of this might be found in his 
peaceful attitude towards his neighbours, which was expressed on a number of 
occasions. 331 For example, when he was informed by the British about the boundary line 
between Hijaz and Jordan regarding Ma'an and Aqaba mentioned earlier, although the 
boundary had not been mentioned to him before, he offered to negotiate with Britain `at 
any time and place convenient to them'. 332 As a result, Sir Gilbert Clayton was chosen 
to negotiate with Abdulaziz the Saudi-Jordan boundary dispute and the Saudi refugee 
problem between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which had not been settled at the Kuwait 
Conference. However, the question of Ma'an and Aqaba, which was known as the 
Hijaz-Jordan boundary dispute, was not on the agenda of the Haddah and Bahrah 
negotiations, due to the unstable situation in Hijaz. 333 
The negotiations began on 10 October 1925 in a special camp set up by 
330 Toynbee, "The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement", Survey of International Affairs 1925 
(London, 1927) vol. 1, p. 343. 
331 Foreign Office 371/10013, a letter from Abdulaziz dated 27`s October 1924 to the Consul General in 
the Persian (Arabian) Gulf, Bushire, pp. 80-1. 
332 Foreign Office 371/10013, a letter from Abdulaziz dated 8th November 1924, and a report by the 
Political Resident in Bushire to the Secretary of State for Colonial dated 25`' November 1924, P. 71. 
333 Foreign Office 371/10013, a telegram dated 30''' October 1924 from the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Palestine, p. 45. Note that because the Saudi 
state was known at the time as the Kingdom of Hijaz and the Sultanate of Najd and its dependencies, the 
Najd-Jordan boundary dispute was dealt with in exclusion of that of Hijaz-Transjordan although they both 
were within the same country. 
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Abdulaziz, midway between Bahrah and the Haddah oasis 334 With regard to the 
settlement of the Jordan boundary, Britain desired that the boundary would follow the 
same line as originally telegraphed to Knox before the Kuwait Conference, according to 
which, Jordan would relinquish Qaf in return for acquiring Aqaba. 335 This time, 
however, the British desired to include Qaf in Jordan because of its strategic position as 
being at the north end of Wadi Sirhan, so Iraq and Jordan would be joined together to 
protect British interests. Qaf was to be ceded to Abdulaziz only if a deadlock over its 
inclusion in Jordan was reached. 336 
After several sessions of negotiations, Abdulaziz was made to agree essentially 
to the British boundary, but he ultimately persuaded Clayton to cede Qaf to him. 337 
Abdulaziz based his argument for the retention of Qaf on the fact that a boundary 
including Qaf had already been offered to him in His Majesty's Government's letter of 
the 23 October, 1924.338 He argued that when his people had protested against the 
mistreatment by Abdullah of Jordan of some members of his government, he had to tell 
them about the said letter in support of his contention that His Majesty's Government 
would deal fairly with them on the question of Saudi natural frontier. 339 Public opinion, 
however, should not be ignored, especially when it is the source of sovereignty, as was 
the case in Saudi Arabia. Abdulaziz might have known that his leadership would be in 
question if Qaf was not ceded to him. The British, on the other hand, kept their word 
and acted with good faith in this regard. 
334 Hadah and Bahrah are located halfway between Mecca and Jeddah in the western province of Saudi 
Arabia, see Collins, (ed. ), An Arabian Diary Sir Gilbert Falkingham Clayton (Berkeley, 1969) p. 97-8 
an6d p. 122. 
33 See supra the Kuwait Conference, see also Collins, (ed. ), op., cit., pp. 101-2. 
336 Collins, (ed. ), An Arabian Diary, op., cit., p. 103. 
337 Ibid., p. 113 and p. 116. 
338 Ibid., p. 99. 
339 Ibid 
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The willingness and determination of both parties to settle their boundary 
dispute, as well as the mutual understanding and flexibility which dominated the 
negotiations, resulted in the Haddah Agreement34o signed on 2 November 1925 by Sir 
Gilbert Clayton and King Abdulaziz to define the Saudi-Jordan boundaries (see map 5). 
The Agreement was reached after twenty sessions of negotiations took place in less than 
one month. 341 Each party was prepared to make concessions: Abdulaziz abandoned his 
claim to the whole of Wadi Sirhan from the south to the north, while the British gave up 
all of Wadi Sirhan, including Qaf but excluding the four smaller Wadis adjoining it. As 
a result, the defence corridor desired by the British was left to connect Iraq with 
Jordan 342 Article 2 of the Agreement stipulated that Qaf could not be fortified. In 
Article 13, Britain guaranteed freedom of passage to Abdulaziz for his trade between 
Saudi Arabia and Syria and secured exemption from customs for all goods in transit. 
Article 12 dealt with freedom of passage to be accorded to pilgrims and travellers. To 
prevent friction between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Article 3 provided for constant 
communication between the Saudi Governor in the Wadi Sirhan and the Chief British 
Representative in Amman. In addition to the definition of the Saudi-Jordan boundaries, 
this Treaty made a significant step towards the reduction of the likelihood of conflict 
between the two states by the restriction imposed regarding the Qaf. Furthermore, the 
freedom of passage of pilgrims greatly enhanced the prospect of peaceful coexistence. 
It should be noted that by awarding most of the Wadi Sirhan to Abdulaziz, the 
agreement secured his suzerainty over much of the Ruwalla tribe. Although Britain 
could not delimit the Hijaz-Jordan boundary owing to the conflict in the Hijaz, as 
mentioned earlier, Clayton, following his instructions from the Colonial Office, was 
340 (IOR: LIP&S/20/C158), Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, No. 5. 
341 Collins, (ed. ), An Arabian Diary, op., cit., pp. chapter 2. 
342 For the actual line see Article 1 of Haddah Agreement. 
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able to persuade Abdulaziz to regard the possession of Ma'an and `Aqaba as a "chose 
jugee" 343 
. 
Let us now turn to the Bahrah negotiations which dealt specifically with inter- 
tribal raiding, as the Saudi-Iraq boundaries had already been determined in the 
Muhammera Treaty and the second Uqair Protocol already discussed. 344 In the 
negotiations, Abdulaziz insisted on the demands he had already put forward in the 
Kuwait Conference regarding the extradition of Shammer refugees who carried out 
raids against Saudi Arabia from Iraqi territory. Iraq and Britain were unwilling to agree 
to Abdulaziz's demands. Indeed, Clayton specifically refused to extradite the Shammer 
tribe from Iraq, even though Abdulaziz insisted that they would be a constant threat to 
Saudi Arabia unless under his direct control. Again, as in the case of Haddah 
negotiations, there was give and take in the Bahrah negotiations and Abdulaziz was able 
to make several concessions as will be seen when discussing the agreement shortly. The 
reason for Abdulaziz's stance was that he wanted to win the Hijaz war, which was 
ongoing while the negotiations were in session. He might have preferred to achieve at 
least part of his demands in relation to the Saudi refugees in Iraq whilst taking Hijaz, 
rather than to achieve all of his demands but lose Hijaz. Indeed, gaining Hijaz was more 
important for Abdulaziz than solving the Saudi refugees' problem, which might be 
solved any time later. Taking Hijaz meant too much to Abdulaziz, who was surrounded 
by three Ashraf rulers (in Hijaz, Jordan and Iraq), and wanted to get rid of one of them 
at least. Furthermore, Hijaz occupied a very important area being bordered by two 
strategically and economically significant seas: the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea to 
the west. The latter connects the Indian Ocean with the Mediterranean with a total 
343 Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'u4 op., cit., pp. 229-30 
344 See supra 1 of this chapter. chapter. 
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coastal length of about 1800 kilometres. It has many scattered islands, most of which 
are uninhabited. Among them are Farasan, Tiran, Sanafir, Saiad, Reman, No'aman, 
Zafer, Wagdah and Lobenah. Moreover, It links the Saudi politics and security position 
345 with those of Egypt, the Sudan, Ethiopia and Djibouti. 
Sir Gilbert Clayton and King Abdulaziz signed the Bahrah Agreement on 1 
October 1925.346 It contained a compromise regarding the question of extradition, which 
had caused a deadlock in the Kuwait Conference whereby the two parties agreed to 
negotiate a special agreement between Iraq and Saudi Arabia for the extradition of com- 
mon criminals within one year from the date of the ratification of this agreement. 347 
Moreover, Abdulaziz accepted the Colonial Office's proposal, put forward during the 
Kuwait Conference providing for the exaction of guarantees from a tribe which had 
emigrated from one territory to another and then raided in its former territory. 348 Article 
8 again embodied a proposition which the Saudi delegation at Kuwait Conference had 
rejected. It stipulated that, were a tribe in one territory called on by the other territory to 
provide armed contingents, it could only go if it left quietly and took its families and 
belongings. 
Articles 1 to 7 of the Balirah Agreement were similar to Articles 5 to 11 of the 
Haddah Agreement. They constituted regulations regarding the prevention of raids and 
tribal movements. Among these was a provision that raiding be considered aggression, 
requiring severe punishment. As a result, mixed Saudi-Jordan and Saudi-Iraq tribunals 
were to be set up to inquire into the facts of tribal aggression on either side, assess the 
damages and losses, and fix the responsibility. The decisions of these tribunals were to 
say Metz, (ed. ), Saudi Arabia: a Country Study, op., cit., pp. 40-59. 
346 (IOR: L/P&S/20/C158), Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, No. 4. 
347 Article 10 of the Bahrah Agreement. 
34' Article 9 of the Bahrah Agreement. 
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be final and executory, the execution of the said decisions to be carried out by the 
government to whom those found guilty were subject. Tribes were not to cross the 
boundaries without a permit from their own government after the concurrence of the 
other government, but, "in accordance with the principle of freedom of grazing", such a 
permit was not to be withheld if the migration was due to grazing necessities. 
Shortly after the conclusion of the Haddah and Bahrah Agreements, Abdulaziz 
completed the capture of Hijaz and, as a result, the question of Ma'an and Aqaba arose 
with all the events that followed. 349 Although King Abdulaziz and Britain signed the 
Treaty of Jeddah on 20 May 1927, no mention was made of the question of Ma'an and 
Aqaba, which was called the Hijaz-Jordan boundary. 350 However, the Hijaz-Jordan 
boundary was mentioned in the Exchange of Notes between King Abdulaziz and Sir 
Gilbert Clayton, which were appended to the 1927 Treaty of Jeddah. In a letter to King 
Abdulaziz, Clayton confirmed that Ma'an and Aqaba were within Jordanian territory. 
Abdulaziz responded by confirming his desire to maintain cordial relations with Britain 
and promised to maintain the status quo in Ma'an and Aqaba until a final settlement of 
the question was reached. 351 Indeed, Abdulaziz had, in practice, accepted the British 
proposed line mentioned in Clayton's letters and recognised the de facto boundary 
between Hijaz or, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. No further steps or proposed settlements 
were put forward by Abdulaziz until the British departure from the area. 
However, the Saudi-Jordan boundary defined by the Haddah Agreement was 
arbitrarily amended by the British in the mid 1930s. The British discovered that there 
was a discrepancy, not in their favour, between the boundary line as officially notified 
349 See supra chapter I, 4 
350 See ibid, 
351 For the Exchange of Notes on Ma'an and Aqaba question and for the actual line proposed by Clayton, 
see Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. 1, p. 40. 
82 
Part One: Northern Boundaries 
to the Saudi government according to the Asian map of 1918, and the boundary of their 
actual control. 352 This line would leave Tubaiq Mountain and the area to the south of it 
outside Jordan's territory. As a result, the British were concerned about the possibility 
of losing a very important area that could be used for military purposes. The British 
chose to amend the boundary line in such a way that the whole Tubaiq Mountain would 
fall within the Jordan territory, because they knew that the Saudi position would be 
stronger than theirs in the case of the question being referred to arbitration. 353 The 
Haddah Agreement, however, did not specify the approach to be taken by the parties in 
case of disagreement over the interpretation of the Agreement. If the case had been 
referred to arbitration, the tribunal's decisions would presumably have been based on 
international law, 354 as is normally the case unless the parties conclude an arbitration 
agreement by which they specify that the decision should be reached in accordance with 
"law and equity", which means that general principles of justice common to the legal 
system should be taken into account, as well as the provisions of international law. In 
the Rann of Kutch case, 355 the parties asked the court to decide the case in the light of 
their respective claims and the evidence produced before it. In the Trail Smelter case, 356 
the law to be applied was declared to be United States law and practice with regard to 
such questions, as well as international law. In the case of the Haddah Agreement, 
however, no disagreement over the interpretation of the Agreement was involved, as the 
positions of the boundary lines were well defined in the Agreement. Therefore, the 
tribunal's decisions would be based on what had been agreed on by the parties in the 
Agreement. This would give Tubaiq to Saudi Arabia according to the Agreement. 
352 A1-Na'iem, The Saudi Political Boundaries (London, 1999) p. 36. 
353 ibid. 
354 Article 37 of the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conference. 355 The Rann of Kutch case, (1968), 7 ILM 633, Wetter, "The Rann of Kutch Arbitration" (1971) 65 AJIL 
346. 
356 92 British and Foreign State Papers, p. 970. 
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However, the amended Saudi-Jordan boundary remained de facto and each side held its 
own position. 
Similarly, in 1937, a contradiction was also found between the Haddah 
Agreement and the First Uqair Protocol regarding the Saudi-Iraqi boundary, specifically 
the intersection where the Saudi-Iraqi-Jordan boundaries met. According to the Uqair 
Protocol, the Saudi-Iraq boundary line ended at Anaza Mount, while the Saudi-Iraq- 
Jordan boundaries, according to the Haddah Agreement, met at the conjunction of 
longitude 39 degrees East and latitude 32 degrees North. These two points were 
different and not congruent. Anaza Mount was around 23 miles to the northeast of the 
point defined by the Haddah Agreement. The matter became more complex when a 
Saudi-Iraqi team visited the disputed area and found that Anaza Mount had two 
summits which were 8 miles away from each other. The Saudi representative suggested 
that the two summits would be the point where the three states' boundaries meet, while 
the Iraqis argued that the nearest summit to the longitude 39 degrees East and latitude 
32 degrees North would be the point where the aforementioned boundaries met. As a 
result of this complicated situation, the final boundary agreement concluded between 
Iraq and Jordan remained silent about Anaza Mount. Thus, the intersection where the 
Saudi-Iraqi-Jordan boundaries met remained in dispute between the three parties until 
final settlement of the Saudi-Jordan and Saudi-Iraq boundaries was achieved after years 
of negotiations. 
The aforementioned two points fall within the category of what is called 
"geographical problems in boundary delimitation". 357 Lack of geographical knowledge 
of boundary areas and, as a result, inaccurate prescription of the boundary sites on 
357 Holdich, Political Frontiers and Boundary Making (London, 1916) pp. 179-200. 
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which the boundary treaties are based, may lead to faulty boundary delimitation. Boggs 
argues that most boundary disputes have arisen because too little was known of the 
geography of the country at the time when the boundaries were first defined. 358 Proper 
definition of the boundary needs exact information, not only when the boundary is 
being demarcated in the ground but also prior to its delimitation in a treaty. The 
boundary dispute between India and China reflected this aspect of boundary making. 
Part of their boundary in the northeast sector is the "McMahon Line" which was 
delimited at the Simla Conference in 1914, by Tibetan and Chinese delegates and the 
representatives of British India whose chief was Sir Henry McMahon. The issue is that 
whereas the Peking Government repudiates the Simla agreement as void ab initio for 
want of authority on the part of Tibet, India, on the other hand, maintains the validity of 
the 1914 settlement. 359 
However, it may generally be said that the aforementioned negotiations of the 
boundary disputes and the subsequent settlements and agreements between Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbouring countries laid a working framework for the states' 
boundary system in the Peninsula. In the case of Saudi Arabia, these agreements were to 
help Abdulaziz in his policy of social transformation and political centralisation in a 
stable atmosphere. Indeed, these new governments now had the legal machinery to 
prevent populations from crossing their boundaries and were more able to control and 
sanction their tribes than ever. By the conclusion of the Haddah and Bahrah 
Agreements, a significant advance was made towards the settlement of the boundary 
disputes between Saudi Arabia and its Ashraf neighbours in the north. Although the 
Saudi northern boundaries were later amended, as will be seen in the next sections, their 
358 Boggs, International Boundaries (New York, 1940) p. 17. 
359 Cukwurah, The Statement of Boundary Disputes in International Law, op., cit., pp. 94-5. 
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settlements were a turning point in the concept of the international boundary in the 
Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, for the first time in the Peninsula, international boundary 
lines, as understood in international law, were delimited from the Arabian Gulf in the 
east to the Aqaba Gulf by the Red Sea in the west to separate the Saudi state from its 
neighbouring states in the north. 
4. The Final Settlement of the Saudi-Jordan Boundaries (the Treaty of 
Amman 1965) 
The Saudi-Jordan Boundary remained partly de jure with regard to that defined by 
Haddah Agreement and partly de facto regarding that amended arbitrarily by Britain 
until two decades after the independence of Jordan in 1946. During this time the 
relations between the two countries had substantially improved. In the 1960s, as a result 
of the Arab-Israel conflict, Jordan expressed its desire to negotiate a final boundary 
agreement in order to settle the pending issues which had not yet been settled between 
them, such as that of Ma'an and Aqaba. 360 Jordan, moreover, desired to expand the area 
south of Aqaba in order to facilitate the defence of its only seaport. 361 Therefore, 
delegations of the two governments started boundary negotiations in Amman, the 
capital of Jordan, on 7 July 1965. After several rounds of negotiations, the two parties 
agreed on a final settlement of the Saudi-Jordan boundaries 362 This was embodied in 
the Treaty of Amman which was signed on 9 August 1965, and which abolished all 
previous boundary Agreements contrary to the new delimitation. 363 According to this 
360 This was expressed by the King Hussain of Jordan and the Jordanian Foreign Minister and other 
governmental officials in a number of occasions while visiting Saudi Arabia, see Umm al Qura, No. 
biaby 
361 Abu-Dawood and Karan, International Boundaries of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 39-42. 
362 ibid. 
363 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 12. 
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Treaty, which was ratified by both parties, 364 the new boundary line begins at 25 
kilometres south of Aqaba instead of 7 kilometres according to the British line 
mentioned in Clayton's letters to King Abdulaziz. Now, Jordan's narrow coastline on 
the Gulf of Aqaba was accordingly lengthened to the southeast of the port. In return, the 
Saudis were given a substantial area of inland desert to the west of the main basin of 
Wadi Sirhan 365 (see map 6). As a result of the aforementioned Saudi-Jordan exchange of 
territory, some tribes in Wadi Sirahn were reunited again under Saudi rule and became 
Saudi citizens. The Treaty of Amman was more important for Jordan than for Saudi 
Arabia because it involved exchange of territories between the two states, by which 
Jordan gained the only outlet to sea. According to international law, such exchange of 
territory is one of the peaceful methods by which a state might acquire a territory. It is 
an example of cession, which is a transfer of sovereignty over state territory by the 
owner-state to another state. 366 Any state may cede a part or the whole of its territory to 
another state. It is a bilateral transaction that takes place voluntarily or as an outcome of 
peace negotiations or as a result of peace treaties which sometimes occur as a result of a 
threat or use of coercion. 367 Under traditional international law, a cession imposed by 
use of force was legal until recent times when modern international law prohibited the 
use of force. 68 Furthermore, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides that a treaty concluded as a result of the threat or use of force is void. 
364 Royal Decree No. 10 dated 21 August 1965, Archives of Council of Ministers. 
365 Jordan agreed to give Saudi Arabia about 7,000 square kilometres along the border which runs north 
and south on the western side of Wadi Sirhan. Saudi Arabia, in return, agreed to give Jordan about 6,000 
square kilometres along the western border which runs into the Gulf of Aqaba. See, Abu-Dawood and 
Karan, International Boundaries of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 42. 
366 Oppenheim, International Law, (1996), op. cit. p. 679. 
367 Sharma, Territorial Acquisition, Disputes and International Law (London, 1997) p. 137. 
368 Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, see supra part 1,1 of this chapter. 
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Cession can be effected by an agreement embodied in a treaty between the 
ceding and the acquiring state, which must be followed by actual handing of the 
territory to the acquiring state unless it is occupied by a third state at the time of 
cession. 369 Cession, however, does not transfer territorial sovereignty until the receiving 
state has effectively established its authority over the ceded territory. 370 The important 
point with regard to the exercise of rights over the ceded territory is that the acquiring 
state cannot exercise more rights than the ceded state had. That is what the arbitrator in 
the Island of Palmas Case371 noted, saying, "it is evident that Spain could not transfer 
more right than she herself possessed. "372 The right of transferring inhabitants with 
regard to citizenship, property, and other obligations should be assumed by the 
acquiring state. 373 The general principle with regard to the population is that persons in 
the ceded territory acquire the nationality of the new state and lose the nationality of the 
ceding state, unless they choose to keep their original nationality. 374 If they do, and they 
are over eighteen, their choice covers their wives and children under eighteen, and they 
must in such circumstances remove themselves to the old state. 375 
5. The Division of the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone (1965) 
As mentioned earlier, the Saudi-Kuwaiti Neutral Zone of 5,790 square kilometres was 
established directly south of Kuwait by the Uqair Protocols, which stipulated that the 
governments of the two countries would share equal rights in it until a further 
agreement was reached. At the time of the conclusion of the Ugair Protocol, oil had not 
369 Ibid., p. 680. 
370 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge, 1949) p. 213. 
371 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at p.. 879. 372 ibid. 
373 Lawrence, The Principles ofInternational Law, (London, 1925) p. 157. 
374 For further discussion regarding the right of self-determination of the inhabitants in the ceded or 
disputed territory of see infra part II, chapter II, 3 (the Buraimi Arbitration of 1954). 
373 Oppenheim, International Law, (1958), op. cit. p. 506 
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yet been discovered in the area although, as mentioned earlier, it was thought likely to 
contain oil. As a consequence, no guidelines were laid down between the two countries 
for the joint administration of the area. 
When oil was discovered in the Zone in the mid 1930s, both countries 
contracted with foreign oil companies to perform exploration work in the Zone. 376 oil 
production in the Zone in 1950s created strains and stresses between the two countries, 
and many difficulties arose as a result. 377 Therefore, both Britain and Saudi Arabia, in a 
number of meetings and exchanges of letters, expressed interest in dividing the Zone 
between them. 378 Actual direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
however, did not start until after Kuwait gained independence in 1960.379 The two 
parties agreed to create a joint committee of experts in order to provide guidelines 
regarding the division of the Zone and after years of negotiations, the parties finally 
agreed on the memoranda exchanged on 5t' August 1963, which laid down the principle 
of equal partition of the Zone. This was embodied in a Partition Agreement signed by 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on 7th July 1965 380 and ratified on 20th July 1966.381 
The Agreement provided for the division of the zone geographically into two 
equal parts which would be annexed as integral parts of the parties' territories, each 
country administering its half of the zone (see map 7). Article 1 of the Agreement 
provided for setting up a Special Joint Surveying Committee in order to survey the Zone 
376 (Foreign Office: 371/126933), official documents reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian 
Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, vol. 9, op., cit., pp. 365-7, see also pp. 227-33. 377 Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, vol. 9, op., cit., pp. 
270-9. This was also mentioned in the preamble of the Partition Agreement. 
378 (Foreign Office: 371/114646), official documents reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian 
Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, vol. 9, op., cit., pp. 270-9. This was also mentioned in the 
preamble of the Partition Agreement. 
79 Note that in the Uqair negotiations, Kuwait, as a British Protectorate, was represented by Major More. 
Sao Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 20. 
3a' Royal Decree No. M/3 dated 20 July 1966. Archives of Council of Ministers. 
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and provided for delimitation of the new boundary, which would divide the Zone 
equally, in the field. In order to do so, both countries contracted with the Pacific Airo- 
survey Company to perform the task under the supervision of the said Committee. 
When the task was completed and the actual boundary line was defined, the two parties 
agreed on the final report and map, which were provided by the company. Therefore, 
they signed a further Agreement in Kuwait on 18th December 1969 by which the Saudi- 
Kuwaiti boundaries were finally delimited in great detail. 382 This Agreement was 
appended to the Partition Agreement. The Partition Agreement guaranteed that the 
rights of both parties to the natural resources in the whole zone would continue to be 
respected after each country had annexed its half of the zone in 1966. 
6. The Division of the Saudi-Iraqi Neutral Zone (1981) 
The Saudi-Iraqi Neutral Zone, like the Saudi-Kuwaiti Zone, was established by the 
Uqair Protocols of December 1922. Although this Zone did not contain oil, the two 
parties, after their relations had been improved, signed an Agreement on 19 May 1938 
regarding its administration. 383 
In 1973, negotiations between the two countries began in order to set up a 
framework according to which the boundary agreed upon at the Uqair Conference 
would be demarcated on the ground. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia had suggested the 
division of the Zone and the Saudi delegation submitted the Saudi proposal to an Iraqi 
delegation when it visited Riyadh on 26 February 1973. Two years later, the first 
meeting was held between the two governments' delegations in Baghdad on 12 April 
1975. Article 14 of the first meeting report mentioned the Saudi suggestion for the 
382 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 19, p. 161. 
383 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, No. 50, p. 268. 
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division of the Neutral Zone and suggested that another meeting be held in Riyadh for 
the purpose of studying the possibility of diving the Zone by as straight a line as 
possible. 84 The second meeting was held in Riyadh on 28 May 1975 in order to discuss 
Article 14 of the report of the Baghdad meeting. As a result, the two parties initially 
agreed to divide the Zone into two equal parts, the northern part belonging to Iraq and 
the southern belonging to Saudi Arabia. On 2 July 1975, they signed the Riyadh 
report385 which also provided that a special joint committee would be set up for the 
purpose of choosing a proper company in order to work together to do the survey and 
the maps for the new boundary line. Once these works had finished, a final and 
permanent boundary agreement would be concluded between the two parties to replace 
those of Muhammera and Ugair386 
When the aforementioned Committee had completed its tasks and submitted its 
report to the two governments on 28 September 1980, the two parties concluded the 
Agreement of the International Boundaries between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, which was 
signed by the Ministers of Interior of the two countries in Baghdad on 26 December 
l9813ß7 and ratified on January 1982.388 As the parties were willing to define their 
boundary, not only did this Agreement divide the Neutral Zone but it also modified the 
Uqair boundary (see map 8). Indeed, Article 8 of the Agreement provided for the 
abolition of all previous boundary agreements including Bahrah Agreement of 1925 and 
the Agreement of 1938 which provided for the Administration of the Neutral Zone. The 
boundary was now a straight line, as most of the indentations of the old boundary line 
384 The Report of Baghdad Meeting of 1975, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 395 The Report of Riyadh Meeting of 1975, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 386 1bid 
387 The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 
388 Royal Decree No. MJIO dated 9 January 1982. Archives of Council of Ministers, also published in 
Umm al Qura No. 2918 dated 21 May 1982. 
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were avoided (although the indentations of the Uqair boundary line had been inevitable 
in order to include some wells within the territory of one country or the other. Now, 
however, a straight boundary line seemed to be more practicable and applicable than 
would formerly have been the case. The region had witnessed great economic and social 
developments during the years since the Uqair boundary was delimited. As a result, the 
wells and the tribal problems, which underlay the Uqair line, had become less important 
than they had been at that time. Article 7 simply provided that the two parties would 
conclude two Protocols, the first to organise the border authorities in the two countries 
and the second to regulate pasture rights. 
The two Protocols were concluded by the parties on 22 February 1982 and 
signed in Riyadh by the Ministers of Interior of the two countries. 389 They were ratified 
by both Governments on 27 April 1982.390 According to the first Protocol, the 
borderland was defined to stretch from the boundary line up to 10 kilometres in the 
parties' territories. 391 Moreover, both parties would refrain from establishing any 
constructions within one kilometre from the boundary line, except for official 
constructions such as those assigned for the guarding the border and other governmental 
constructions 392 The Protocol also defined the cases that would be considered as border 
incidents and violations and the procedures which would be followed by the parties in 
order to deal with them, as well as the border authorities from both sides that would 
carry out this task. 393 The Protocol, moreover, stipulated that the border authorities from 
both sides would define the positions of the border check and exit points and border 
3s9 The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 39° Royal Decree No. M/48 and Royal Decree No. M149 dated 27 April 1982, Archives of Council of 
Ministers, also published in Umm al Qura No. 2918 dated 21 May 1982. 
391 Article 2 (1) of the Protocol regarding the organisation of the border authorities. 
392 Article 1 (2) of the Protocol regarding the organisation of the border authorities. 
393 Articles 3-9 of the Protocol regarding the organisation of the border authorities. 
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guard stations. 94 The second Protocol stipulated that pastures and movements would 
be prohibited within the borderland, which was defined as being l0km from the 
boundary line. 395 Both parties would enjoy pasture rights within an area stretching up to 
30km beyond the borderland and in the pasture seasons the inhabitants of both countries 
would enjoy movement from one country to another according to the regulations which 
were defined in the Protocol. 396 
From the above discussion of the settlement of the northern Saudi boundary 
disputes with Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan, it is clear that the boundary disputes arose when 
these states first emerged as successors of both the Ottoman and the British Empires. 
These states were born with no defined boundaries, with the exception of the Saudi- 
Kuwait boundary, which was defined by the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention by a 
boundary line known as the Red Line. However, not only was this Convention not 
ratified, but it was also terminated and superseded by both the 1915 and 1927 Anglo- 
Saudi Treaties, which recognised the independence of the Saudi state and stated that its 
territory with the British colonies would "hereafter be determined". Such termination, 
however, gave rise to boundary disputes between the two states because Saudi Arabia 
claimed the territory assigned to Kuwait by the terminated Convention on the ground of 
ancestral rights, while evidence showed that Kuwait exercised effective control over this 
territory. According to international law, however, Kuwait would have legally 
possessed such territory and the action of both Britain and Saudi Arabia, regarding the 
termination of its inherited boundary line, was contrary to the principles of international 
law governing territorial issues. 
394 Articles 10-11 of the Protocol regarding the organisation of the border authorities. 
395 Article lofthe Protocol regulating pasture rights. 
396 Articles 4-10 of the Protocol regulating pasture rights. 
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Taking advantage of the absence of any defined boundaries, Saudi Arabia fought 
to expand its territory at the expense of the territory of its neighbouring states in all 
directions. Saudi Arabia acquired most of its territory by way of conquest, which was at 
that time a legal way of creating title, as long as it was followed by effective control of 
the acquired territory. Such acquisition of territory gave rise to boundary disputes 
between Saudi Arabia and these states. Among these disputes were the dispute over the 
sovereignty of Wadi Sirhan between Saudi Arabia and Jordan and the territorial dispute 
over the territory located between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Another dispute was the 
dispute over the two villages of Aqaba and Ma'an between Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
which were claimed by Saudi Arabia on the ground of state succession when it captured 
Hijaz and succeeded to the sovereignty of these two villages. These boundary disputes 
were aggravated by the clashes between the tribes of Saudi Arabia and its northern 
neighbours. 
To put an end to these boundary disputes, both Britain and Saudi Arabia 
approached the problem in an attempt to define international boundaries of a kind 
understood by international law, separating each sovereign from others. They were all in 
full agreement that their boundary disputes must be settled according to the principles of 
international law regarding the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. 
A state should have its own defined territory over which it exercises its authority and 
sovereignty. This settlement, however, was the first experience in the Arabian Peninsula 
regarding the definition of international boundaries. The problem was essentially legal: 
how to negotiate sovereignty rights and draw boundaries in the desert according to the 
contemporary of international law. At issue was not only the conflict between the 
parties' claims, but also the conflict between the concept of sovereignty in tribal law 
and in international law. 
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It could be said that Saudi Arabia and its northern neighbours have made a 
significant contribution to international law as was reflected by their practice, which 
was a response to the call made by international law for states to settle their disputes by 
peaceful means. Consequently, they all entered a new era of security, stability and 
coexistence in the region. Indeed, the concept of a modern sovereign state as recognised 
by international law has replaced the old concept of personal rule, whereby the 
allegiance of tribes was the source of sovereignty. Now, each state has its own defined 
territory over which its authority and jurisdiction are exercised, exclusive of other states. 
In the next chapter, the eastern boundaries will be examined. The discussion will 
include their evolution, the rise of boundary disputes and the methods of their 
settlement. 
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PART II 
EASTERN BOUNDARIES 
Chapter I 
The Evolution of the Eastern Boundaries and the Boundary 
Disputes 
When King Abdulaziz captured Al-Hassa region to the east of the Arabian Peninsula in 
1913 and portions of the Empty Quarter to the south of Al-Hassa, l the new Saudi 
boundaries with Qatar, the Trucial states2 (now the United Arab Emirates) and Oman 
evolved. These boundaries were in fact the first Saudi boundaries to evolve, and, for 
the first time since its creation in 1902, the Saudi political entity possessed a coastline. 
Indeed, by taking Al-Hassa to the east, the Saudis added a new dimension to their 
boundaries, an open door to one of the major maritime arteries in the Middle East. Not 
only did the Saudis accomplish their major goal of having a sea outlet, but they also 
gained a long coastline from the Kuwait border to the Qatar border. 4 
As far as Saudi Arabia's boundaries with its eastern neighbours are concerned, 
they were defined in the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Conventions as part of the definition of 
Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ud, op., cit., pp. 44-53. 
2 The Trucial States or Trucial Coast are the seven states or Emirates which are on the Arab side of the 
Gulf, namely, Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Al Fujayrah, Dubai, Ras at Khaymah, Sharijah and Umm at Qaywayn. 
In 1971 they joined together to form a single independent country under the name, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). In 1819 a British fleet was sent from India to the Arab side of the Gulf in order to take 
control of the Gulf trading cities to maintain security on the route from Europe to India, so the merchants 
could safely send goods between India and the Gulf. The British fleet destroyed all ships along both sides 
of the Gulf. As the British were not interested in taking over the desolate areas, in 1820 they decided to 
leave most tribal leaders in power and concluded a series of treaties with them. It was as a result of these 
truces that the Arab side of the Gulf came to be known as the "Trucial Coast" or "Trucial States". This 
area has also been referred to as "Trucial Oman" to distinguish it from the part of Oman under the Sultan, 
that was not bound by the treaty obligations. 
3 Abu-Dawood, and Karan, International Boundaries of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 32. 
4 Ibid. 
s (IOR: UP&S/18/B381) official documents reproduced in Tuson & Quick, (ed. ), Arabian Treaties: 1600- 
1960, (London, 1992) vol. I, pp. 91-138. 
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the two Empires spheres' of influence in the region. Article 11 of the Convention 
defined the boundaries by a straight line, known as the "Blue Line", running due south 
from Zakhnuniyah island, lying some distance west of the Qatar peninsula and 
terminating in the desert wastes of the Empty Quarter, to meet the boundary between 
the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. It defined the eastern boundary of the sanjak 
(district) of Najd (now Saudi Arabia) and separated it from the Peninsula of Qatar. 
According to this Convention, the area to the south and east of the Blue Line (now 
including Qatar, UAE and Oman) was acknowledged as within the British sphere, while 
the area to the north and west, including Hijaz, Najd and Hassa, went to the Ottomans 
(see map 9). As a result, the Ottoman Government renounced all its claims concerning 
the Peninsula of Qatar, which was accepted as an autonomous country. The Ottomans 
also renounced their claim to Bahrain. In return, the Turks were met on their 
requirements that Qatar should be ruled by Al Thani and that the Al Khalifa of Bahrain 
would not intervene in its affairs. In addition, the Ottomans gained Zakhnuniyah, which 
was just off the mainland, and the British agreed not to annex Bahrain. 6 
As in the case of the Saudi northern neighbours, boundary disputes arose 
between Saudi Arabia and its eastern neighbours on the ground of state succession when 
they succeeded the Ottoman and the British Empires. According to the principle of 
continuity of state boundaries already discussed, 7 the successor states can only acquire 
from their predecessors as much territory as the latter possessed. As far as the validity 
of the Blue Line as the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and its eastern neighbours 
is concerned, it could be said that, although the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention in 
6 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 62-3. 
See supra part I, chapter 1,2. 
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which the Blue Line was defined was never ratified, 8 the reference to the Blue Line 
contained in Article 3 of the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention (which was ratified) has 
given it legal validity as the eastern boundary of the Ottoman sanjak (district) of Najd. 9 
When this Convention was ratified, Abdulaziz had already concluded his 1914 Treaty 
with the Ottoman Empire in which he recognised the Ottomans' suzerainty over Najd 
and Al-Hassa, over which he ruled as Ottoman vali (governor). As a result, he was 
bound to abide by it and to observe the Blue Line. 10 Indeed, according to the 1978 
Vienna Convention and state practice before and after it, it could be said that Abdulaziz, 
when he succeeded the Ottoman Empire in Najd and Al-Hassa, succeeded in 
international law to the treaty obligations of the Ottoman Empire with respect to the 
boundaries of these districts. These boundaries are unaffected by the succession. 
However, the Blue Line, as defined, would have given the Saudi eastern 
neighbours more territory than they had held at the time of the evolution of the Saudi 
boundaries with them. As a result, Abdulaziz never recognised the Blue Line as a 
boundary line between his territory and his neighbours', because he claimed the 
territory that his ancestors had ruled in the first and the second Saudi states. " Instead, 
he intervened in the territory which he claimed beyond the Blue Line, giving rise to 
boundary disputes between him and his neighbours. For example, responding to a call 
made to him by several tribes of the UAE for protection against other tribes there, 
Abdulaziz's governor in Al-Hassa, Ibn Jiluwi, dispatched strong troops to raid Abu 
Dhabi territory in 1925. As the allegiance of the tribes was the source of sovereignty in 
8 The question of the non-ratification of the Convention and its impact and consequences according to 
international law was discussed in the previous chapter while discussing the Red Line as being the Saudi- 
Kuwaiti boundary which was also defined by the same Convention. 
9 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers (London, 1964) p. 113. 
10 Ibid., p. 111. 
1 Ibid., p. 123. 
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the Arabian Peninsula at that time, 12 the territory of the tribes who transferred their 
allegiance to Abdulaziz and accepted Saudi protection was to be considered as part of 
the Saudi territory. Therefore, a Saudi Agent accompanied by the local emirs of those 
tribes arrived at Abu Dhabi and told its ruler that Abdulaziz had taken the Awamir, the 
Duru and the Al Bu Shamis under his protection, and that the Saudi Agent was there to 
collect the zakah from them. 13 Despite Sultan Ibn Zaid's refusal to recognise the Saudi 
claim, Su'ayyid Al- Arafa, a Saudi Agent, went to Buraimi Oasis, and during his stay 
there, he carried out the regular collection of zakah from the inhabitants of the Oasis and 
the Bedouin tribes of the vicinity. 14 The Saudi Agent continued to collect zakah from 
some of the tribes of the Buraimi Oasis and in its vicinity every year until 1930.15 
Furthermore, the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty, 16 which recognised the 
independence of the Saudi state, acknowledged that Najd, Al Hasa, Qatif and Jubail, 
their dependencies and territories, and their ports on the shores of the Persian Gulf were 
the territories of Abdulaziz and of his fathers before him and his descendants. 17 
Wilkinson suggests that some of the significance of the ancestral clause in the Treaty 
was that Abdulaziz was determined that the Treaty formally defining Saudi-British 
future relations should recognize the continuity of Abdulaziz's historical rights. 18 Such 
confirmed historical rights would be in favour of the Saudi state whenever it discussed 
the problems of its territory and its boundary problems. This is the reason why the 
Saudis always based their arguments on these historical rights whenever they discussed 
12 See supra part 1, chapter 1. 
13 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 115-6. 
'4 Ibid, p. 116, footnote 1. 
13 Ibid., pp. 118-21. 
16 (IOR: LP&S/10/387), official documents reproduced in Tuson & Quick, Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 
29-40. 
17 Article I of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty. 
18 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 135. 
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their boundary disputes. The Treaty, moreover, acknowledged that the boundaries of 
Saudi Arabia with its eastern neighbours were not defined. 
"Bin Saud [Abdulaziz] undertakes, as his fathers did before him, to 
refrain from all aggression on, or interference with the territories of 
Kuwait, Bahrain, and of the Shaikhs of Qatar and the Oman Coast, 
who are under the protection of the British Government, and who have 
treaty relations with the said Government; and the limits of their 
territories shall be hereafter determined. "19 
This was reaffirmed by the 1927 Anglo-Saudi Treaty20 (or the Treaty of Jeddah) 
which, while recognising the territorial sovereignty of King Abdulaziz as the same 
territory as that confined within the Blue Line, recognised that the area had 
dependencies. 21 Not only did both the 1915 and 1927 Anglo-Saudi Treaties not mention 
the boundaries of the new Kingdom but they also made no reference to the Blue Line as 
being the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and the British colonies to the east. The 
reason for this was that relations between the British and In Saud had improved since 
the conclusion of the 1913 Convention with the Ottomans, so they ignored the Blue 
Line in Ibn Saud's favour, as they did not want to limit his territory. 22 In addition, the 
British recognised before the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah that Ibn Saud had 
established effective occupation over the territory, which was terra nullius, beyond the 
Blue Line, as it was later confirmed by the Foreign Office legal adviser, WT Beckett, in 
19 Article 6 of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty. 
20 The Text of the Treaty of Jeddah and the letters of ratification exchanged are found in Umm Al Qura 
No. 145 dated 23.9.1927, pp. 1-3, see also Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. 1, 
No. 10. 
21 Article 6 of the Treaty of Jeddah. 
22 See Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 151-2. 
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a report sent to the Foreign Office dated 29 August 193423. Therefore, they left the area 
beyond the Blue Line undefined. However, such a contradiction between the 1913 
Convention and both the 1915 and 1927 Anglo-Saudi Treaties gave rise to boundary 
disputes between Ibn Saud and his neighbours, as each of them claimed the other's 
territory. As a result of the improvement of Saudi relations with Britain, the British, at 
this time, did not recognise the Blue Line as a ground of the settlement of the boundary 
disputes which were to be settled some time later, as mentioned in the Anglo-Saudi 
Treaty of 1915.24 In addition, this Treaty recognised Saudi sovereignty on the basis of 
ancestral territory, which extended beyond the Blue Line. 25 However, when oil was first 
discovered in a commercial quantity in Bahrain in 1932,26 the British went back to 
arguing that the Blue Line was the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and its eastern 
neighbours. 27 
The reason for this new argument was that the British wanted to limit the 
territory of Ibn Saud in their colonies' favour because of the potential discovery of oil in 
the disputed area. 28 Not only was this argument, which was rejected by Abdulaziz29, 
contrary to the British attitude before the discovery of oil in the area, but it was also 
contrary to the British recognition of Abdulaziz's sovereignty over the territory beyond 
the Blue Line which was based on the effective occupation of terra nullius. This 
argument did not stand up in international law, as was admitted by WE Beckett, the 
23 Official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, (London, 1992) vol. 
18, pp. 59-66. 
24 Article 1 of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Metz, Persian Gulf States, op., cit., pp. 124-28, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 169. 
27 A telegram from Sir A Ryan, the British Minister at Jeddah to Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 
28 April 1934, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, 
(London, 1992) vol. 18, p. 47. 
28 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 183-5. 
29 A telegram from Fuad Hamza, acting Saudi Minister for Foreign Affairs dated 13 May 1934 to Sir A 
Ryan, the British Minister at Jeddah, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian 
Boundary Disputes, (London, 1992) vol. 18, p. 48. 
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Legal Adviser at the British Foreign Office, in his report dated 29 August 1934.30 
Beckett concluded that Britain would not win before a tribunal deciding the matter on 
legal principles because Abdulaziz exercised effective control over the territory beyond 
the Blue Line. 31 Indeed, if the case had been referred to an international tribunal, its 
legal decision would have been based on the principles of international law governing 
state sovereignty and the acquisition of territory. 
For the purposes of international law, territory is divided into three categories: 
(a) Sovereign territory, which is actually under the sovereignty of a state; (b) territory 
which is not owned by anyone and is open to acquisition, known as terra nullius; (c) 
territory called res communis which is also owned by no one, but (in contrast to terra 
nullius) cannot be acquired or reduced to sovereign control. 32 The prime instance of this 
is the high seas, which belong to no one and may be used by all states according to the 
rules of international law and with due regard for the interests of other states. 33 Other 
examples would be Antarctica, 34 outer space and the moon 35 
Prior to the establishment of Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states, the 
territory of the Arabian Peninsula might have been divided into two broad categories. 
The first is territory which was totally uninhabited, such as some scattered islands in the 
Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, as well as the large deserts such as the Empty Quarter. 36 
In addition to the Empty Quarter there were the Dahana Desert in the western Saudi 
30 Official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, (London, 1992) vol. 
18, pp. 59-66. 
31 Ibid 
32 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, op., cit., 4t' ed. p. 107. 
33 Article 87 of the 1982 United Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the Law of the Sea, United 
Nations Conventions on the Law of the Sea (UN Publication, Sales No. E. 83. V. 5). 
34 Article 4 of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, United Kingdom Treaty Series 97 (1961), Cmnd. 1535,402. See 
enerally O'Connell, International Law, op., cit., pp. 448-50. 
S Articles 1&2 of the Treaty on Principles governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Outer Celestial Bodies. 
36 Lipsky, Saudi Arabia: its People, its Society, its Culture (New Haven, 1959) p. 3. 
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Arabia and the Great Desert or Al-Nafud Al-Kahbir in the northern Saudi Arabia. 37 
These territories were terra nullius because they were uninhabited areas. 38 Therefore, 
because Abdulaziz effectively occupied the terra nullius beyond the Blue Line and 
effectively exercised his authority over it, which was demonstrated by his levying 
Zakah from the inhabitants and their submission to the Saudi government, it could be 
said that a tribunal decision would probably have been in Abdulaziz's favour. Indeed, 
Judge Huber in the Island of Palmas Case confirmed that: "a continuous and peaceful 
display of territorial sovereignty is as good as title". 39 He also declared that the 
Netherlands possessed sovereignty on the basis of "the actual continuous of peaceful 
display of state functions"40, evidenced by various administrative acts performed over 
centuries. 
The dispute over the recognition of the Blue Line as being the boundary line 
between Saudi Arabia and its eastern neighbours became even more crucial when 
international oil companies started to carry out some geographical exploration in the 
area. It was necessary for both the companies and the states which had granted 
concessions to these companies to know the definition of the territory in which they 
were working. Now, the British were determined that their interests would prevail in 
their remaining territories. 41 In 1933, King Abdulaziz granted a petroleum concession to 
CASOC. According to royal decree No. 1135, dated 7 July 1933, the concessionary area 
was to be "the eastern portion of our kingdom of Saudi Arabia, within its frontiers... "42. 
The royal decree did not specify the Saudi eastern boundaries because up to that time 
37 See the map of Saudi Arabia, The Historic Atlas of Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, 1999) pp. 182-3. 
38 For further details see supra part I, chapter I, 4. 
39 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at 876, see also Clipperton Island Case, (1932), 62 AJIL 390, Eastern 
Greenland Case, PICJReports, (1933) series AB, No 53, p. 151. 
40 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at pp. 867-8. 
41 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 171. 
42 Umm AiQura, No. 448 dated 14 July 1933. 
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they had not been authoritatively defined. When the United States Government made 
inquiries about the actual limits of the concession of the British Government, its 
Embassy in London was informed that the eastern boundary of Saudi Arabia was the 
Blue Line and that King Abdulaziz had succeeded to the Ottomans' sovereignty to the 
west and north-west of that Line. 43 The Saudi Foreign Minister at the time, Fuad Bey 
Hamza, disputed the Blue Line in view of the considerable changes that had taken place 
in the position of Saudi Arabia since the conclusion of the 1913 Convention and said 
that his government did not regard the Blue Line as the correct boundary line in the 
area. 44 So, the Saudis, as the successors of the Ottoman Empire, considered the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention as having been terminated due to the changes that had 
occurred since the conclusion of the Convention. It is true that it is widely accepted 
under international law that a party may terminate a treaty on the ground that 
fundamental changes in the circumstances since the conclusion of the treaty have 
occurred, 45 but such termination is not applied to boundary treaties, as Article 62 (2a) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties excludes treaties which define a 
boundary from those which might be terminated on the ground of changes of 
circumstances. 
Another Saudi argument put forward for not recognising the Blue Line was the 
reference to the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty, in which the British Government had 
recognised Abdulaziz as the independent ruler of Najd, Al-Hassa, Qatif and Jubail and 
43British Foreign Office Document: E 2481/279/91, a telegram from G. W. Rendel to Millard dated 24 
April 1934. 
"British Foreign Office Document: E 3651/279/91, a telegram from Fuad Bey Hamza to Ryan dated 13 
May 1934, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, p. 48. 
45 See Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ Reports, 1973, p. 3,55 ILR, P. 183. 
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their dependencies, which were to be determined thereafter. 46 The Saudi Foreign 
Minister argued that it might be deduced from this that the British Government had 
acknowledged King Abdulaziz's rights to his ancestral territories and his authority over 
the tribes inhabiting them. 7 An assessment of this argument was made above while 
discussing the 1915 and 1927 Anglo-Saudi Treaties. 
With regard to the Qatari boundary, Fuad Bey Hamza, the Saudi Deputy Foreign 
Minister, stated that it was the boundary of the inhabited towns and villages. 48 Indeed, 
the Shaikh of Qatar, at the maximum, never claimed much below the base of the Qatar 
Peninsula. Evidence of this is found in the practice of the Shaikh of Qatar when he was 
about to grant an oil concession to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) and sent 
some of his men with the APOC geographical survey team to show them his boundary; 
it was said that beyond the base of the Peninsula was a neutral zone. 9 Further support is 
found in a Lorimer's Gazetteer article about Qatar, based on special investigation before 
the First World War, in which there is no reference to any authority of the Shaikh of 
Qatar beyond the base of the Qatar Peninsula, although the boundary was 
indeterminate. 50 As for the rest of Eastern Arabia, Fuad Bey Hamza suggested that all 
the tribes living between the coastal towns of Qatar and those of Oman and Hadramout 
belonged to Saudi Arabia. They were entirely submissive to the law of the country, paid 
zakah and were obedient to the call of the Government in time of war. 51 
"British Foreign Office Document: E 4451/279/91, a telegram from Fuad Bey Hamza to Ryan dated 20 
June 1934, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 
54-5. 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid. 
49 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 172. 
50 Lorimer's Gazetteer, op., cit., vol. I, part IB, chapter IV. 
51 a telegram from Fuad Bey Hamza to Ryan dated 20 June 1934, an official documents reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 54-5. Kelly, Eastern Arabian 
Frontier, op., cit., pp. 124. 
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The boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours in the east 
continued to develop as a result of their competition for geographical survey and 
exploration in the area. For example, when Petroleum Concessions Ltd. 52 resumed oil 
prospecting in the Trucial Shaikhdoms and Oman, and in particular, its surveying of the 
Buraimi region in 1947-8,53 King Abdulaziz showed an interest in the region to the east 
of Jafurah after the lapse of more than a decade. Indeed, early in the following year, the 
Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) began its survey for the Saudi interest to 
the east of Qatar and in March another ARAMCO party travelled eastwards along the 
coast towards the town of Abu Dhabi, now the capital of UAE. 54 In April of the same 
year, a third ARAMCO party set up camp on the coast near Ghaghah Island. As a result, 
the British Political Officer in Trucial Oman, Sir P. O. Stobart, handed the leader of 
ARAMCO party a written protest asking them to withdraw, as their presence at a point 
North of Sufuq was considered as an intrusion. 55 ARAMCO replied by asserting that it 
had no right to intervene in the boundary dispute and any protest in this regard should 
be submitted the Saudi Government. 56 ARAMCO withdrew their party from the 
disputed area because of the sensitive position, but asserted that this should not affect 
the Saudi rights in the area. 57 In response to Stobert's protest, the Saudi Government 
protested to the British Embassy in Jeddah, asserting that the ARAMCO party had 
camped within the Saudi territory, as was supported by the presence in the area of tribes 
52 A Report of movements of a party from the south in Abu Dhabi, from the file of Petroleum Concession 
Ltd., dated 4 April 1949, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary 
Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 556-8. 
33 The Saudi Memorial submitted to arbitration for the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with Abu Dhabi 
and Muscat in 1955, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, 31. July 1955, vol. 1, pp. 396-7, 
from now on referred to as Saudi Memorial. 
54Ibid, p. 397. 
55 Saudi Memorial, op., cit., vol. I, pp. 397-8. 
561bid, p. 398. 
37 Ibid. 
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owing allegiance to Saudi Arabia. 58 This claim was rejected by the British Government, 
which invited the Saudis to discuss territorial rights in the area. 59 The Saudi 
Government agreed to open the discussion, but stipulated that the starting point should 
be the conquest of Al-Hassa by King Abdulaziz in 1913.60 Furthermore, they 
maintained that delimitation of the boundaries should be based on the evidence of the 
Bedouin tribes inhabiting the region and that the criteria for determination of 
sovereignty should be the effective levying of zakah and the existence of grazing 
rights. 61 These Saudi stipulations were rejected by the British Government62 and many 
letters and views were exchanged between the two Governments before it was finally 
agreed to submit the Buraimi case to Arbitration, which will be discussed in chapter two 
of this part. 
From the above, it can clearly be seen that the attitudes and stances of both King 
Abdulaziz and the British changed following the discovery of oil in Eastern Arabia. 
Both of them were more interested in the region than ever. Before the discovery of oil, 
there had been few problems in drawing the boundary line, even though the parties 
stood to lose some territory in the desert as a result. Now, however, the situation was 
completely different. Every effort was made to gain as much territory as possible, as it 
contained oil, which would change the life of the inhabitants of the region. 
38 A Note from the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy at Jeddah dated 26 
April 1949, an official document reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 
1992) vol. 18, pp. 560-63. 
59 A Note from the British Embassy at Jeddah to the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs dated 11 
May 1949, an official document reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 
1992) vol. 18, pp. 570-2. 
60 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 143. 
61 Ibid. 
62 British Foreign Office Document: E 8082/1052/25, Aide-memoir to H. M. King Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud, 
17 June 1949, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 584- 
5, in Saudi Memorial, op., cit., vol. 1, pp.. 
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Chapter II 
The Settlement of the Eastern Saudi Boundaries 
The eastern Saudi land boundary disputes with the British mandates of Qatar, UAE and 
Oman, unlike those of the British mandates in the north, were not settled during the 
mandate period, although several attempts at settlement were made. These disputes 
depended, in addition to the allegiance of tribes, on the oil factor, since oil was 
discovered in the area in the 1930s. Therefore, several attempts were made to define the 
boundaries between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours to the east. For example, during 
the Uqair Conference, Cox arbitrarily drew a line to separate Qatar from Al-Hassa in 
order to protect the British potential oil interests in the area. 63 The Cox Line began at 
the head of Salwa Gulf, leaving the Saudi Anbak Hijra (settlement) for the Saudis and 
ended to the north of Khaur al-Udaid, which he considered as belonging to Abu Dhabi. 
In addition to the Cox line, the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which was a British 
company, produced a map in 1933, before it was granted the oil concession in the Qatar 
area, in which a boundary line was drawn to include all the Peninsula of Qatar within 
the territorial sovereignty of the Shaikh of Qatar. 64 This proposed line started at the 
coast to the south of Jabal Nakhsh, 10 miles away from city of Salwa, 12 miles to the 
north of the Gulf of Dauhat Salwa, and ran southwards and southeastwards until it 
reached a point 8 miles to the north of Khaur al-Udaid. 65 Although the Company was 
interested in including as much territory as possible for its own interests, its proposed 
boundary line did not go as far westward as the Blue Line did. Indeed, the two 
aforementioned proposed lines were different from the Blue Line with regard to the 
63 Saudi Memorial, op., cit., vol. 1, p. 380, Al-Mansur, The Political Development of Qatar: 1916-1949, 
Qa 1979) p. 77 (in Arabic). 
Ibtar, id., pp. 49-95 and pp. 443-509. 
6s Ai-Mansur, The Political Development of Qatar: 1916-1949, op., cit., pp. 81-2. 
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boundary of Qatar, as they left the territory between the Blue Line and the base of the 
Peninsula of Qatar out of the Qatar territory. This, however, supports both the argument 
that Saudi Arabia exercised effective control beyond the Blue Line up to the base of the 
Peninsula of Qatar, and the argument that the sovereignty of the Sheikh of Qatar never 
extended beyond the base of Peninsula of Qatar. The Sheikh of Qatar, himself, had 
already made an undertaking to the Saudi government while visiting Riyadh in 1933,66 
not to grant any oil concession in the area without Saudi consent, an undertaking which 
was later denied by both the British and the Qataris. fi7 This undertaking, however, 
indicates that the Sheikh of Qatar recognised the Saudi sovereignty over the disputed 
area between the Blue Line and the base of the Peninsula of Qatar, otherwise he would 
not have made such an undertaking. The denial of the undertaking by the British and the 
Qataris resulted from the importance of the disputed area following the discovery of oil. 
The same thing happened regarding the Blue Line, when Britain did not initially 
recognise it as the boundary line between Saudi Arabia and its colonies to the east and 
then, following the discovery of oil, argued that it was the boundary line between them. 
1. The 1934-7 Saudi-British Boundary Negotiations 
While the Saudi government continued to deny that the Blue Line was its boundary with 
the British colonies to the east, whose emirs never claimed more than a small strip of 
the coastline, Britain was concerned about protecting its interests in the area after the 
discovery of oil, 68 and was more interested than ever in discussing the boundary 
question with the intention to make concessions to the Blue Line. 69 As a result, 
66 Umm al Qura, No. 457 dated 15 September 1933. For further details regarding the oil problem and 
dispute see Al-Mansur, op., cit., chapter V. 67 For further details regarding the oil problem and dispute see Al-Mansur, The Political Development of 
Qatar: 1916-1949, op., cit., chapter V. 
6S Leatherdale, op., cit., p. 231. 69lbid, p. 132. 
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negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Britain for the settlement of the Saudi 
boundaries with the British Protectorates to the east started when the British invited 
Fuad Bey Hamza, the Deputy Saudi Foreign Minister, to London in September 1934.70 
A series of preliminary meetings was held at the Foreign Office to enable each 
side to state its position more fully. Fuad Bey Hamza indicated that Abdulaziz intended 
to argue that the territories of tribes long under his rule should be included in his 
dominions. He made particular mention, in this connexion, of the Murrah and Manasir 
tribes. He was told in reply that while the Murrah might be regarded as subjects of 
Abdulaziz, the Manasir were mostly dependent upon the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. 71 As 
nothing more was heard of Abdulaziz's intentions in the months following these 
exchanges, the Saudi Government were asked at the beginning of 1935 for a definite 
statement of his claims. 72 On 3 April 1935, Fuad Bey Hamza handed the British 
Minister at Jeddah a memorandum setting forth a proposed boundary of Saudi Arabia 
with Qatar, the Trucial Shaikhdoms, the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and the eastern 
Aden Protectorates 73 (see Hamza Line in map 10). 
The proposed boundary with Qatar started on the west coast of the peninsula, 
about 15 miles from the head of the Dauhat Salwa, ran eastwards for about five miles, 
then turned south-eastwards to strike the east coast about seven miles north of Khaur al- 
Udaid. The line placed both Jabal Nakhsh, at the western foot of the peninsula, and 
70 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, (London, 1992) vol. 18, p. 307. 71 British Foreign Office Document: British Foreign Office Document E 5908/2429/25, Record of Second 
Meeting, 20 September 1934, and E 5997/2429/25, Record of Fifth Meeting, 24 September 1934, also 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 307-12, in Saudi 
Memorial, vol. I, pp. 382-3. 
72 Record of discussion with Fuad Bey Hamza on 20-21 January 1935, official documents reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 381-3. 73British Foreign Office Document: E 2700/77/91, Memorandum by Fuad Bey Hamza to Sir A. Ryan, 3 
April 1935, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, p. 
69. 
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Khaur al-Udaid, at its eastern foot, in Saudi territory. The proposed boundary with the 
Trucial Sheikhdoms began at a point about 16 miles south of Khaur al-Udaid, ran 
southwards for about 10 miles, then east-south-east in a curve until it met longitude 56 
Degrees East at its junction with latitude 22 degrees North. The proposed boundary with 
Oman ran down longitude 56 degrees East to its junction with latitude 19 degrees North, 
then turned south-westwards until it reached longitude 52 degrees East at its junction 
with latitude 17 degrees North. 74 
The Saudi proposed boundary, which came to be known as the "Hamza Line" or 
the "Red Line"75, which was based on the tribes and their loyalty, was reasonable, as it 
was in conformity with the Saudi sovereignty in the area. There were two Saudi hyras 
(settlements), Sikak and Anbak, to the east of the Blue Line and to the west of the 
"Hamza Line". Support for this is found in a statement submitted later by the British 
traveller, Wilfred Thesiger, to the British Government in which he stated that the 
"Hamza Line" represented the true boundary between Saudi Arabia and the Trucial 
States and that in an arbitration which took account of all factors, this should not be 
difficult to confirm. 76 Although the British did not accept the "Hamza Line", 77 they 
were willing to make a concession to the Blue Line. Their legal position for claiming 
the Blue Line was, after all, weak because it was contrary to the effective exercise of the 
State authority and sovereignty beyond the Blue Line. 78 Therefore, a settlement seemed 
possible in the form of a boundary somewhere between the 1913 Blue Line and the 
'4 rbid 
75 In order not to confuse this Saudi Red Line with other Red Lines, namely, that defined by the 1913 
Anglo-Ottoman Convention regarding the Saudi boundary with Kuwait and that proposed by IPC 
regarding the Saudi-Qatar boundary, this Line will be referred to as the "Hamza Line" from now on. 
76 In Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 71, in Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 
713-6. 
77 British Foreign Office Document: E 3783/77/91, Aide-memoir from Sir A. Ryan to Saudi Government, 
9 April 1935, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 71. 
79 See Leatherdale, op., cit., pp. 229-31, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 195. 
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1935 "Hamza Line". Indeed, the Foreign Office tactic was to offer three alternative 
plans for conducting their negotiations with Saudi Arabia, which made gradual 
concessions. 79 On 9 April 1935, the British Minister at Jeddah, Sir Andrew Ryan, 
handed the Saudi Government an aide-memoir proposing a boundary, the "Green Line" 
which was the first British offer and made a slight amendment to the Blue Line. 80 
When the Saudi delegates rejected this81, Britain proposed a "Brown Line", as their 
second line, which also did not meet the Saudi claim, as it retained as part of Qatar both 
Jabal Nakhsh and Khaur al-Udaid, claimed by the Saudis. 82 Therefore, Rendel, the 
leader of the British delegation, suggested, as the third alternative, a neutral zone, that 
would be created to include most of the Empty Quarter as a buffer zone or desert zone 
to separate Saudi sovereignty from that of Britain in the east and southeast of the 
Arabian Peninsula. 83 According to this suggestion, the Saudis would exercise 
jurisdiction in the neutral zone over the inhabitants, but not over the territory, and 
Abdulaziz's tribes would be free to roam up to the boundary as his subjects. Should 
they cross it, however, then they would be treated as foreigners and subject to the 
authority of the local administration. 84 This kind of neutral zone seems to have been a 
hybrid solution between the European and tribal concepts of territorialism. However, 
Rendel's suggestion was not formally submitted to the Saudi government, because 
79 A telegram from Sir A Ryan to Mr Stanley Baldwin dated 10 April 1935, an official documents 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 72. 
So British Foreign Office Document: E 3783/77/91, Aide-memoir from Sir A. Ryan to Saudi Government, 
9 April 1935, also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 71, in 
Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 3 85-6. 
81 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 386. 
82 Records of several meetings with Fuad Bey Hamza held at the Foreign Office between 24 June and 18 
July 1935, official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 
18, pp. 445-50. 
83 A note from Mr Rendel, Foreign Office to Laithwaite, Indian Office dated 23 October 1934, an official 
documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 324-6, also a 
note from Mr Rendel, Foreign Office to Laithwaite, Indian Office dated 7 November 1934, an official 
documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 19, pp. 779-85. 94 Ibid 
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Britain feared that in practical terms the neutral zone would gradually come under Saudi 
sovereignty, as the Saudis considered the Empty Quarter to belong to them. 85 In 
addition, ARAMCO, which considered that its oil concessions included all the areas 
that Saudi Arabia had claimed so far, informed the British that they were not prepared to 
make any commitments regarding the neutral zone. 86 
On the basis of the above Lines, negotiations were opened in London in June 
1935. The Green Line was rejected by the Saudi government which could not retreat 
from the boundary defined by the "Hamza Line", based on the allegiance of tribes 
beyond the Green Line. 87 Indeed, when the Saudis were asked to define the tribes 
considered to be directly subject to Abdulaziz, 88 Fuad Bey Hamza produced a list of 161 
wells running northwards from the Empty Quarter towards the Gulf coast, some of 
which had been excluded from Saudi territory by the Green Line. 89 Therefore, the 
Saudis, again, wanted a boundary line based on tribal allegiance, while the British 
opposed that on the ground that most of the areas concerned were deserts, over which 
several tribes with uncertain or shifting allegiances wandered. 90 
As a result of this disagreement between the two parties, the London 
negotiations terminated in July 1935 on an understanding by the British delegation that 
85 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 189-90 and pp. 269-70. 
861bid, p. 269. 
87British Foreign Office Document: E 4111/77/91, a memorandum by Fuad Bey Hamza to G. W. Rendel 
dated 2 April 1935, a summary of this memorandum is found in a telegram from Sir A Ryan to John 
Simon dated 6 April 1935 also reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 
18, p. 69. 
88 A telegram from Rendel to Fuad Bey Hamza dated 27 June 1935, an official documents reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 461. 
89 British Foreign Office: E 4314/77/91, Statement by Fuad Bey Hamza, 8 July 1935, reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 459-63. 
90British Foreign Office Document: E 3944/77/91, Record of First Meeting, with Fuad Bey Hamza 24 
June 1935, reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 445-7. For 
further details about the advantages and disadvantages of adopting tribal boundary or western-style fixted 
boundary see ibid., pp. 313-50. 
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they would make a further study of the tribal situation in the areas east of the Blue Line 
to which Saudi Arabia laid claim. 91 Based on the British investigations, it was decided, 
without withdrawing the basic objection to defining boundaries on the grounds of tribal 
lands and loyalties alone, to make some accommodation to Saudi Arabia's claims, 
especially in the Empty Quarter. 92 As a result, on 25 November, 1935 Sir Andrew Ryan 
handed Fuad Bey Hamza at Riyadh a memorandum proposing, as the British final offer, 
a boundary known as the "Riyadh Line", which was radically more favourable to Saudi 
Arabia than the Green Line had been93 (see map 10). 
The "Riyadh Line" began at the head of the Dauhat al-Salwah and ran south- 
eastwards for 10 miles, skirting the southern tip of the Sabkhat Matti, and eastwards 
along the northern edge of the Empty Quarter to the junction of longitude 55 degrees 
East with latitude 22 degrees 30 minutes North. With respect to the Oman boundary, it 
ran from there south down longitude 52 degrees East to its junction with latitude 20 
degrees North then turned approximately southwestwards to run in a straight line to the 
junction of longitude 52 degrees East with latitude 19 degrees North, then from this 
point to intersect at 18 degrees North with the ""Violet Line". 94 
The "Riyadh Line" differed from the "Hamza Line" in that it assigned more of 
the lower half of Qatar to that Sheikhdom, retained Khaur al-Udaid in Abu Dhabi 
territory, and reduced the Saudi's claims upon Oman and the eastern Aden Protectorate. 
It conceded to Saudi Arabia the Bunaiyan Well, which was used predominantly by the 
91 A telegram from Fuad Bey Hamza to Rendel dated 2 July 1935, an official documents reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 75-6. 92 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., cit., p. 127. 
93 Note handed to Fuad Hamza at Riyadh on 25 November 1934 by Sir A Ryan, an official documents 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 89. 
94 Ibid., Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, chapter V, pp. 389-90. The Memorial states incorrectly that the line 
passed through the junction of longitude 53 degrees East with latitude 19 degrees North. 
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Murrah, but retained for Abu Dhabi the Sufuq Well, which lay on the route from Abu 
Dhabi to Qatar and was much closer to the coast than had previously been supposed. 
With respect to Oman, this line left Shisor and Migshin as well as a great part of the 
eastern edge of the Empty Quarter within the Omani territory. Ryan told Ibn Saud that 
the Riyadh Line represented the furthest possible concession that his government could 
make 95 Ibn Saud rejected it within 24 hours, however, maintaining his claim to Jabal 
Nakhsh and Khaur al-Udaid on the area around the base of the Qatar Peninsula. This 
was based on the actual exercise of the Saudi sovereignty in these areas, 
96 while 
Britain's claim was based on the interests of IPC, which had already been granted oil 
concessions in Jabal Nakhsh. 97 
Ryan protested that Khaur al-Udaid formed an integral part of Abu Dhabi, 98 and 
the disagreement over Jabal Nakash and Khaur al Udaid caused a deadlock of the 
negotiations. 99 In December 1937, however, the "Riyadh Line" was amended by the 
British in favour of Saudi Arabia as a result of the discovery of the correct location of 
the Sufuq Well. '00 The modification left the Sufuq Well in the Saudi territory, instead of 
being within Abu Dhabi territory, as it was according to the "Riyadh Line". 
By 1937, World War II and the realisation of the magnitude of the problem in 
Palestine lent a new perspective to Anglo-Saudi relations. '°' The British realised that 
Abdulaziz's friendship during that time was much more important to them than a few 
95 A report made by Sir A Ryan about his visit to Riyadh and his negotiations with Ibn Saud dated 7 
December 1935, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., 
cit., vol. 18, pp. 89-96. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 387-8, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 230. 
98 Ibid 
99 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 493-502. 
100 A letter from Sir Reader Bullard to Saudi Government dated 4 December 1937, an official documents 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 505 & vol. 19, pp. 817-9, 
in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, chapter V, p. 393. 
101 Leatherdale, op., cit., p. 241. 
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hundred miles of desert, or even oil bearing area, and the outstanding difficulty with the 
boundary was largely concentrated on the Base of Qatar Peninsula. 102 Therefore, Rendel 
visited Saudi Arabia to discuss the question of Jabal Nakhsh and Khaur al-Udaid and he 
and Bullard, the British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, had several meetings with 
Abdulaziz and the Saudi Foreign Minister, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, in Jeddah. Rendel 
pointed out that Khaur al-Udaid had been recognized as Abu Dhabi territory as far back 
as the 1870s. Saudi Arabia's claim to it for constructing a harbour was practically 
useless, as being ill-suited for this purpose and too shallow. Possession of its foreshore, 
on the other hand, was essential to Abu Dhabi as affording a land link with the 
adjoining Sheikhdom of Qatar. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin promptly declared that Sufuq Well 
belonged to the Murrah. Rendel protested that this kind of progressive claim for the 
tribes of the Murtah could not be accepted. 103 
During the negotiations, Rendel stated that his government wanted to leave aside 
historical arguments and seek a practical way of settling the boundary dispute. Shaikh 
Yusuf Yasin agreed and pointed out that if Abdulaziz was to claim all his historical 
rights he would claim what his ancestors had, which was beyond what they were 
negotiating. 104 It was reported, on the other hand, that the Californian Arabian Standard 
Oil Company (CASOC), which held the Saudi concession, was exploring in the 
disputed area east to the "Riyadh Line" but west to the "Hamza Line". 105 Therefore, the 
British drew the attention of the emir Faisal (later king), now Saudi Foreign Minister, to 
these reports and to prevent any misunderstanding, reminded the emir of the course of 
'°Z Ibid. 
103British Foreign Office Document: E 2124/258/91, Record of Discussion between Rendel and Yusuf 
Yasin, 19 March 1937, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, 
o 
'g, 
cit., vol. 18, p. 505 & vol. 18, pp. 499-502. In Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 392-3. 
Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 392-3. 
105 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 394. 
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the "Riyadh Line". 106 They also expressed their willingness to re-open negotiations on 
the boundary on the basis of that line. 107 The Saudi government refused to accept the 
Riyadh Line as the basis of the suggestions. ' 08 The discovery of oil in large quantities in 
Al-Hassa in Saudi Arabia, Arab attitudes against the intervention of Britain in the Gulf 
and southern Arabia and the outbreak of the Second World War then put an end to the 
negotiations and postponed them for a decade. 109 
Whilst neither side approached each other to find a way out of the impasse 
reached at the end of 1935, some progress was made in the British camp about the 
matter that had been left open, that is, the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman. 
Sir Andrew Ryan had indicated that this part of the boundary offer might be improved, 
gradually extending it to somewhere east of meridian 55, as in the British "Riyadh 
Line", but not as far as 56, as in the Saudi "Hamza Line". "0 Fuad Bey replied that the 
Sultan would agree to any boundary proposed by the British because of his own 
problems with "two personages" in the interior. "' The Sultan, for his part, did not think 
that boundaries drawn with reference to latitude and longitude would necessarily define 
his boundary, which could not be established without careful enquiry. He was, 
therefore, not willing at that time to define an accurate line but had "no objection" to the 
line the British proposed. Major Watts put this reply down to laziness and believed that, 
were the Sultan at hand, he could be persuaded to commit himself to something more 
precise. The Foreign Office was beginning to learn that the Sultan's policy for 
106British Foreign Office Document: 7572/258/91, Bullard to Faisal, 4 December 1937, also found in 
Ibid., pp. 503-5, in Saudi Memprial, vol. I, p. 394. 
107 Ibid. 
108British Foreign Office Document: E 439/150191, Faisal to Bullard, 19 December 1937, in Saudi 
Memorial, vol. I, pp. 394. 
109 Leatherdale, op., cit., p. 247. 
1'0 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 19, pp. 683-90. 
111 For Further details see, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 48-51. 
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maintaining his interests was to commit himself to nothing. He never deviated from this 
reply and eventually the line beyond which he offered "no claims" became his official 
boundary. 12 
2. The 1949-54 Saudi-British Boundary Negotiations 
After the Second World War Britain was not as strong as it was before the War and, as a 
result, its influence in the area shrank in the favour of the US, which became its rival in 
the area in order to protect its oil interests. 113 Furthermore, the US diplomatically 
supported Saudi Arabia in its boundary dispute with Britain and tried to act as a 
mediator for the settlement of this dispute. 114 Consequently, the British Government 
invited the Saudis to discuss territorial rights in the area. 115 The Saudi Government 
agreed to open the negotiations but they stipulated that the starting point should be the 
conquest of Al-Hassa by King Abdulaziz in 1913. Furthermore, they maintained that 
delimitation of the boundaries should be based on the evidence of the Bedouin tribes 
inhabiting the region and that the criteria for determination of sovereignty should be the 
effective levying of zakah and the existence of grazing rights. 116 The British informed 
the Saudi Government that they did not regard the stipulations laid down by that 
government as constituting, of themselves, a satisfactory basis for the delimitation of 
boundaries. 117 Both parties were more concerned about the disputed area than ever. The 
discovery and exploitation of oil and increased governmental administration made the 
112 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 206-208, Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, 
op., cit., vol. 19, pp. 683-96. 
13 A1-Na'iem, The Saudi Political Boundaries, op., cit., p. 76. 
114 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 291. 
115 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 407. 
116 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 143. 
117 Foreign Office Document: E 8082/1052/25, Aide-memoir to H. M. King Abdul Aziz ibn Sa'ud, 17 
June 1949, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., 
vol. 18, pp. 584-5. 
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demarcation of the boundary desirable. Indeed, the boundary would serve to mark the 
limits of concession granted by either party and the limits of their governmental 
suzerainty; should not have any other effect on the inhabitants of Arabia. 118 
Negotiations started at Riyadh in 1949, where the Saudi Government put 
forward its proposed boundary with both Qatar and Abu Dhabi (now UAE). 119 The 
Saudi Government stated that, after detailed study of the tribal areas and of the facts, the 
Saudi Arabian Government considered that the boundaries between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar were as follows: 
(a) The frontier between Qatar and the Saudi Arabian Kingdom starts from a point at 
the coast of Dohat Salwa at 24 degrees and 56 minutes North (point A). 
(b) From point (A) the line runs due east until it intersects longitude 51 degrees 00 
minutes East (point B). 
(c) The frontier runs in a straight line from point B until it reaches the sea coast at 
latitude 24 degrees 48 minutes North (point C), leaving Amirah to the Saudi Arabian 
Kingdom. 120 
The Saudi Arabian Government considered that the frontier line between Saudi 
Arabia and Abu Dhabi started from a point on the Persian Gulf between Bandar Al 
"' Ibid. 
119 Foreign Office document: E 13024/1081/25, Statement by the Saudi Government dated 14 October 
1949, an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, 
p. 107, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1 pp. 399-400. There seems to have been some confusion about the 
direction that the boundary with Abu Dhabi should take after leaving point 'A' on the coast east of Mirfa. 
In their Statement to the British Government of 14 October 1949, the Saudi Government stated that the 
line should run south-west; yet in the version of the same Statement reproduced in the Saudi Memorial, 
pp. 399-400 the line is made to run south-east, This latter could be merely an error, but it could also 
represent a modification of the claim between 1949 when the Riyadh Line was suggested and 1955 when 
the Saudi Memorial was prepared in Saudi Arabia's favour. See Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., 
cit., p. 145, footnote 1. 
120 Ibid 
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Mirfa and Bandar Al Maghira, two kilometres east of Bandar al Mirfa (point A). From 
this point the boundary ran in a straight line to the South West until it reached latitude 
23 degrees 56 minutes North (point B). From there it ran due east until it intersected 
longitude 54 degrees 00 minutes East (point C) and from that intersection it ran in a 
straight line as far as latitude 24 degrees and 24 minutes North and longitude 55 degrees 
36 minutes East (point D). 121 
The Saudi Arabian Government considered that these boundaries corresponded 
with reality, having regard to their authority and the authority of Abu Dhabi and relying 
on the fact that the lands thereby allocated to Saudi Arabia were inhabited by tribes 
owing allegiance to the Saudi Arabian Kingdom: the Bani Hajir, the Manasir, the 
Awamir, the Al Murrah, the Dawasir and other tribes. As regards what lay to the south 
and east of the position 24 degrees 25 minutes North and longitude 55 degrees and 36 
minutes East, this was under the authority of Sheikhdoms which were not in treaty 
relations with the British Government. Therefore, the boundary between Saudi Arabia 
and these Sheikhdoms would be agreed between the Saudi Arabian Government and the 
Sheikhdoms in question. 122 
This boundary was completely different from the first Saudi boundary of 1935 
or the "Hamza Line", in that this boundary claimed more territory, namely, the Dhafrah 
desert, and the Buraimi Oasis. 123 The reason for claiming more territory was that the 
Saudis argued that their proposed boundary before the War was based on their 
minimum requirement, 124 because they were willing to conclude a compromise 
121 Ibid. 
122 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 401. 
123 Ibid., p. 399 & p. 402. 
124 Ibid. 
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agreement, despite their historical rights. 125 As no agreement was reached before the 
War, the Saudis considered themselves free from all previously proposed boundaries, 
which they considered to be void, 126 and were encouraged by the changes in the balance 
of world powers to come with a different boundary proposal, which constituted their 
maximum requirement. 127 Another reason was that Britain's admission that the area was 
terra nullius invited the Saudis to claim the whole territory, and to reinforce their own 
claim to "effective occupation". 128 As far as international law is concerned, this new 
proposed boundary was valid because it was based on effective occupation and the 
exercise of state authority over the claimed territory. 129 
The British, nevertheless, rejected the new Saudi boundary on the ground that 
Saudi Arabia claimed territory which it had acknowledged in 1935 to belong to its 
neighbours. The British, therefore, went back to what they considered to be their legal 
rights under the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. 130 The Saudis, for their part, rejected 
the British argument of the Blue Line as a basis for negotiations and declared that their 
new claim was based on the rights of lawful possession reinforced by the continued 
exercise of sovereignty and influence. 131 What is interesting here is that the new Saudi 
claim and the British counterclaim to go back to the Blue Line made all the territories 
east of this Line within the disputed area, including the territories which were claimed 
by both parties. Indeed, the reference to the Blue Line, as the basis of the negotiations, 
its Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 194 and p. 296. 
126 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 400. 
127 Ibid. 
28 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 289. 
29 See Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at p. 876, Clipperton Island Case, (1932) 62 AJIL 390, Eastern 
Greenland Case, PICJReports (1933) series A/B, No 53, p. 151. 
'30 British Foreign Office Document: E 14598/1081/25, Note from the British Embassy at Jeddah to Saudi 
Government dated 30 November 1949, reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., 
cit., vol. 18, pp. 108-9, in Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 401-2. 
131 British Foreign Office Document: 15073/1081/25, Note from Saudi Government dated 10 December 
1949, reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 110-11, in Saudi 
Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 402-3. 
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meant that the dispute had effectively returned to square one, despite years of 
negotiations. 
2.1. The Fact-Finding Commission 
Saudi Arabia did not want any area that was not inhabited by its own people to be under 
its control. 132 Therefore, it suggested a joint fact-finding Commission to determine 
accurately the loyalties of the tribes inhabiting the areas in dispute. 133 The British 
Government agreed that a joint technical commission might be set up for this purpose, 
but certain conditions must be observed, among them, that during the Commission's 
investigations both parties would abstain from any pressure on persons who may be 
called to give evidence before the Commission and that the Saudi Government should 
furnish detailed evidence in support of the claims east of the Blue and Violet lines of the 
1913-14 Anglo-Turkish Conventions. 134 If the commission proved ineffective, then the 
boundary dispute might be submitted to international arbitration. 135 
Britain could not refuse the Saudi suggestion of the fact-finding Commission, as 
it was reasonable, but invoked the Blue Line and put forward the conditions already 
mentioned. 136 With regard to the international arbitration, the British wanted a three- 
party mediation rather than to go to the International Court in the Hague, and they were 
convinced that the Saudis, also, did not want the matter to be referred to outsiders. 137 
The Saudi Government accepted the conditions concerning the proposed joint boundary 
132 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 399 & pp. 402-3. 133Ibid., 
p. 403. 
134 British Foreign Office Document: ES 1081/59, Aide-memoir to Saudi Government, 25 July 1950, 
reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 618-9, in Saudi 
Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 404-5. 
135 ibid. 
136 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 291. 
131 Ibid., pp. 291-2. 
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commission and agreed that there should be no pressure or irregular influence exerted 
by either party upon the work of the commission, and that the status quo ante October 
1949 should be respected. 138 On the other hand, they refused to accept the argument 
regarding the legal position established by the 1913 Convention and continued to assert 
that Buraimi did not lie within Abu Dhabi territory, nor the adjacent areas in Muscat 
territory, and that, consequently, the British Government had no legal standing in these 
areas. They were, however, willing for the boundary commission to examine the 
situation in Buraimi and its vicinity. The Saudis refused to supply detailed proof in 
support of their right to territory east of the Blue Line because they believed that proofs 
should be demanded only of one who claims ownership of what is not in his 
possession. 139 As a result, the British explained on 10 January 1951 that they had not 
intended that Saudi Arabia should be required to supply detailed evidence in support of 
its claims before the commission convened, but only that it should furnish such 
evidence during the commission's investigations. 140 
2.2. The Dammam Conference of 1952 
The British attitude towards the question of Saudi boundaries with the British colonies 
to the east changed when the Iranian Government nationalised Iranian oil. 141 The British 
Government and the other western oil companies favoured settling the boundary 
disputes on the Arab side of the Gulf, in order to protect their oil interests and to make 
138 British Foreign Office Document: ES 1081/74, Memorandum from Saudi Government to the British 
Ambassador at Jeddah dated 22 September 1950, reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary 
Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 637-8, in Saudi Memorial, Vol. 1, pp. 405-6. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Aide-memoir from the British Government dated 10 January 1951, an official document reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 639-40, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 
407. 
141 Al-Na'iem, The Saudi Political Boundaries, op., cit., p. 77. 
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up for the shortage in oil from the Gulf territory. 142 Therefore, the British Government 
invited Emir Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, to London to discuss the outstanding 
differences between the two countries. 143 Faisal suggested that a round-table conference 
of the various parties might be held, to see whether a settlement could be reached. Here, 
Faisal insisted on the Rulers of the British colonies, not their deputies, because he 
wanted to discuss the matters with those who were directly involved. 144 The British 
agreed, and arrangements were then made for the curtailment of activities by the parties 
to the dispute in the areas concerned in the interval before the conference convened. 
Now, the fact-finding commission was replaced by the conference and the agreed 
resume of the discussions, drawn up by Faisal at the end of the London meetings, stated 
that both parties agreed that, until the conclusion of the conference, the movements and 
activities of representatives of the oil companies on both sides and also movements and 
activities of the Trucial Oman Levies would be restricted to areas outside the disputed 
area. 145 The resume further stated that the purpose of the conference would be to study 
what territory belonged to Ibn Sa'ud and to the other rulers concerned, in order to arrive 
at a just delineation of their boundaries. 146 The idea of a joint boundary commission had 
not been abandoned; provision was made for the setting-up of a commission to collect 
information on both the territories and the tribes involved. 147 
The round-table conference was held in Dammam, on the Gulf coast of Saudi 
Arabia, between 28 January and 14 February 1952. The Saudi delegation was led by the 
Amir Faisal and included Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, deputy Foreign Minister, the Amir Sa'ud 
142 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 293. 
143 Saudi Memorial, p. 407. 
144 Ibid., 409, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 294. 
145 British Foreign Office Document: ES 1053/18, Agreed final text of Amir Faisal's resume, in Saudi 
Memorial, vol. I, pp. 410-11. 146 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 410-11. 
147 Ibid. 
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ibn Jiluwi, Governor of Nasa, and Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, Saudi Ambassador in London. 
The British delegation was led by the Political Resident in the Gulf, Sir Rupert Hay, 
who was accompanied by the Ruler of Qatar, Sheikh Ali ibn Abdullah Al Thani, and the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut ibn Sultan. 148 The Sultan of Muscat refused to 
send a representative and continued to hope that no dispute would arise. 149 These Gulf 
Rulers, on whose participation in the negotiations Faisal insisted, were there not to 
speak for themselves, however, but for Sir Rupert Hay to consult, as he made clear to 
Faisal. 150 This is not surprising because the said Gulf states were British protectorates 
and, accordingly, Britain was responsible for conducting foreign affairs on their behalf. 
Britain, therefore, had the right not to allow them to participate directly in these 
negotiations which were carried out to settle the boundary disputes between these Gulf 
Rulers and Saudi Arabia. 
The boundaries of Saudi Arabia with Qatar and Abu Dhabi were discussed by 
the principal delegates in seven plenary sessions, and by their deputies in five informal 
sessions. At the second plenary session, on 29 January, after consultation with the 
Sheikh of Qatar, Sir Rupert Hay put forward as the boundary claimed by the Sheikh a 
line beginning at Ghar al-Buraid on the Dauhat al-Salwah, and running eastwards 
through three named points to Harm Sauda Nathil, and thence through Aqlat Manasir to 
a point on the western shore of Khaur al-Udaid. '5' Such a boundary would retain for 
Qatar the strip of territory, roughly twenty-five miles deep, across the base of the 
peninsula, which had been included in the 1949 Saudi claim. At the third plenary 
session Hay put forward as the boundary claimed by the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi a line 
148 Ibid., p. 412. 
149 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 295. 
150 Ibid. Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 414. 
1S1 Saudi Memorial, p. 414. 
125 
Part Two: Eastern Boundaries 
beginning at Hazm Sauda Nathil and running on a straight course to the southernmost 
tip of the Sabkhat Matti. From there, the line ran approximately southeastwards to al- 
Quraii, then roughly east-north-east to Umm al Zamul. 152 The southern boundary so 
formed, it was later explained, included within Abu Dhabi territory the district known as 
Kidan, to the south of Liwa, to which it was more closely allied, topographically, than 
to the heavy sands of the Empty Quarter. Further east, the great sand dunes of the 
Ramlat ibn Su'aidan formed a natural boundary as far as Umm al-Zamul. 153 
In the following meetings the Saudis contented themselves with rebutting all the 
evidence for Abu Dhabi's claim. Faisal denied that the British Government's 
recognition of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's title to Khaur al-Udaid could serve to transfer 
sovereignty to him. This, however, had not been the point made by the British 
delegation. The first recognition of Abu Dhabi's authority over the khaur in the 1870s 
had come about as a result of its being used as a refuge for pirates. Later recognitions 
were accorded because no one else could prove title to the place, and because the 
Ottomans and the Sheikh of Qatar had endeavoured, at various times, to occupy it. 
Saudi Arabia did not put forward a formal claim to its sovereignty until 1935. If the 
earlier recognition had been made with the object of thwarting Saudi Arabia's later 
ambitions, then the Sheikh of Qatar was crediting the British Government with 
remarkable foresight. 
The positive arguments put forward by the Saudi delegation in support of the 
1949 claim were concerned largely with the Dhafrah and the western areas in general. 
Faisal stated on 2 February that the Dhafrah was the dirah (territory) of the Manasir and 
152 ibid. 
153 British Foreign Office Document: ES 1081/63, Record of Fourth Meeting at Dammam, 31 January 
1952, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 414-5. 
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that any other tribes found there were interlopers. '54 The Bani Yas in the Dhafrah did 
not outnumber the Manasir, nor were they all Abu Dhabi subjects. The Mazari' section 
owed loyalty to Saudi Arabia. 155 The Manasir, he went on, were a Saudi tribe, and the 
British Government had admitted this in a letter from the British Minister at Jeddah on 
20 April 1942, concerning the Anglo-Saudi agreement of that year on Kuwait. 156 It was 
pointed out to Faisal that the letter referred to tribes in the vicinity of Kuwait, and that it 
did not actually admit the Manasir in that area to be a Saudi tribe. 157 He laid 
considerable emphasis, however, upon the zakat collected by Saudi Arabia from the 
Manasir and others in these areas. The zakat collected by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on 
dates at Liwa, he said, was not the zakat prescribed by the Shari 'ah but merely gifts 
from Bani Yas tribesmen. The real zakat was that collected by the Saudi Government in 
Dhafara. Shaikh Yusuf Yasin went even further and asserted that the Saudi Government 
took zakat on livestock only and no zakat was ever taken on growing crops. '58 
During the Conference, the Saudi-Qatar boundary was not an issue because 
completely amity existed between the two countries and it was said no barrier would 
ever stand between them. '59 Indeed, although their boundary was not formally settled at 
the Conference, both parties came to the Conference after having come to a secret 
understanding about their prospective boundaries at just about the time when the Saudis 
and the British negotiations were reaching a final deadlock before the War. 160 This 
secret understanding indicates the willingness of the two parties to settle their boundary 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid 
156 Ibid 
137 Ibid. 
us Ibid. 
159 On the second day of the Conference, in 29 January 1952 the Sheik of Qatar declared that he had 
always considered King Abdulaziz as his father, and therefore, any boundary settlement by his Majesty 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar would be accepted, in Saudi Memorial, vol. I, p. 413. 
160 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 287 and p. 296. 
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dispute and that the difficulties over these boundaries were caused by the British 
presence. 161 
On the other hand, Saudi relations with Shakhbut went from bad to worse during 
the Conference, and the British realised that any further detail would simply make 
settlement even more remote. 162 Therefore, it was decided that a series of informal 
meetings between the Foreign Office officials without the leaders of the delegations or 
the rulers might help clear the ground. 163 However, in the informal negotiations the 
Saudi delegates spoke of past understandings, although no written supporting 
documents were produced, between Imam Faisal (one of the Saudi rulers of the second 
Saudi state which rose and fell between 1823-1891) and the British during the visit of 
Colonel Lewis Pelly, then the British Representative in the Arabian Gulf, to Imam 
Faisal in 1865. The Saudi delegates did not produce any evidence of this claim which 
suggests that no agreement had been concluded between the Saudis and the British in 
this respect. This view is supported by an undertaking164 found in both the British and 
Saudi Memorials which was signed on 21St April 1866 by Mohammed bin Abdullah bin 
Maneh on behalf of Imam Abdullah bin Faisal, the son of Imam Faisal. The undertaking 
was a declaration by the Saudis of non-aggression against Muscat and the Trucial 
Sheikdoms. 
Another claim put forward by the Saudi delegates was that there had been an 
agreement with Sir Percy Cox and General Clayton in 1915, and that Cox had said that 
161 See ]bid, p. 295. 
1621bid., p. 296. 
'63Ibid, p. 297. 
164 See (IOR: LP&S61544), Collection to Despatch no. 61 of 22 August 1866), in Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), 
Arabian Treaties, op., cit., vol. 4, p. 17. For more details see, Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 
121-122, Troeller, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Saud, op., cit., pp. 17- 
18. 
128 
Part Two: Eastern Boundaries 
everyone knew that these Trucial Sheikhs' influence did not extend more than fifteen 
miles from their capitals. Since then, the Trucial Sheikhs' power had waned and it was 
only thanks to Britain that they had lasted. 165 Abdulaziz was convinced that there was 
an old agreement between the two countries, that this had been acknowledged in a 
formal agreement and that Britain had also recognized that Qatar and the Trucial 
Sheikhs did not have proper territories. The British simply replied that Cox could never 
have made such an admission, for he knew that the Blue Line had been agreed with the 
Ottomans within the last two years. This British argument seems to be untenable in the 
light of the fact that Cox and the Foreign Office considered the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman 
Convention, by which the Blue Line was defined, a dead letter in concluding the 1915 
and 1927 Anglo-Saudi Treaties and Uqair Protocols. 166 In addition, Cox admitted the 
reduction of the status of Qatar and the Trucial Sheikhs without objection in 1915 with 
the conclusion of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty. 167 Abdulaziz's wording for Article 6 
already quoted168 was accepted and was also retained in the definitive 1927 Anglo- 
Saudi Treaty (the Treaty of Jeddah). 169 
In the case of Kuwait, which was discussed in the previous part, Britain told the 
emir of Kuwait that the 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was drawn up under 
conditions which no longer obtained, that he was not a party to this Convention, and 
that, in any case, it had been superseded by Article 6 of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty 
165 Ibid. 
166 See supra chapter I. 167 (IOR: LP&S/10/387), in Tuson & Quick, Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 29-40. 
168 Supra chapter I. 
169 The Text of the Treaty of Jeddah and the letters of ratification exchanged are found in Umm Al Qura 
No. 145 dated 23.9.1927, pp. 1-3, see also Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, 
No. 10. 
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which provided that the Saudi-Kuwait boundaries would be defined later. 170 In light of 
this, it could be argued that the same arguments could be applied to Saudi Arabia's 
boundaries with its eastern neighbours defined by the Blue Line, because this Line was 
defined by the same Convention and the provisions of Article 6 of the 1915 Anglo- 
Saudi Treaty, which stated that the Saudi boundaries with the British protectorate were 
to be determined hereafter, applied to all the British protectorate. 171 As Britain, 
however, continued to insist on the validity of the Blue Line, this must have given the 
impression to Abdulaziz that the British were reluctant to accept the reality, which 
strengthened him in his new course of action to extend his boundary claim. 172 
Clearly, then, agreement was some way off and deadlock had been reached. 
After consultations with London, Sir Rupert Hay proposed that settlement of the Abu 
Dhabi boundary might be possible if the Saudis returned to their 1935 position the 
(Hamza Line), but agreed to drop Khaur al-Udaid. 173 Emir Faisal agreed to lay this 
proposal before his Government and obtain its instruction. 174 However, in view of the 
fact that for the moment the Saudi 1949 statement was now a claim and not just a 
proposal, there was no alternative but to adjourn the negotiations sine die and allow the 
Saudis to consider this new British suggestion. It was agreed that in the meantime the 
restriction imposed on movements in the disputed areas would continue. 175 
170 Memorandum by the British Political Agent in Kuwait dated 17 July 1920, an official document 
reproduced in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries: Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., 
vol. 9, p. 59. 
"' See supra chapter I of this part for Article 6 of the 1915 Anglo-Saudi Treaty, see also supra part 1, 
chapter 1, the Saudi-Kuwaiti boundary dispute. 
172 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 298. 
173 Saudi Memorial, p. 417. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Ibid, p. 416. 
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Saudi Arabia suggested that the question should be settled by means of a 
plebiscite, and that a Saudi-British-American Commission should be set up to supervise 
it. 176 The British rejected this suggestion on the ground that Turki ibn Utaishan, the emir 
of Ras Tanura in the Al-Hassa region, had been sent to Buraimi for the purpose of 
ensuring, by means of bribery and intimidation, 177 that such a plebiscite would produce 
results favourable to Saudi Arabia. 178 A plebiscite, moreover, would not take into 
account the historical bases of the contending parties' claims. 179 Although the British 
did not submit any evidence regarding these allegations, it was self-evident that the 
presence of Turki ibn Utaishan in Buraimi helped to make the inhabitants pay their 
allegiance, which was the source of sovereignty in Arabia, to the Saudi Government. As 
no evidence had been provided by Britain, it could be argued that Saudi Arabia carried 
out its duty and responsibility towards its inhabitants by providing them with the 
services they needed, in the absence of any other responsible authority in the area. The 
presence of Turki ibn Utaishan in Buraimi, along with the loyalty of the inhabitants, 
might be viewed as evidence of the exercise of the Saudis' sovereignty over the 
Buraimi, especially as the Saudis denied that the loyalty of the inhabitants was gained 
by means of bribery. 180 They stated, moreover, that the loyalty was the will and desire 
of the inhabitants, as the Sheiks of the Buraimi tribes participated in several 
176 A telegram from ibn Saud to the British Government dated 23 October 1952, in Saudi Memorial, pp. 
426-7. 
1" Note that the Saudi Memorial stated that Turki ibn Utaishan was appointed in 1952 as governor of 
Buraimi and was accompanied by a civil committee of forty persons in order to help him to carry out the 
responsibilities of his new position, Saudi Memorial, pp. 419-20. 
178 A note from the British Ambassador at Jeddah to the Saudi Government dated 2 April 1953, an official 
documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 153-60, in 
Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 426-7. The Buraimi Memorial, Memorial submitted by the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island. Arbitration Concerning Buraimi and the Common 
Frontiers Between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia (Buckinghamshire, 1987) vol. 1, pp. 135-8, Saudi 
Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 426-7 and pp. 502-5. 179 Ibid. 
180 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 421-22. 
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demonstrations expressing their allegiance to the Saudi Government. 181 These Sheiks 
also signed a declaration of loyalty to ibn Saud and had it ratified not only by the 
Buraimi Qadi (Judge) but also by both the Judge of Sharijah, one of the UAE provinces, 
and Dubai's religious leader. 182 
A few days later, other Sheikhs in the region signed similar declarations and, 
within one month from the arrival of Turki ibn Utaishan to Buraimi, the number of 
Sheikhs and nobles who had signed written declarations amounted to not less than 59.183 
However, as a result of the failure of the Dammam Conference to achieve any progress 
regarding the question of the Saudi boundary with Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia reassumed 
its official existence in the Buraimi Oasis and succeeded in rallying the tribes' 
support. 184 Britain, on the other hand, responded by setting a police check point four 
kilometres from the Buraimi. 185 British military aircraft, furthermore, flew daily over 
the Oasis and its villages at low level. 186 
The US Ambassador at Jeddah intervened to mediate between the two parties 
and to reach a Standstill Agreement, 187 signed in Jeddah on 26 October 1952, which 
stated that the two parties were allowed to keep their present positions in Buraimi, but 
would refrain from any threatening move or provocative actions. ' 88 This agreement was 
a positive step towards preventing the exacerbation of the dispute, but it did not last 
very long. The British withdrew from it because they considered the activities of Turki 
181 Ibid., 
182 Sharijah and Dubai were among the Sheikdoms which were under British protection at the time. 
183 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 421-2. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Saudi Memorial, vol. I, pp. 422-3, Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, Primary 
Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 675-692. 
186 ibid. 
187 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 149-52, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, 
pp. 408-11 and pp. 418-27. 
88 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 425. 
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ibn Utaishan, the Saudi governor in Buraimi, a violation of both the London Agreement 
and the Standstill Agreement. 189 Britain accordingly reserved complete freedom of 
action, both on its own behalf and on behalf of the rulers under its protection, with 
respect to the matters covered by the Standstill Agreement, and established several 
police posts in the disputed area. 190 The British considered the Standstill Agreement as 
being terminated on the ground that Saudi Arabia had violated its provisions by the 
activities of Turki ibn Utaishan in the disputed area. 
International law recognises the right of a state to terminate a treaty if the other 
party commits a material breach of the provisions of the treaty. Article 60 (1) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: 
"A material breach of a bilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles 
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for termination the treaty or 
suspending its operation in whole or part". 
But whether Saudi Arabia had violated the Agreement or not is in question. The Saudis 
argued that the Standstill Agreement did not extend to the Buraimi, as it only included 
oil companies and military activities, and not civilian employees such as Turki ibn Utai- 
shan and his men. 191 This issue, therefore, resulted from the dispute between the parties 
over the identities of Turki In Utaishan and his men. Britain considered them as a 
military force, and as a result, their presence in the disputed area as a violation of the 
Standstill Agreement. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, insisted that they were civilian 
employees and their presence in the disputed area was legal because the Agreement was 
189 A statement of protest handed by the British Embassy at Jeddah to the Saudi Government dated 14 
September 1952, an official British document reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, 
oz., cit., vol. 18, pp. 153-60, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 421. 
1 Ibid. 
191 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p 421. 
133 
Part Two: Eastern Boundaries 
only concerned with military activities, not civilian ones. 
Again, it was very important that both Saudi Arabia and Britain should act in 
good faith to carry out their obligations and refrain from any act, which was contrary to 
the provisions of the Agreement. Article 26 of Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties provides that a treaty in force is binding upon the parties and must be 
performed by them in good faith. No one knew the real identities of Turki ibn Utaishan 
and his men except the Saudi Government, and therefore, they could have acted in bad 
faith by sending military people in civilian clothes. Similarly, if the British wanted to 
act in bad faith, they could use their allegations regarding Turki ibn Utaishan against 
Saudi Arabia as grounds for the termination of the Standstill Agreement. In addition to 
the problem of Turki ibn Utaishan, the Saudis met every accusation of irregular 
behaviour levelled against him with an accusation of a similar kind against the Political 
Officer or other British officials. 192 Indeed, they stated that their sovereign rights were 
being infringed by the actions of British representatives in the Buraimi area, especially 
the visits of the Political Officer, Trucial Oman, to the oasis. 193 They also claimed that 
Britain had no right in Buraimi because it was not under the sovereignty of any of those 
who had a protection treaty with Britain, and Turki ibn Utaishan had been appointed as 
a Saudi governor after the Britain intervention in the area. 194 
The US pressures on Britain, together with the Saudis' threat to resort to the 
Security Council, 195 made the British go back on their withdrawal from the Standstill 
Agreement. Under international law, any state, whether a member of the United Nations 
192 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 153-60, in Saudi Memorial, vol. II, 
Annex 85. 
193 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 419. 
94 Ibid., p. 421. 
195 A personal letter from Ibn Saud to the British Foreign Minister handed by the Saudi Embassy at 
London dated 19 September 1952, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, p. 423. 
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or not, has the right to bring any dispute to the attention of the Security Council in order 
that the latter may investigate it and determine whether its continuance is likely to 
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. 196 The Security Council 
may recommend appropriate procedures or methods of settlement taking into account 
the methods adopted by the parties to the dispute. 197 Further action may be taken by the 
Security Council under the function granted to it by Article 39 of the United Nations 
Charter, to determine the existence of any "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression". If any of the said actions is found by the Security Council, it may 
recommend or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42 
of the United Nations Charter to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
According to these two Articles, the action to be adopted by the Security Council might 
fall into two categories: (a) non-military action under Article (41) or (b) military action 
under Article (42) if the former is inadequate or insufficient to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. 
Whether or not the Security Council would have recommended methods of 
settlement or determined the existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act 
of aggression in Britain's action would depend on the consequences of Britain's 
withdrawal from the Agreement. However, it is not likely that the Security Council 
would have taken any action or adopted any resolution against Britain, because Britain 
would have vetoed it. Britain did want the case to be taken to the Security Council 
because the British did want to be seen by the world community as violating 
international law by withdrawing from the Agreement. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, 
might have known that resorting to the Security Council would have been useless, but it 
196 Articles 34 and 35 of the United Nations Charter. 
197 Articles 36 and 37 of the United Nations Charter. 
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might have wanted its issue to be given international attention, which might have helped 
it in the settlement of its boundary disputes in the future. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia 
continued in this unstable period to observe the restriction in the disputed areas which 
was already agreed upon by the two parties, but as a result of a personal suggestion from 
the US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, the two parties agreed that such a restriction would 
apply only to oil activities in the Buraimi Oasis. 198 
Form the above, it could be said that with the exception of the Saudi-Qatari 
boundary dispute, the Dammam Conference failed to settle Saudi Arabia's boundary 
disputes its eastern neighbours. The reason for this was that the parties were in 
disagreement on the validity of the Blue Line, as well as the sovereignty over certain 
tribes in the disputed area. Another reason was that both the British and the Saudis acted 
in bad faith regarding the violation of the Standstill Agreement, as the parties accused 
each other of violating the Agreement. 
3. The Buraimi Arbitration of 1954 
In 1954, the idea of the neutral zones came to the fore again, but this time Saudi Arabia 
made the suggestion when the confrontation between the two parties reached serious 
proportions. According to this suggestion, Saudi Arabia would have Khaur al-Udaid, 
but the rest of the area between the Saudi claim of 1949 and that of the British of 1952 
regarding Abu Dhabi should be a neutral zone. 199 In this neutral zone, the Saudis would 
grant their right over half the oil to a British company. 200 
In November 1952, the British Government suggested to the Saudi Government 
198 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 423-5, see also Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, Primary 
Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 153-9. 199 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 270. 200ßritish Foreign Office Document: 371/109832, quoted in Ibid 
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that as the area of dispute regarding the boundary question was so great, the question 
should be submitted to arbitration. 201 The Saudi reply to this was to insist that Buraimi 
should be treated separately from the boundary problem as a whole, as it was a part of 
the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, and the people who lived in that area and its vicinity bore 
allegiance to the King of Saudi Arabia. 202 The British Government, however, did not 
agree to this, on the ground that Saudi Arabia had previously agreed to the inclusion of 
the oasis in the area to be examined by a boundary commission and the Standstill 
Agreement recognized that it was in dispute. 03 The British expressed their intention to 
honour their obligation to the Gulf states and repeated the earlier offer to submit the 
whole boundary dispute to impartial arbitration. 204 Ibn Saud replied that he wished to 
see a return to the situation created by the London Agreement and the Standstill 
Agreement. 205 He was willing to consider arbitration as a means of settling the dispute, 
but he wished it to be combined with his government's earlier proposals for a 
plebiscite. 206 
Negotiations were re-opened shortly after this exchange to work out the basis of 
an arbitration agreement. In order to restore normality to the situation at Buraimi and to 
safeguard the chances of an impartial arbitration, the British and Saudi negotiators 
agreed on October 1953 to an interim regime for Buraimi and the other disputed 
201 A note from the British Government to the Saudi Government dated 22 November 1952, an official 
document reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 703-5. 
202 A note from the Saudi Government to the British Ambassador at Jeddah dated 6 December 1952, an 
official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 706- 
8. 
203 A note from the British Government to the Saudi Government dated 5 January 1953, an official 
documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 708-11. 
204 A letter from Sir Churchill, the British Prime Minister to Ibn Saud dated 2 April 1953, an official 
documents reproduced in ibid. 
205 A note from Ibn Saud to Sir Churchill dated 20 April 1953, an official documents reproduced in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 717-20. 206 ibid. 
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areas, 207 based upon a mutual withdrawal of forces and the maintenance of a small 
police force in the oasis by both sides to keep order during the period of arbitration. 208 
Discussions began in December 1953 on the terms of the arbitration agreement itself, 
and continued until the following July when the Arbitration Agreement209 was signed at 
Jeddah on 30 July 1954, coming into force on the same day. The independent and 
impartial tribunal was to decide: 
(a) the location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi within 
the line claimed by the former in 1949 and that put forward on behalf of the latter in 
1952; and 
(b) sovereignty in the area comprised within a circle, having its centre in Buraimi 
village and whose circumference passed through the junction of latitude 24 degrees and 
25 minutes North and longitude 55 degrees and 36 minutes East, i. e. through the 
terminal point of Saudi Arabia's 1949 claim 210 
The tribunal was to consist of five members: Saudi Arabia and Britain would 
each nominate a member, and the other three members, one of whom would act as 
president of the tribunal, would be chosen by agreement from persons not nationals of 
either party. The British member of the arbitration tribunal was named in August and 
the remaining members at the end of December. They were: 
(1) Dr. Charles de Visscher (Belgium), a former judge of the International Court of 
Justice, president; 
207 United Kingdom Treaty Series, 65 (1954), Cmd. 9272, p. 16. 
209 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 171. 
209 Cmd. 9272, Treaty Series No. 65 (1954), an official documents reproduced in Schofield, (ed. ), 
Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 161-68, Umm al Qura No. 1526 dated 6 August 1954. 
210 Ibid 
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(2) Sir Reader Bullard (Britain), a retired member of the British Foreign Service who 
had been Minister to Saudi Arabia, 1936-9; 
(3) Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia; 
(4) Dr. Ernesto de Dihigo (Cuba); and 
(5) Mr. Mahmud Hassan (Pakistan). 
In conducting its proceedings and in formulating its award, the tribunal was to have due 
regard to all relevant considerations of law, fact and equity, brought to its attention by 
the parties concerned or disclosed by its own investigations. In particular, it was to take 
into account, in so far as they were relevant: 
(a) historical facts relating to the rights of the rulers concerned and their forefathers; 
(b) the traditional loyalties of the inhabitants of the areas concerned; 
(c) the tribal organization and way of life of these inhabitants; 
(d) the exercise of jurisdiction and other activities in the area; and 
(e) any other considerations brought to its attention by either party. 211 
September 1955 had been fixed by the arbitration tribunal as the date for the 
submission by both parties of their memorials setting out their submissions on the 
territories and boundary in dispute. Afterwards, each party would have the right to 
submit, within a further period of six months, a reply to the memorial presented by the 
other. On the conclusion of these written proceedings the tribunal would hear oral 
z" Ibid. 
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arguments by the parties, or, with their consent, it could dispense with such arguments. 
The tribunal would have the right to call witnesses, conduct inquiries, and visit the areas 
in dispute. Its award would be final, binding upon the governments concerned, and 
without appea1412 
When the tribunal opened its hearings on 11 September, it faced many obstacles, 
as the British submitted complaints about various breaches of the conditions of 
arbitration committed by Saudi Arabia. At this sitting and the subsequent sittings, the 
tribunal heard evidence of Saudi bribery and gun-running, of the plot to overthrow the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi, of the circumstances surrounding the fire at Hamasa, of the abuse 
of Saudi supply aircraft, and of other violations of the conditions of arbitration. Sheikh 
Zaid ibn Sultan gave evidence of last-minute attempts by Abdullah al-Quraishi, a 
member of the Saudi police detachment in Buraimi, to induce him to desert his brother 
and declare for Saudi Arabia. 213 The witnesses who gave evidence were Hazza' ibn 
Sultan, Sultan ibn Surur and Mani' ibn Muhammad of the Dhawahir, and Captain P. H. 
Clayton, the former commander of the Trucial Oman Levies detachment at Buraimi. 214 
On their side, on 13 September, the Saudi Government brought forward Abdullah al- 
Quraishi to refute the charges brought against him. He denied that he had ever tried to 
bribe Zaid and said that Zaid, not he, had made the approaches. 215 On the other hand, 
numerous counter-complaints were made by Saudi Arabia against the British violations 
of the Arbitration Agreement in the Buraimi Oasis. 216 However, the assessment of these 
complaints and counter-complaints needs very careful study, referring to both the 
British and the Saudi documents, which is beyond the scope of this study. 
212 Ibid. 
213 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., cit., p. 200. 
214 Ibid., p. 201. 
215 Ibid., for further details see Umm al Qura No. 1582 dated 16 September 1955. 
216 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., cit., p. 200. 
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The arbitration proceedings, already imperiled by the aforementioned 
accusations, finally broke down in mid-September when the British member of the 
Tribunal, Sir Reader Bullard, resigned. 217 Bullard explained in a statement that he had 
to resign because the Saudi member was acting in the proceedings on behalf of the 
Saudi Arabian Government and was representing that Government on this tribunal, 
rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator. 218 The Saudis argued that Bullard had been 
ordered to resign by the British Government because they knew that the Tribunal's 
decision would be in the favour of Saudi Arabia, as the inhabitants were loyal to Ibn 
Saud. 19 Some writers, however, are of the opinion that Bullard resigned because a 
judgment unfavourable to the British accusations was about to be produced. 220 
Saudi Arabia repeated its observation of the Arbitration Agreement and 
repeatedly asked the British to go back to it, but the latter declared that the Arbitration 
Agreement was void because of the Saudi violations. 221 Under international law, 
however, both Britain and Saudi Arabia, as parties to a judicial process, should have 
maintained the status quo in the disputed area by refraining from any act which might 
prejudice the eventual execution of the arbitration agreement. Indeed, the principle of 
good faith prohibits the evasion of an obligation as established by the common intention 
of the parties. 222 Both parties, therefore, should have waited until the final decision of 
the arbitration concerning the definition of the sovereignty in the Buraimi was made. 
217 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 817. 
218 The Times, 17 September 1955. 
219 Umm al Qura No. 1583 dated 23 September 1955, Wahbah, Fifty Years in the Arabian Peninsula 
(Cairo, 1960) p. 114 (in Arabic). 
220 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 323, see also some articles written by some neutral 
European writers in support of this argument, Umm al Qura No. 1587 dated 21 October 1955. . 221 Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontiers, op., cit., p. 279, Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, 
Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 17, pp. 327-43, Umm al Qura No. 1583 dated 23 September 
1955.. 
222 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Court and Tribunals" , op., cit., pp. 140-41. 
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Such a decision would be taken on the basis of the status quo, which would not be 
prejudiced in its effect by a unilateral act of one of the parties during the inevitable 
waiting time. 
The Samoan Claims Case223, between Germany on the one hand, and the United 
Kingdom and United States on the other, illustrated the importance of maintaining the 
status quo by the parties to a dispute between two events. At the time in question, there 
were two contending parties in Samoa, namely, the Malietoans and the Mataafans. On 
31 December 1898, the Chief Justice of Samoa declared Malietoa Tanumafili King of 
Samoa. By a proclamation issued on the 4t' of January 1899, the Consular 
representative of the treaty powers in Samoa, owing to the then distributed state of 
affairs and to the urgent necessity to establish a strong provisional government, 
recognised the Mataafa party, represented by the High Chief Malaafa and 13 of his 
chiefs, as the provisional government of Samoa, pending instruction from the three 
treaty powers. The question submitted to arbitration was the legality of certain military 
measures taken unilaterally by the United Kingdom and United States in support of the 
Malietoans against the Mataafans in March 1899. The Arbitrator held that: 
"The military action in question undertaken by the British and 
American military authorities before the arrival of the instructions 
mentioned in the proclamation, and tending to overthrow the 
provisional government thereby established, was contrary to the 
aforesaid obligation"224 
The arbitrator thus found that according to principles of international good faith, those 
powers were bound to maintain the situation created by the proclamation of January 
223 Papers related to the United States Foreign Relations, Washington 1862- quoted in Bin Cheng, 
General Principles of Law as Applied by International Court and Tribunals ", op., cit., pp. 140-41. 224 Ibid. 
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1899 until, by common accord a further decision was taken. 
With regard to the resignation of the Britain representative, although there was 
no evidence that Britain ordered him to resign, he should have either waited until a final 
decision was taken or left it to the President of the Tribunal to assess the act of Saudi 
representative during the hearings, and then acted accordingly. Both parties, moreover, 
should have cooperated and made every possible effort to make the tribunal's decision 
possible. Indeed, in the Interpretation of Peace Treaties, (second phase)225 concerning 
the interpretation of the Peace Treaty of 1947 between the Allied Powers and Bulgaria, 
Hungary and Rumania, the International Court of Justice refused to accept the 
argument, reinforced by a long line of precedents in arbitration, which established that a 
party cannot prevent completion of arbitration and the rendering of a binding decision 
by the device of withdrawing its national representative from the tribunal. 226 Both 
withdrawing a representative and failing to appoint one are against the principle of good 
faith which should prevail in any method of peaceful settlement. Judge Read, in his 
Dissenting Opinion, had no doubt about the relevance of good faith to the situation. He 
stated that: 
"I am of the opinion that the principle established by these precedents 
is equally applicable to the case where a party to a dispute act in bad 
faith from the outset. And attempts to use the device of defaulting on 
its treaty obligation to appoint its national representative on the 
tribunal in order to prevent the provisions of the arbitration clause 
from taking effect". 227 
225ICJReports, (1950), p. 221. 
226 Ibid., at p. 
227 Ibid., at p. 348. 
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The observation of the principle of good faith by the parties is of great 
importance for the settlement of any dispute. The absence of good faith may lead to the 
breakdown of any attempt of dispute settlement. This what happened in the Buraimi 
Arbitration when both the British and the Saudi representatives failed to behave in good 
faith, which led to the breakdown of the arbitration proceedings. 
The next British step was to occupy the disputed area by the use of force. 228 
Such action was contrary to international law. Indeed, international disputes must be 
settled by peaceful means and not by resorting to the use of force, which is prohibited229 
in inter-state relations. Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter provides that: 
"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with 
the Purposes of the United Nations. " 
The principle is embodied in Article 2 (3) of the Charter, which provides that " all 
Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means". Indeed, the 
principle has been developed by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among states, which includes the 
use of peaceful methods for the settlement of international disputes. 230 Although 
228 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 817, see Umm al Qura No. 1589 
dated 4 October 1955 and No. 1590 dated 11 October 1955. It should be noted the Saudi Government 
announced that it reserved all its rights in the Buraimi Oasis and it did not recognise any oil concession 
that might be granted to any oil company. It also submitted a statement of protest to the Security Council 
through its ambassador at the US, see Umm a! Qura No. 1589 dated 4 October 1955. 
229 Important exceptions to Article 2 (4) on the prohibition on use of force, exist in the Charter, namely, 
the right of self-defence in Article 51 enforcement action by the Security Council, in Chapter VII and 
enforcement action taken by regional organizations with authorization from the Security Council, in 
Chapter VIII. Apart from those exceptions, the threat or use of force are totally and substantially 
prohibited. For further details, see generally McCoubrey and White, International Law and Armed 
Con, flict (Aldershot, 1992). 
230 General Assembly Resolution 2625 dated 1970, see Djonovich, (ed. ), United Nations Resolutions, 
(vol. XIII 1970-1971), New York, Oceana Publications, 1976, p. 337. 
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Buraimi was a disputed area and its sovereignty was not yet defined, the use of force by 
Britain to remove the Saudis and capture it was against both the prohibition of use of 
force and the principle regarding the settlement of the international disputes by peaceful 
means. 
Britain declared unilaterally on 26 October 1955 that the boundary between 
Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi was the Riyadh Line (as amended by Britain in 1937) 231 
and that no unauthorized crossings of that line by the Saudis, by land or air, would be 
permitted 232 According to this new boundary, Liwa Oasis and Khaur al-Udaid were 
preserved for Qatar while the Buraimi core area was reserved to Abu Dhabi. The nine 
villages of the Buraimi Oasis were divided between Abu Dhabi and Muscat; Muscat had 
three while Abu Dhabi had six. This line left a great area of territory for Oman, 
including some parts of the sand of the Empty Quarter, which the Sultan of Oman 
himself did not know about, 233 let alone exercise sovereignty over. 
In 1956 new developments took place such as the Suez crisis and the break out 
of the triple hostility against Egypt. 34 As a result of these developments, along with the 
Saudi hostility against the Baghdad Pact235 and its orientation towards Egypt, Saudi 
231 See supra 1, footnote no. 100. 
232 The Speech of the British Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden to the House of Commons on 26 October 
1955, Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, 5th series, H. of C., Vol. 545 (1955-6), cols. 199-200, also in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 817 & vol. 19, pp. 709-12. 
233 For further details regarding the sovereignty of the Sultan of Oman see, Wilkinson, Arabia's 
Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 48-51. 
234 This was the war between Britain, France and Israel on the hand and Egypt on the other in 1956. For 
further details regarding the Suez crisis and its consequences, see The Suez Canal Problem: July 26- 
September 22,1956, Documentary Publication (Washington, Department of State, 1956), Bowie, Suez 
1956 (Oxford, 1974). For further details regarding the settlement of the Suez dispute, see Lauterpacht 
(ed. ), The Suez Canal Settlement: a Selection of Documents (London, 1960). 
235 Baghdad Pact was a Treaty of mutual cooperation in matters of security and defence between Iraq and 
Turkey singed by the two states at Baghdad on 244' February 1955. The Pact aimed to ensure the stability 
and security of the Middle East. As it was open for accession to other states, Britain welcomed the Pact 
and became a member of it on 5a' April 1955, for further details, see The Baghdad Pact, a document 
produced by the British Government as part of United Kingdom Overseas Information Services (London, 
December 1957). 
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Arabia severed its diplomatic relations with Britain and moved rapidly to the Soviet 
camp. 236 US and Iraq, in order to contain the Arab nationalism movement and the 
communist influence in the region, advised Britain to leave aside its dispute with Saudi 
Arabia for a while. Within this framework, 237 a further suggestion was made by the 
Americans known as "Dick's memo", 238 according to which Qatar would get Khaur al- 
Udaid while the coast east of the latter as far as Jabal Dhanna would go to Saudi Arabia. 
The boundary with Abu Dhabi would remain the same as in the 1949 Saudi claim, 
except that it would now start further west along the coast, just to the east of Jabal 
Dhanna. In other words, Abu Dhabi would gain about 80 kilometres of coast with 
respect to the 1949 claim, but no further hinterland 239 This proposal was not submitted 
formally to Britain, although King Saud, the oldest son of King Abdulaziz of Saudi 
Arabia, mentioned this proposal to a British journalist in an interview with the Daily 
Express on 6 February 1956.240 If this proposal had been submitted to the parties, then 
Saudi Arabia would have objected because it retained Khaur al-Udaid for Qatar, which 
had always been one of the key issues throughout the Saudi-British negotiations. It 
caused a deadlock of the negotiations before the Second World War, as well as in the 
Dammam Conference. 
Two years later, when tension arose between the Arab leaders who supported 
western regime around the Baghdad Pact and those who opposed it, the US believed 
that Saudi cooperation was fundamental for stability in the region. Therefore, the 
Americans put forward another suggestion, according to which the disputed area would 
236 Kelly, Arabian, the Gulf and the West (London, 1980) p. 73, Wahbah, Fifty Years in the Arabian 
Peninsula, op., cit., p. 115. 
237 Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 869-80. 
239 Manley 0. Hudson Papers, Harvard Law School Library, (box 126, folder 10) quoted in Wilkinson, 
Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 325 and footnote no. 6 at p. 396. 
239 Ibid., pp. 325-28. 
240Ibid' p. 328 and footnote no. 9 p. 397. 
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be established as a neutral zone under some administrative body, recruited perhaps from 
the Gulf Sheikhdoms, Pakistan, Tunis and Morocco, and in which all parties would 
pledge non-interference. 241 The American proposal aimed to reduce any potential 
friction between the American and British oil companies in the disputed area. The 
British, for their part, thought this proposal over for a while and made some changes by 
which Buraimi would remain outside the neutral zone, but the objection of the Aden 
Government to this change made the American proposal impossible. 42 
In the beginning of the 1960s, the General Secretariat of the United Nations 
intervened in this dispute obtaining an undertaking from both parties not to take any 
action which might lead to the escalation of the dispute. 243 He suggested that a fact- 
finding commission might be set up in order to determine sovereignty in Buraimi. 244 
Both parties accepted this suggestion, and, thus the first International Fact-Finding 
Commission arrived in the Oasis and submitted its report, which suggested that a 
plebiscite would be carried out under UN supervision. 45 
Unlike arbitration and judicial settlement, and like all diplomatic means, the 
report of a Fact-Finding Commission is only a proposal and does not constitute a 
binding decision. Thus, parties retain full control over their disputes. Saudi Arabia 
accepted the Commission's report while Britain rejected it on the ground that it would 
be equivalent to a referendum246, which meant that the inhabitants would choose the 
state they wanted to belong to. This was an idea that the British had opposed for some 
241 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 333. 
242 Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., both vol. 
17, pp. 380-2 and pp. 387-8, and vol. 18, pp. 871-9 and pp. 881-91. 243 Kelly, Arabian, the Gulf and the West, op., cit., p. 73. 
244 Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, Primary Documents 1853-1957, op., cit., vol. 16, pp. 
658-660. 
245 Ibid 
246 Ibid 
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time, because they knew that the inhabitants of this area would vote for Saudi Arabia, as 
it exercised its authority over the territory where they lived. A referendum involves the 
principle of self-determination where people exercise their right to choose their 
government or state. The principle of self-determination has led to the settlement of 
several boundary disputes by referenda of the inhabitants. 247 Resolution 1514 (XV), the 
Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, adopted in 
1960 stated that: 
"All people have the right to the principle of self-determination; by 
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and fully 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development. " 
The principle was emphasised by International Court of Justice in the Western Sahara 
case. 248 There, the Court concluded that the ties which had existed between the 
claimants and the territory during the relevant period of 1880s were not such as to affect 
the application of resolution 1514 (XV), the Colonial Declaration, in the decolonisation 
of the territory and in particular the right of self-determination. 249 It is obvious that the 
right of self-determination was concerned with decolonisation process and the right of 
the inhabitants of colonial territory to determine their future. The question, which arises 
now, is whether the right is applicable to boundary disputes. In other words, do the 
inhabitants affected by the transfer of territory and the definition of a boundary disputes 
have the right to be consulted via referendum or plebiscite? In the context of cession 
and peaceful transfer of territory, Cassese maintained that such inhabitants should be 
consulted before any boundary agreements between the concerned parties are 
247 Butler and Ranney, Referendum Around the World (Washington, DC, 1994) p. 2. 
248 Western Sahara Case, ICJ Reports, 1975, p. 12. 249 Ibid., at p. 68. 
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concluded. 250 He stated that such boundary agreements would be declared void 
according Article 66(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 251 Brownlie, 
however, maintained the opposite view and argued that such transfer could not be void 
because the inhabitants' opinions were not taken into account. 252 This view is supported 
by Oppenheim who stated that it was doubtful whether the Law of Nation would ever 
make it a condition of every cession that it must be ratified by a plebiscite. 53 Indeed, 
state practice showed that not all colonial boundaries coincided with ethnic lines, as 
some boundary lines cut off tribes amongst different states. 254 Indeed, as will be seen 
throughout this study that international boundary disputes are usually discussed and 
settled between the head of states concerned regardless of the inhabitants' opinions. 
From the above discussion, it can safely be said that the right of self-determination was 
irrelevant with regard to the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with its eastern 
neighbours. These boundary disputes would be settled by other peaceful means apart 
from the right of self-determination. 
When Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi was deposed in favour of his brother 
Sheikh Zayid in August 1966, the latter, in April 1967 decided to visit Saudi Arabia and 
discuss the boundary question with the Saudis. 255 He was presented with a new 
boundary proposal which bore an interesting resemblance to the American proposal, 
mentioned earlier, for the coast, but now the Abu Dhabi hinterland was extended to 
cover its producing fields north of the Liwa. 256 Zayid never replied, partly because new 
oil fields were discovered in the area and partly because Britain was about to withdraw 
250 Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge, 1995) pp. 189-193. 
u' Ibid. 
252 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, op., cit., p. 173. 
253 Oppenheim's International Law (1955) 8`h ed. vol. 1 pp. 551-2. 
254 Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa, op., cit., pp. 98-99. 
255 Kelly, Arabian, the Gulf and the West, op., cit., p. 74. 
2561bid. 
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from the Gulf and started making arrangements for some form of federation of the lower 
Gulf Sheikhdoms. 257 In May 1970, Zayid again visited Saudi Arabia and was met with 
a new boundary proposal by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia. The new boundary started on 
the same point of the coast at the eastern edge of Sabkhat Matti, as in 1967. The hinter- 
land boundary now ran along 23 degrees North, thus granting to Abu Dhabi the area of 
no oil operations that existed during the 1954-5 arbitration proceedings " and the main 
Liwa settlements, 58 From there it ran due east to the end of that area, ie. more or less to 
the intersection of 23 degrees North and the Abu Dhabi-Muscat boundary, whence 
north-eastwards to the edge of the Buraimi arbitration area, around this and then back, 
direct down 56 degrees East. To solve the question of the ownership of the Buraimi 
Oasis, Faisal proposed that a plebiscite be held among its inhabitants after those who 
had fled had been allowed to return. 259 Faisal demanded the cease of the oil activities 
south of parallel 23 Degrees North under threat of use of force. 260 Although Zayid never 
replied to Faisal regarding the new proposal, he had to meet Faisal's demand regarding 
the cessation of oil activities when the British advised him to do so, and to hedge over 
Faisal's ultimatum, even though it was an open challenge to Britain's treaty rights and 
obligations regarding the Trucial Sheikhdoms. 261 This new boundary claim was 
certainly a retreat from the 1949 claim and only slightly different from the 1967 claim. 
It would give Saudi Arabia an outlet on the lower Gulf between Qatar and Abu Dhabi 
(the UAE). No agreement, however, was reached and, as a result, the boundary question 
remained untouched until after the independence of the UAE in 1971 when negotiations 
resumed again between the two parties. 
257 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 338. 
258 Kelly, Arabian, the Gulf and the West, op., cit., p. 75. 
259 Ibid. 
260 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 339. 
261 Kelly, Arabian, the Gulf and the West, op., cit., p. 78. 
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4. The Saudi-Qatari Boundary Agreement of 1965 
The last formal declaration concerning the boundary with Qatar was the declaration 
made by the Sheikh on British orders at the Dammam Conference in 1952. Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar had always maintained friendly relations and had reached an informal 
boundary agreement behind Britain's back before the Dammam Conference. 262 
Therefore, on 4 December 1965 a full formal boundary agreement was concluded 
between the two states263. According to this agreement, Dohat Salwa was to be divided 
between the two countries. 264 Jabal Nakhsh went to Qatar; in return, Saudi Arabia 
retained the two h Uras (settlements), Sikak and Anbak, and Qatar recognised Khaur al- 
Udaid as belonging to Saudi Arabia265 (see map 11). This boundary conformed with the 
Saudi proposed line in 1935 or the "Hamza Line", with the exception of Jabal Nakhsh 
which was assigned according to the "Hamza Line" to Saudi Arabia. 266 However, the 
deal was at the cost to Abu Dhabi of Khaur al-Udaid, which had always been a complex 
issue during the previous negotiations. Therefore, the validity of this agreement was 
challenged on behalf of Abu Dhabi by the British Government267 and, as a result, the 
boundary was not demarcated at that time as stipulated in the Agreement. 68 In this case 
Britain as a third state was affected by the Agreement because it was not consulted with 
regard to the boundary agreement, as the Saudi-Qatar-UAE boundary met in a tri- 
junction. 
262 See supra 2.2. 
263 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 48, p. 465, The Boundary 
Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 
2 Article 1 of the 1965 Saudi-Qatari Agreement. 
265 Article 2 of the 1965 Saudi-Qatari Agreement. 
266 See supra 1. 
267 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 324. 
268 Article 3 of the 1965 Saudi-Qatari Agreement. 
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As far as international law is concerned, although consultations are not 
mentioned in Article 33(1) of the UN Charter as one of the peaceful means of settlement 
of international disputes, they are provided for in a growing number of treaties as a 
means of settling disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the treaty 
concerned. 69 In other cases, consultations are resorted to when a state anticipates that a 
decision or a proposed action may harm another state, in order to avoid any trouble and 
create an opportunity for adjustment and accommodation. An example, which may 
illustrate the value of consultation, is provided by the practice of the United States and 
Canada in antitrust proceedings. 270 With regard to the acts taken by a state in order to 
avoid trouble with another state, a distinction is sometimes drawn between acts of 
consultation such as those just been mentioned, on the one hand, and acts of notification 
or obtaining of prior consent of the state concerned, on the other hand. Indeed, 
notification is applied when a state notifies another state of imminent action that likely 
to affect the other state's interests. Such advance warning gives the state concerned time 
to consider its response in a way which may avoid any dispute. Obtaining of prior 
consent takes place when a state seeks the consent of the affected state for an action 
before taking it. In this case, the affected state enjoys the right of veto and it may use it 
to block such an action in the absence of its consent. 271 In the Lake Lanoux case272 
between Spain and France, Spain argued that under both customary international law 
and treaties between the two states, France was under an obligation to obtain Spain's 
consent to the execution of works for the utilisation of certain waters in the Pyrenees for 
a hydroelectric scheme. The argument was rejected, but the tribunal went on to hold that 
269 Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes between 
States, United Nations, New York, 1992, p. 10. 
270 Merrills, International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge, op., cit., p. 3. 
271 Ibid., p. 4. 
272 Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. Spain) (1957) 24 ILR 101, at 127-128. 
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France had a duty to consult with Spain over projects that were likely to affect Spanish 
interests. 73 In multilateral relations, however, the advantages of consultation in matters 
which are of concern to a large number of states, are evident. The Antarctic Treaty 
system, for instance, shows the value of "anticipatory cooperation" which refers to the 
capacity of member states to anticipate problems related to environmental and other 
issues in the region and undertake responsive actions before such problems become 
aggravated. 274 In the light of the above discussion, both Saudi Arabia and Qatar should 
have consulted Abu Dhabi and obtained its consent before concluding the 1965 Saudi- 
Qatari Agreement, because this Agreement would have affected Abu Dhabi's interests, 
as the boundary of the three states met in a tri junction. 
5. The Saudi-Qatari Post-Independence Negotiations 
The first step taken by Saudi Arabia and Qatar after the latter's independence 275 towards 
the demarcation of their boundary dispute was the conclusion of the Security 
Cooperation and Criminals Extradition Agreement, which was signed by the Ministers 
of Interior of the two countries between 21-22 February 1982.276 This Agreement, 
which was ratified by both the Saudi and the Qatari Governments277 aimed, among 
other things, to prevent boundary incidents and smuggling into and out of the two 
countries by complete cooperation between the Border Guards of the two states. 
The Agreement could have helped the final demarcation of the their boundaries, 
but in October 1992, a Qatari communique stated that Saudi military forces (on I 
273 Ibid., 
274 Joyner, "The evolving of Antarctic legal regime" (1989) 83 AJIL 605, at 617-618. 
275 Qatar gained its independence on 3 September1971. 
276 The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 277 Royal Decree No. M/20 dated 23 March 1982, Archives of Council of Ministers, also published in 
Umm at Qura No. 2912 dated April 1982. 
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October 1992) had seized al-Kafous Qatari border police station on the Saudi-Qatari 
border and forced the Qatari soldiers to leave it 278 In consequence, the Qatar 
Government declared that the Saudi-Qatari boundary agreement of 1965 was void on 
the ground that the Saudis had acted against international law. 279 However, Saudi 
Arabia declared that according to the principles of international agreements, it rejected 
completely Qatar's unilateral declaration regarding the 1965 Saudi-Qatari boundary 
agreement and considered the Agreement as binding on both states. 280 Indeed, hostile 
relations do not automatically terminate treaties between parties to a conflict, as many 
treaties including the United Nations Charters and Geneva Conventions of 1949 were 
binding to the same degree in the case of war 281 Some kinds of treaties, however, are 
regarded as being suspended in the time of war, and war conditions may lead to the 
termination of treaties on the ground of impossibility of execution. 282 If the 
impossibility of execution may be temporary, the treaty is not void but merely 
suspended. 283 
It is widely recognised that according to the law of treaties, the denunciation of 
the 1965 Saudi-Qatati boundary Treaty by any of the parties might take place only 
according to the provisions of the treaty itself or the provisions of the Vienna 
Convention of the Law of Treaties. 284 Article 60 (1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, however, provides that a material breach of the obligations of a 
treaty by one party entitles the other party to terminate or suspend the treaty on the 
ground of such a breach. 
278 Umm al Qura, No. 3423 dated 2 October 1992. 
279 Umm al Qura, No. 3424 dated 9 October 1992. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, op., cit., pp. 616-7. 
282 Oppenheim, International Law, (1958), op., cit., p. 945. 
283 Ibid 
284 Article 41(2) of Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties. 
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The material breach of a treaty is illustrated by the Rainbow Warrior case. 285 In 
1985 two French agents destroyed the vessel Rainbow Warrior in harbour in New 
Zealand. The United Nations Secretary-General mediated and both parties concluded 
the 1986 New Zealand-France Agreement286 which provided for the transference of the 
two French agents to a French base in Pacific, where they were to stay for three years 
and not to leave without mutual consent of both parties. France, however, allowed its 
agents to leave for France before the expiry of the period of three years without the 
consent of New Zealand. The 1986 New Zealand-France Agreement contained an 
arbitration clause, which was invoked by New Zealand, and arbitration between France 
and New Zealand took place in 1990. The Tribunal held that France had committed a 
material breach of the Agreement by permitting the agents to leave the island before the 
expiry of the three-year period. 287 With regard to the situation of Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar, it could be said from the above discussion that the Saudi action, which was 
denied by Saudi Arabia, had nothing to do with the 1965 Saudi-Qatari boundary 
agreement, because this Treaty defined the boundary between the two states which was 
not affected by the Saudi action. Moreover, the 1965 Saudi-Qatari boundary Agreement 
did not stipulate that such an action taken by Saudi Arabia would result in the 
termination of the Agreement. Therefore, it could be argued that Saudi Arabia did not 
commit a material breach of the 1965 Saudi-Qatari boundary agreement and the Qatar 
had no right to denounce this treaty on the ground of the Saudi breach of an irrelevant 
principle. The Saudi action, although was a violation of international law, could not be 
taken as a reason by Qatar to terminate the Agreement because, as just mentioned, 
hostile relations do not automatically terminate treaties between parties to a conflict. 
285 (1990), 82ILR, p. 500. 
286 The Agreement is found in (1987) 74 ILR 274. 
287 (1990) 82 ILR 500, at 499,564-6. 
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Returning to the Saudi-Qatari dispute, Saudi Arabia downplayed the incident 
and described it as a minor one carried out by unofficial and irresponsible persons 
which did not represent the position of the Saudi Government. 288 As far as international 
law is concerned, it is a duty of a state, as far as possible, to prevent its own subjects 
and foreign subjects who live in its territory form committing injurious acts against 
other states. 289 In practice, however, it is impossible for a state to prevent all injurious 
acts, which might be committed by a private person against a foreign state. Therefore, a 
state is only responsible for official acts committed by its agents or representatives. The 
International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide that the 
conduct of any state organ either having that status under internal law or not part of the 
formal structure of the state is considered as an act of the state. 290 In the US Diplomatic 
and Consular Staff in Tehran case (the Tehran Hostage case), 291 the International Court 
of Justice noted that the initial attack on the United States Embassy by militants could 
not be imputable to Iran, since they were clearly not agents or organs of the state. 292 
The Saudis also pointed out that al-Kafous border station did not originally exist 
in the Saudi territory and claimed that Qatar during the Gulf war of 1990-1 had 
penetrated the Saudi territory and moved al-Kafous border station from its territory into 
the Saudi territory. 293 This Saudi argument seems to have been baseless, because Saudi 
Arabia remained silent for about a year since the conclusion of the Gulf war and did not 
protest against the Qatari penetration into the Saudi territory. If the Qataris had really 
penetrated into the Saudi territory and moved al-Kafous border station from their 
288 Umm al Qura, No. 3424 dated 9 October 1992. 289 Oppenheim, International Law, (1958), vol. 1, op., cit., pp. 364-5. 290 Articles 5 and 7(2) of International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility. 
291 ICJ Reports, 1980, p. 3,61 ILR, 502. 
2921bid, at p. 34-5. 
293 Umm al Qura, No. 3426 dated 16 October 1992. 
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territory into the Saudi territory, Saudi Arabia must have known what was going on and 
would not have remained silent. If, however, it is accepted that the Qatari action had 
really happened, but Saudi Arabia failed to protest, this might be explained on the 
ground of the acquiescence of the Saudi state. Acquiescence occurs in circumstances 
where protest is expected but does not happen. In this case, the state making no 
objection is understood to have accepted the new situation. 294 Indeed, failure to protest, 
especially when the situation is crucial, as in the case of the Saudi-Qatari boundary 
disputes, which were not finally settled, may be taken into account in determining 
acquiescence in the boundary demarcation. 295 
In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 296 the International Court of Justice held 
that Great Britain, being a maritime power with an interest in Norwegian waters, must 
have known the Norwegian method of baselines, 297 and could not excuse her absence of 
protest, which was thus relevant in proving historical title. 98 The importance of the 
Saudi protest in this case is self-evident because its boundary disputes with Qatar had 
been going on for years and the 1965 Saudi-Qatari boundary Agreement had been 
challenged by Britain on behalf of its protectorate to the east. Indeed, in such a 
situation, any movement on the boundary site might have been discovered by Saudi 
Arabia and then some kind of action could have been taken. In the light of the above 
discussion, it could be said that either the Saudi claim regarding the Qatari penetration 
into the Saudi territory and the movement of al-Kafous to the Saudi territory, was 
framed against Qatar or the Saudis had consented to the Qatari action by their failure to 
294 Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, op., cit., p. 160 
295 See O'Connell, International Law (London, 1970) 2nd edition, vol. 1, pp. 424-5. 
296 The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951,116. 
297 Instead of measuring the territorial sea from the low-water line, the Norwegians constructed a series of 
straight baseline linking the outermost parts of the land running along fringe of islands and rocks which 
parallel the Norwegian coastline. 
98 The Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports, 1951, at 138. 
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protest against it. This boundary incident, however, delayed the demarcation of the 
Saudi-Qatar boundary and brought the boundary dispute between the two states to the 
fore again. As a result, the Qataris became reluctant to demarcate the boundary, because 
they wanted to gain additional hinterland in al-Kafous region to the utmost southeast of 
the agreed boundary line of 1965, by moving their border police check points to the 
south, taking advantage of the non-demarcated boundary. 299 
5.1. The Egyptian Mediation and the Amendment of the 1965 Agreement. 
In 1992 the Egyptian president intervened as a mediator between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar in order to bring them to the negotiating table. He held several talks with both 
parties individually in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and several letters and visits were 
exchanged between the three leaders and their officials. 300 However, the contents of 
these letters and official visits were never revealed, as the two parties chose not to 
publish them for the benefit of the negotiations. 301 As a result, on 19 December 1992, a 
summit of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt was held in Madinah in Saudi 
Arabia in which the three leaders discussed the Saudi-Qatari boundary dispute. 302 After 
the meeting, the Foreign Ministers of the three states signed a short communique on 20 
December 1992.303 According to this communique, which was considered by the parties 
to be an integral part of the 1965 Agreement, Saudi Arabia gave up some of its territory 
to Qatar. 304 In addition, the parties agreed on setting up a joint technical committee in 
299 Al-Hayat, No. 12097 dated 8 April 1996. 
300 Umm al Qura, No. 3415 dated 16 October 1992, No. 3428 dated 6 November 1992, No. 3432 dated 4 
December 1992, No. 3433 dated I1 December 1992, No 3434 dated 18 December 1992 & No. 3435 dated 
25 December 1992. 
301 King Fahd in an interview with the AI-Siyassah, a well-known Kuwaiti newspaper, in Umm al Qura, 
No. 3431 dated 27 November 1992. 
302 Umm al Qura, No. 3435 dated 25 December 1992. 
303 Ibid., also in Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 5, The Boundary 
Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 
3 Ibid. 
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order to supervise the boundary demarcation according to both the 1965 Agreement and 
what was agreed on in this communique . 
305 However, the committee faced some 
problems, as on 12 November 1994, Qatar sent a memorandum to Saudi Arabia about 
several armed incidents, which had taken place along the boundary between the two 
states in March and October 1994.306 Saudi Arabia, however, denied the incidents, 
claiming that it had been unaware of any problem until the receipt of the memorandum 
from Qatar. 307 Moreover, Qatar was hoping that the Saudis would give it more territory 
in Khaur al-Udaid to the southeast of Qatar. In the aftermath of the coup on 27 June 
1995 in which the crown prince of Qatar seized power from his father, 308 the new emir 
outlined his position on Qatar's boundary disputes. He described the dispute with Saudi 
Arabia as a "simple problem" which he sincerely wished to solve. 309 This positive 
Qatari position resulted from the circumstances that followed the coup, as Saudi Arabia 
was among the first states to recognise the new Emir. 310 The former Qatari emir, the 
father, went to Saudi Arabia in exile. The new Qatari emir, the son, wanted to conciliate 
the Saudis, to prevent them from trying to help his father in returning to Qatar and 
seizing power. 
As a result of these developments, the foreign minister of the state of Qatar, 
Sheikh Hamad Bin Jasim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, met the deputy prime minister of Saudi 
Arabia, Prince Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Sa'ud, in Saudi Arabia on 7 April 1996.311 
They decided to end the long-standing boundary dispute which had led to clashes in 
1992 when they agreed to complete the demarcation of the boundary between the two 
305 Ibid., Al-Hayat, No. 11975 dated 5 December 1995. 
306 Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh, 1 December 1994. 
307 Ibid. 
308 Al-Hayat, No. 11815 dated 28 June 1995. 
309 Al Hayat, No. 11827 dated 10 July 1995. 
310 A1-Hayat, No. 11820 dated 3 July 1995 & No. 11822 dated 5 July 1995.. 
311 Umm al Qura, No. 3597 dated 12 April 1996. 
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countries and resume the activities of the joint technical committee in order to agree on 
the choice of surveying company. 312 A high level Qatari official stated that a Gulf state 
had played a vital role and mediated between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in order to bring 
them back to the negotiation table. 313 In the negotiation which led to this agreement, the 
Saudis insisted in settling the boundary dispute according to what had been agreed on in 
Madinah in Saudi Arabia on 20 December 1992, already mentioned, while Qatar wanted 
to be given more territory in Khaur al-Udaid. 314 
On 7 June 1999, Saudi Arabia and Qatar signed demarcation maps of their 
common boundaries. 315 The accord also included the identification of the boundary 
point on the coast of Dohat Salwa, an area that the two sides had agreed to divide 
between them in the 1965 Agreement. The Qatari head of the joint technical 
commission said that the two sides had made great efforts over three years to achieve 
agreement 316 Therefore, the two states signed in 21 March 2001, in Doha, the capital of 
Qatar, the final maps reflecting what had been achieved in demarcation of the land 
boundary between the two countries. 317 
6. The Saudi-Abu Dhabi (UAE) Post-Independence Negotiations 
The British decision to leave the Gulf at the end of 1971 encouraged the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms to develop their relations and to enter into some sort of unification in order 
to maintain their security and protect their interests in the area. Therefore, in 1971-72 a 
federation of seven separate emirates joined together to form a single independent 
312 Al-Hayat, No. 12097 dated 8 April 1996, Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh, 7 April 1996 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid 
315 AI-Hayat, No. 13241 dated 9 June 1999. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Riyadh Daily, No. 2087 dated 22 March 2001. 
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country, the United Arab Emirates, while Bahrain and Qatar decided to be independent 
states. 
318 
The increase in importance of the Iranian role in the Gulf in both the security 
and political aspects, encouraged the small Gulf states to improve their relations with 
Saudi Arabia in order to be able to challenge and minimise such a role. 19 As a result, 
the parties, within a very short time, reached agreements regarding their boundary 
disputes with Saudi Arabia. Indeed, in 1974, both King Faisal and Sheikh Zayid signed 
the Jeddah Agreement by which the boundaries between the two countries were 
defined. 320 According to this agreement, Saudi Arabia's claim to sovereignty over the 
Buraimi Oasis was relinquished and the UAE retained the six villages of the Buraimi 
Oasis which it had before the agreement, and the Dhafrah desert. In return, Zayid 
renounced his claim to Khaur al-Udaid and gave Saudi Arabia an outlet to the lower 
Gulf west of Sabkhat Matti, which separated UAE from Qatar, and the bulk of Zarrara 
oil fields (see map 1). Article 7 of the Agreement provided for a joint technical 
committee to be set up, consisting of three members of each state, in order to carry out 
the boundary demarcation, but the committee never did so, as both parties agreed in 
1993 to move the western end of their joint boundary line slightly to the west in Khaur 
3" For further details, see Metz, op., cit., p. 203 ff. 
319 This was the starting point in the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which was 
established in May 1981 and is composed of six Gulf countries, namely, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). For further details about the GCC see generally Al- 
Garni, The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Challenges (Riyadh, 1997) (in Arabic). 
320 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 5, The Boundary Agreements, 
Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. It should be noted that the two states signed in February 1982 a 
Security Cooperation Agreement. The Royal Decree No. M/22 dated 23 March 1982, see ibid., also 
Archives of Council of Ministers, Umm al Qura No. 2912 dated 9 April 1982. 
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al-Udaid. The UAE was accordingly given more territory that it had held under the 1974 
Jeddah Agreement. 321 
7. The Saudi-Omani Post-Independence Negotiations 
The departure of the British from the Gulf also affected Saudi relations with Oman. The 
criteria for dealing with the outside world had changed considerably since Sultan Qabus 
took power in 1970 and Oman at last began to open its doors to the outside world. The 
only formal dispute here is Buraimi. For the rest there is no specified Saudi claim and 
only the de facto boundary which was declared by the British on the Sultan's behalf in 
1955. If Buraimi was still subject to adjudication, then the question that arises is the 
critical date for the formal dispute and what sovereign acts might now be held to have 
been designed to improve the parties' legal position since that date. It might well be 
held on one side that, post-1955, effective occupation had consolidated the titles to 
sovereignty claimed by the British on behalf of their colonies, but then Saudi Arabia 
might claim that its rights, established by both title and continuous manifestation of acts 
of sovereignty, had been usurped by force after the collapse of the arbitration, and that 
the case would have to be judged on the situation referred to arbitration under the 1954 
agreement. Therefore, in 1971 both parties took the first practical step towards resolving 
the Buraimi dispute (which had always been the root of the dispute between the two 
countries) and the two parties signed an Agreement in 1971 by which Saudi Arabia 
conceded three of the Buraimi villages to Oman. In addition, the two states concluded a 
Security Cooperation Agreement in 1982322 in order to prevent boundary incidents and 
321 The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. The Agreement was ratified by both 
parties, see the Royal Decree No. M/21 dated 23 March 1982, Archives of Council of Ministers, Umm al 
3Qura 
No. 2912 dated 9 April 1982. 
2 The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the Saudi Border Guard. 
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regulate boundary security patrols. 
Oman has become a vital ally for Saudi Arabia in the Peninsula as well as for 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). It has emerged as one of the leading Independent 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (IPEC) of the Middle East and thus found itself acting in 
some measure as a counterweight to Saudi Arabia, the "swing" producer of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Oman has been trying to settle 
its differences with its neighbours, whilst the intensification of its oil search with the 
discovery of fields near the disputed boundary (notably the Lekhwair field not far from 
Umm al-Zamul where production is scheduled to rise to 100,000 barrels a day) has 
given impetus to reaching an agreement with Saudi Arabia. 
Both parties realised that to refer to the past was to make the issue even more 
complicated, ranging from the extremes of the Blue Line on the one hand, to claims to 
total sovereignty of the whole area up to Ras al-Hadd and beyond, based on the Al 
Saud's ancestral rights, on the other. For Saudi Arabia, it was impossible to renounce 
these claims; the whole raison d'etre of the state would be put in question. For some 
form of settlement to be reached, therefore, the Omanis would have to accept that there 
has never been a de jure boundary, and the Saudis that the de facto one is fair now that 
Oman is reunited. From that basis, a reasonable outcome might be that Saudi Arabia 
would accept the present situation, perhaps subject to some access to the south coast, 
and Oman might make a further gesture to recognizing the leading status of Saudi 
Arabia in the Peninsula in terms of its political and economic roles. The Saudi maps 
which were produced in that time showed that the Saudis relinquished their claim to 
Dhofar, and the Saudi boundary with Oman resembled that of the 1955 British 
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declaration. 323 This positive indication was probably the sort of basis on which a 
settlement was reached in 1990. Therefore, King Fahd and Sultan Qabus met at head of 
state level in December 1989 to reach some basic understandings, whilst their respective 
ministers worked out details regarding pasture rights of the tribes and crossing points on 
the boundary. 324 
On 21 March 1990, Sultan Qabus visited Saudi Arabia and he and King Fahd 
and their delegations held a meeting in Hafr Al-batin in Saudi Arabia to discuss the final 
boundary agreement between the two states. 325 The two parties accordingly signed the 
boundary agreement by which their boundary dispute was finally settled. 326 The 
Agreement was ratified by both parties327 and the documents ratifying the Agreement 
were exchanged between them on 21 May 1991 at the Saudi Foreign Ministry in 
Riyadh. 328 The Agreement was on the basis of the "declared line" or roughly the 
existing boundary (see map 1). Indeed, the boundary line started from the junction of 
latitude 22 degrees and 42 minutes and 30 seconds North and longitude 55 degrees and 
12 minutes and 30 seconds East. Then it followed in a straight line to the junction of 
latitude 22 degrees North and longitude 55 degrees and 40 minutes East. From there the 
boundary stretched to the junction of latitude 20 degrees North and longitude 55 degrees 
East and then to the junction of latitude 19 degrees North and longitude 52 degrees 
323 Schofield, Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Nineteenth 
Century, in Schofield, (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States (London, 1994) p. 24. 
324 Saudi Press Agency, 26.3.1990. With regard to the pasture rights of the tribes and crossing points on 
the boundary, the Interior Ministers of the two countries signed on 21 March 1990 two Additional 
Agreements which were considered to be annexed to 1990 Saudi-Omani Boundary Agreement. Treaty 
Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 5, The Boundary Agreements, Archive of the 
Saudi Border Guard. 
325 Umm al Qura, No. 3301 dated 23 March 1990. 326 Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. II, No. 5, The Boundary Agreements, 
Archive of the Saudi Border Guard, also in Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 19, 
pi 730-46. 
2 Royal Decree No. M123 dated 31 March 1990, Archives of the Council of Ministers, also in Umm al 
3aura, 
No. 3305 dated 20 April 1990. 
8 Umm al Qura, No. 3358 dated 24 May 1991. 
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East. 329 The Agreement set up a Joint Technical Committee composed of four members 
from each country in order to carry out the survey and supervise the demarcation 
process which would be carried out by one of the specialised companies. 330 On 10 July 
1995, the two states signed the demarcation maps in a signing ceremony in Riyadh, by 
which the demarcation of the 657.4km boundary between Oman and Saudi Arabia was 
completed . 
33 1 The erection of 341 concrete boundary markers, which was completed in 
March 1995, took three years to complete and required formidable geographical 
obstacles to be overcome, including sand dunes reaching 200m high in some places. 332 
From the above, it could be said that the boundary disputes between Saudi 
Arabia and its eastern neighbours centred on the Blue Line defined by the 1913 Anglo- 
Ottoman Convention as part of the definition of the two Empires' spheres of influence 
in the Arabian Peninsula. Spheres of influence, however, have no legal status in 
international law, as it is rather concerned about the definition of international 
boundaries as separating each sovereignty from others, and according to which each 
state would have its defined territory, over which it exercises its authority and 
jurisdiction. Before the independence of the Saudi Arabia's eastern neighbours, Britain 
conducted the boundary negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia's 
boundaries with its northern neighbours, these boundaries were not settled during the 
colonial period because of the discovery of oil in the area in the 1932. These 
boundaries, however, could have been settled as early as 1935 when the negotiations 
first started, if oil had not been involved. They could also have been settled some time 
during the colonial period, if Britain had let the rulers of its colonies speak for 
329 Article 2 of the 1990 Saudi-Omani Boundary Agreement. 
330 Articles 3 and 4 of the Agreement. 
331 A1-Hayat, No. 11827 dated 10 July 1995. 
332 A1-Hayat, No. 11828 dated 11 July 1995. 
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themselves and conduct negotiations directly with Saudi Arabia. Support for the first 
argument is found in the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with its northern 
neighbours, when no oil had yet been discovered there. The second argument is 
supported by the fact that all the Saudi boundary disputes with its eastern neighbours 
have been settled in a very short time following the independence of these states. 
Further support is found in the understanding reached between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, 
behind Britain's back, regarding the definition of their boundaries during the British 
negotiations with Saudi Arabia. Other factors that encouraged the settlement, however, 
should not be ignored, such as the improvement of Saudi relations with these states, 
along with the need for solidarity in the Arabian Peninsula, which could never be 
achieved without stable and defined international boundaries. In the next part, the 
settlement of the Saudi boundary dispute with Yemen will be discussed. This boundary 
dispute was the last one to be resolved. 
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PART III 
SOUTHERN BOUNDARIES 
Chapter I 
The Evolution of the Southern Boundaries and the Boundary 
Disputes 
It should be noted that at the time of the evolution of the southern Saudi boundaries, 
present-day Yemen was divided into two countries, namely, North Yemen and South 
Yemen or Aden Protectorate. ' The Saudi boundary with North Yemen evolved as a 
result of taking the Asir region in several stages, while the Saudi boundaries with South 
Yemen evolved as a result of the Saudi advance into the Empty Quarter. These 
boundaries were the last Saudi boundaries to take shape. 
The first stage of the evolution of the Saudi boundary with North Yemen took 
place when King Abdulaziz took Asir Al-Sarat, which constituted the northeastern half 
of Asir region, as a result of the 1920 Saudi-Idrisi Treaty which was concluded between 
King Abdulaziz and Al-Idrisi in 31 August 1920.2 The area subsequently became the 
Saudi province of Asir Al-Sarat. This slightly altered the western and southwestern 
boundaries of the Saudi territories. Nevertheless, although the Saudis reinforced the new 
boundaries, demarcated and defined boundaries still did not exist in Central Arabia at 
that time. The second stage took place when the Saudi-Idrisi agreement of 1926, known 
1 In 1990, the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, and the People's Democratic Republic or South 
Yemen agreed to be unified under the name, the Republic of Yemen, Al-Bilad, No. 9480 dated 23 May 
1990. 
2 This treaty specified the tribes which belonged to King Abdulaziz and that belonged to Imam Idrisi, see 
(PRO: FO 371117930), in Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), Arabian Treaties, op., cit., vol., 4, pp. 41-50. 
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as the Mecca Agreement3, was concluded, by which the whole Asir region, including 
Tihamat Asir and the Farasan archipelago, became a Saudi protectorate. The final stage 
took place in 1930 when King Abdulaziz announced the annexation of Asir. 4 This stage 
provided the final territorial acquisition of the Saudi state. Instead of being a Saudi 
protectorate, Asir was annexed to Saudi Arabia and became part of the Saudi territory. 
Although the annexation of Asir region was well received by the British, who benefited 
by having it as a buffer between Yemen and Hijaz that might have reduced tension in 
the area, 5 such an annexation, though no force was used, was illegal from an 
international law viewpoint. Indeed, it was a violation of the provisions of the 1926 
Mecca Agreement by which Asir region became a Saudi protectorate. Article 26 of 
1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties states that treaties are binding upon the 
parties to them and must be performed in good faith. 6 If it were otherwise, there would 
be no reason for states to conclude such treaties with each other. Although this 
Convention does not have retroactive effect, it is a compound of codification and of 
progressive development of customary international law. 7 In respect of treaties, good 
faith must be observed by the parties in all the obligations connected with formation and 
performance of treaties. 8 
Now, instead of a mountainous boundary, about 350 kilometres of coastline on 
the Red Sea was added to the Saudi boundary in the west, increasing the Saudi coastline 
3 (PRO: FO 371/12250), in Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), Arabian Treaties, op., cit., vol. 4, pp. 79-85, Treaty 
Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh No. 7, Schofield, Border and Territoriality in the Gulf and 
the Arabian Peninsula during the Nineteenth Century, in Schofield, (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the 
Gulf States (London, 1994) p. 54, see also Urrun Al Qura, No. 108 dated 7.1.1927. 
° (IOR: IJP&S112/2064), in Tuson & Quick, (eds. ), Arabian Treaties, op., cit., vol. 4, pp. 127-135, see 
also Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, 1925-1939, The Imperial Oasis (London, 1983) p. 146. 5 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 146. 6 Note that the references to good faith were also made in Articles 31 and 69 of the Convention. 7 See Namibia case, ICI Reports, (1971) p. 16 at p. 47, the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, ICJ Reports 
(1973) p. 3 at p. 18, the Nicaragua case (the Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ Reports (1984), p. 392. 8 O'Connor, Good Faith in International Law, op., cit., pp. 123-4. See also the Nicaragua case (the 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility) ICJ Reports (1984), p. 392, at p. 418. 
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to about 1,800 kilometres .9 
This coastal area began at the tip of the Gulf of Al-Aqaba in 
the north near latitude 29 degrees North and extended to the village of Mowsem near 
latitude 16 degrees North. 1° This boundary later caused, as will be seen shortly, a 
conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, although it was subsequently resolved. " 
Before proceeding to discuss the causes of the Saudi-Yemen boundary dispute, 
it is necessary to mention that the situations of North Yemen and the Aden protectorate 
or South Yemen in terms of the causes of their boundary disputes with Saudi Arabia 
were completely different. North Yemen was part of the Ottoman Empire until it 
became an independent state after the First World War. The Aden protectorate or South 
Yemen was within the British sphere in the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention, which 
defined the two empires' spheres of influence in the Arabian Peninsula, and then 
became a British protectorate. As a consequence, the latter was affected by the 
boundaries defined by the Violet Line in the said Convention, while the former was not. 
However, when the two states became one country in 1990, this Line became applicable 
for the state of Yemen. Therefore, it is very important to bear this in mind while 
discussing the causes of the Saudi-Yemen boundary dispute, which will be discussed in 
the following paragraphs. 
The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1914 was signed on 9 March 1914 and was 
ratified on 5 June of the same year. '2 The Ottomans' reason for defining the Aden 
boundaries was because it was believed at the time that the Hadramawt and its adjacent 
territory might contain oil deposits and the French and British might find a new base in 
9 Abu-Dawood, and Karan, International Boundary of Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 25. 
1D1bid, p. 35. 
11 See infra chapter II of this part. 
12 The text of the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention and a map showing the Violet Line are found in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes (London, 1992) vol. 18, pp. 9-12. 
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the Hadramawt and Mahra territory. 13 Article 3 of this Convention defined the Violet 
Line to link up the southern terminus of the Blue line with the Anglo-Ottoman boundary 
in southwest Arabia delimited during 1903-5 to separate the Ottoman Vilayat (districts) 
of Yemen or North Yemen from the "nine cantons" of British Aden or South Yemen14 
(see map 12). The Violet Line ran at an angle of 45 degrees from Waldi Bana in the 
southwest in a straight line until it met the Blue Line at 20 degrees North in the middle 
of the Empty Quarter. " Again, this Line had nothing to do with the Saudi boundary 
with North Yemen, because both Saudi Arabia and North Yemen were part of the 
Ottoman Empire and the Violet Line aimed to separate the British sphere from that of 
the Ottomans. Therefore, the Violet Line separated the South Yemen or Aden 
protectorate, as part of the British sphere from Saudi Arabia and North Yemen or the 
Imamate of Yemen, as parts of the Ottoman sphere. According to the 1978 Vienna 
Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties16 and the state practice 
before it, already discussed, 17 boundary treaties are not affected by the state succession 
and thus bind the successor states automatically. 18 As a result, both Saudi Arabia and 
South Yemen were bound by 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention concluded between 
their predecessors, and could only succeed to the boundary defined by this Convention 
which was the Violet Line. However, Imam Yahya of North Yemen repudiated the 
boundaries defined by the Violet Line between North Yemen and South Yemen, 
arguing that the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention was concluded by two foreign 
13 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 103-4. 14 That is to say between the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, and the People's Democratic 
Republic or South Yemen respectively when they were two separate states. 's Kelly, Eastern Arabian Frontier, op., cit., p. 19. See also Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 
107. 
16 This Treaty entered into force on 6 November 1996. 17 See supra part I, chapter I. 
18 Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties. 
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powers and so had no legal application to Yemen. 19 Although this boundary is beyond 
the scope of this study, it should be noted that the North Yemen argument is untenable 
because North Yemen was bound by the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention with regard 
to its boundary with South Yemen, as was Saudi Arabia regarding its boundary with 
South Yemen. 
When the Saudi boundary with South Yemen evolved, another dimension was 
added to the land boundary dispute between the two countries. This was the allegiance 
of the tribes living in the borderlands along the edge of the Empty Quarter, which 
formed the boundary between the two countries. 20 Although some of these tribes were 
not subject to either country, as they were far from their core areas, 21 both sides claimed 
sovereignty over them in order to gain as much territory as possible. 2 However, most of 
the disputes focused on three areas: first, the area to the southeast of Najran; secondly, 
the land strip which separated Aden from the Empty Quarter, and thirdly, the Muhra 
region located to the utmost east of the disputed area. 23 The Saudi claims were, as in 
many other areas, based on historical rights on the ground that these areas had been 
parts of the old Saudi states and their inhabitants submitted to the Saudi rulers and paid 
Zakah to them even in the time of the modem Saudi state. 4 When oil was discovered in 
the early 1930s in the eastern region of the Peninsula, it was certain that the adjacent 
areas would soon be in demand. As a result, oil companies started searching for oil on 
19 Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 139. 
20 In Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, Buckinghamshire 1988, vol. 20, pp. 200- 
204. 
21 Note that the uninhabited area of the Empty Quarter was to be considered in the pre-Saudi period as 
being terra nullius, see supra part 11, chapter 1. 
22 See the correspondence between King Abdulaziz and Imam Yahya of Yemen between 25.12 1351 and 
17.12 1352, official documents reproduced in Akili, The History of AI-Miklaf Al-Sulaimani (Riyadh, 
1982) vol. II, pp. 915- 22, (in Arabic). 
23 Ibid, also a report produced by Research Department of the British Foreign Office dated 19 December 
1954, in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 20, pp. 200-6. 
24 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 189, Saudi Memoeial, vol. I, pp. 469-76. 
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both sides, 25 and both Saudi Arabia and Britain became more concerned about the 
disputed area than ever. This, again, gave rise to a boundary dispute between the two 
countries. 
Let us turn now to consider the causes of the boundary dispute between Saudi 
Arabia and North Yemen. The taking of Asir region and the evolution of the Saudi 
boundaries with North Yemen, as a result, gave rise to boundary dispute between the 
two countries. Indeed, the reassertion by Imam Yahya of North Yemen of claims to Asir 
led to friction and boundary clashes before the two parties signed a Treaty of Islamic 
Friendship and Arab Fraternity on 20th May 1934, known as the Treaty of Taif 26 This 
Treaty, which will be discussed in detail in chapter II of this part, defined part of the 
Saudi-Yemeni boundaries that contained the cities of Najran in Asir Al-Sarat and Jazan 
in Tihamat Asir and the surrounding areas. What is interesting about this treaty is that it 
did not settle the boundary dispute between the two countries finally and permanently, 
as Article 22 of the Treaty called for renewal every 20 years. This defect in the 
boundary making has accordingly given rise to boundary disputes between the two 
countries for years. 
25 For example two oil companies, namely, the Standard Oil Company of California or California-Arabian 
Standard Oil Company (CASOC) and the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) started their competition for 
the geographical survey and exploration in the borderlands to the north and to the south of the Violet 
Line, In Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, Archives Editions, 1992, vol. 18, pp. 43, also in 
Umm al Qura No. 448 dated 14 July 1933, Royal Decree No. 1135 Granting oil concession by Saudi 
Arabia to CASOC, Archives of Council of Ministers, also in Umm at Qura No. 448 dated 14 July 1933. 
26 (PRO: FO 371/17929 and FO 905/6), in Tuson & Quick, (ed. ) Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 323-346, 
Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riyadh, vol. I, No. 30. 
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Chapter II 
The Settlement of the Southern Saudi Boundary Disputes 
For clarification, it should be noted that the settlement of the Saudi boundary disputes 
with North Yemen, as part of the Ottoman Empire, resulted from direct negotiations 
between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. South Yemen, on the other hand, was a British 
protectorate, and therefore, the first attempt at defining its boundary with Saudi Arabia 
was the "Violet Line" as defined by the 1914 Anglo-Ottoman Convention. This 
boundary was first negotiated between Saudi Arabia and Britain while discussing the 
boundaries of the other British colonies examined in the first and the second parts of 
this study. Therefore, in this part, reference will be made to the two Yemen states as the 
former North Yemen and the former South Yemen in discussion of their boundary 
dispute before their unification, which took place in 1990. 
1. The Saudi-Former North Yemen Pre-Unification Negotiations 
As mentioned in chapter one, above, Asir region was the root of the boundary dispute 
between Saudi Arabia and the former North Yemen. Following the annexation of Asir 
region to the Saudi state in 1930, the boundary dispute between the two countries 
became over a narrow strip of 12 miles that stretched from the coast to Najran, on the 
western edge of the Empty Quarter. In order to settle this dispute, the two parties 
resumed direct negotiations which composed four rounds held, in rotation, in San'a, the 
capital of Yemen and Abha in the Asir region in Saudi Arabia. King Abdulaziz sent his 
delegation to discuss the matter with Imam Yahya's delegation and the two parties held 
their first meeting in San'a, the capital of Yemen on 13.12 1345 (1925) 27 After one 
27 Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani (Riyadh, 1982) vol. II, pp. 915- 22, (in Arabic). 
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month of negotiations, however, the parties could not reach any agreement, 28 although 
they were at least, willing to discuss the problem and negotiate the boundary dispute. 29 
Therefore, King Abdulaziz sent another delegation to Imam Yahya, which resumed 
negotiation on 6.6.1346 (1926) in San'a, holding several meetings with the Yemeni 
delegation. 30 This time the two parties were very close to reaching an agreement, as the 
Imam recognised for the first time the sovereignty of King Abdulaziz over what was 
under the Idrisi sovereignty, and over the whole of Asir region. They were in 
disagreement over Najran. 31 Therefore, the Saudi delegation went back to Saudi Arabia 
carrying a letter from Imam Yahya to King Abdulaziz, suggesting he send a delegation 
to Mecca for further negotiations. 32 After the departure of the Saudi delegation, Imam 
Yhaya sent his delegation to Mecca, but again no agreement was reached and the parties 
accused each other of not having good faith in their negotiations, which reached an 
impasse. 33 
The situation remained calm for three years until Yemeni troops captured Al- 
Aur and Monabih Mountains, which belonged to the Idrisi in 1350 (1930). Saudi Arabia 
protested against this capture34 but Imam Yahya justified his action by stating that the 
inhabitants of these two mountains belonged neither to Asir Al-Sarat nor to Tihamat 
Asir, 35 and that neither Asir Al-Sarat nor Tihamat Asir belonged to Saudi Arabia. The 
capture of Al-Aur and Monabih Mountains by Yemeni troops was a violation of 
28lbid, p. 923. 
29 This was expressed in a telegram sent by Imam Yhaya to King Abdulaziz dated 21.1 1346 and 
Abdulaziz's reply dated 22.4.1346, in ibid., pp. 923-24, also in The Green Book, op., cit., p. 17. 
30Ibid, p. 924. 
31 Ibid, p. 925. 
32 A letter from Imam Yahya to King Abdulaziz dated 4.8.1346, in Akili, op., cit., pp. 925-6. 33 A Report by a Member of the Saudi delegation dated 20.11.1346 and a Report by a member of the 
Yemeni delegation to the negotiations dated 2.12.1346, in ibid., pp. 
34 Ibid, p. 933. 35 A letter from Imam Yahya to his Governor at Maidi dated 29.3,1350, official documents reproduced in 
Akili, The History ofA1-MiklafA/-Sulaimani, op., cit., pp. 933-4. 
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international law. War in inter-state relations was first outlawed in 1928 when the 
General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, also known as Pact of Paris (the Kellogg- 
Briand Pact) 36 was signed. This Treaty, which was adopted outside the framework of 
the League of Nations and which was the law of that time, prohibited the use of inter- 
states force. Article 1 of the Pact contained a declaration by the parties that they 
condemned "recourse to war of the solution of international controversies", and 
renounced war "as an instrument of national policy". It was also agreed that 
international disputes were to be settled by "pacific means". 37 Although Yemen was not 
party to the Pact of Paris, it could be argued that it was bound by it, since the Pact had 
been accepted by over sixty states, including all the Great Powers of that time. 38 As a 
result, the capture of Al-Aur and Monabih Mountains by Yemeni troops was 
unjustifiable and contrary to international law. 
Both sides, however, agreed to resume negotiations in order to discuss the 
matter and the delegations held a meeting near the said mountains, but no agreement 
was reached. Imam Yahya suggested that he would leave it to King Abdulaziz to 
determine their sovereignty. King Abdulaziz reasserted that the Imam had no right to 
keep the Mountains, but decided to make a concession and abandon his claim to these 
two mountains and give them up to Yemen because he wanted to make progress in 
settling the boundary dispute between the two countries. In return, the Imam recognised 
Abdulaziz's sovereignty over Fifa and Bani Malik. 39 As a result, the parties informally 
agreed that from Najran northward belonged to Saudi Arabia and from Wa'ilah 
36 "The Paris General Treaty for the Renunciation of War"(Pact of Paris), United Kingdom Treaty Series, 
29 (1929) Cmd 3410. 
37 Article 2 of the 1928 Pact of Paris. 
38 The Pact was a law-making treaty, which was intended to have general relevance because it was signed 
by 
9y 
over sixty states, including all the Great Powers of that time. 
3 Ibid, p. 935. 
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southward belonged to Yemen. With regard to Najran itself, King Abdulaziz explained 
to Imam Yahya that Najran naturally would belong to Saudi Arabia on the ground of 
historical rights which could be proved by the correspondence that took place between 
the ancestors of both Ibn Saud and the Najran tribes. 40 Therefore, the eastern Saudi- 
Yemeni boundary was settled and the two parties in 1950 signed an informal agreement 
which focused on the treatment of the nationals of each side towards each other. 41 
As a result of the failed Idrisi revolt against Saudi Arabia and his flight to 
Yemen, King Abdulaziz suggested to Imam Yahya that negotiations be assumed on the 
boundary question. When the Saudi delegations arrived on 6.2.1352 (1932) in San'a, 
they stayed two months during which the Imam neither nominated his delegation nor 
allowed the Saudis to contact their country. 42 While instructing his delegations, King 
Abdulaziz insisted that modem political boundaries, such as those applied by western 
countries, should be defined between the two countries. 3 This instruction shows that 
Abdulaziz was aware of the importance of Western-style boundaries, as lines separating 
states from each other. Clearly, Abdulaziz's attitude towards Western-style boundary 
had changed from the one he held during the Saudi-British negotiations at the Uqair 
Conference for the settlement of the Saudi boundary with its northern neighbours, 
discussed in the first part. At the Uqair Conference, Abdulaziz fought for tribal 
boundaries rather than fixed ones. The reason for this new attitude, which was in 
conformity with international boundaries as understood by international law, might be 
that Abdulaziz realised, after his experience of defining fixed boundaries with his 
40Ibid, p. 1099. 
11 Ibid. 
42 A telegram from the Head of the Saudi delegation to his brother, the Minister of Finance asking him to 
inform King Abdulaziz about their situation, dated 4.41352, official documents reproduced in Akili, The 
History ofAl-MiklafAI-Sulaimani, op., cit., p. 1046. 
43 King Abdulaziz's Instructions to his delegation, Ibid., p. 1039. 
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northern neighbours, that tribal boundaries were no longer acceptable for separating 
states from each other. Therefore, he wanted a final and permanent definition of this 
boundary, which could not be achieved except by defining fixed boundaries, because 
tribal boundaries were changeable according to the change in the allegiance of the 
tribes. 44 Abdulaziz also stated that his Government did not ask Imam Yahya to concede 
what had belonged to the Idrisi before the Imam's troops entered Najran, especially 
Hodaidah and Maidi, because they had come under the Imam's sovereignty after the 
collapse of the Idrisi. 45 At that time, both Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed that every 
side should keep its territory after the collapse of the Idrisi and before the capture of 
Najran. Abdulaziz also expressed his willingness to modify the western boundary line 
slightly in the Najran area if the Imam wished to do so 46 The delegates of the two 
states held several meetings in San'a, but no agreement was reached, as the two sides 
disagreed over Najran. 47 During the negotiations, they suggested that the disputed area 
would be divided between the two countries by drawing a boundary line that conformed 
to the military meridians, which were in use at that time. 48 According to the repeated 
reports from the Saudi delegations, it would seem that Imam Yahya deliberately delayed 
the settlement of the boundary dispute in order to reinforce his position in the Najran 
area. 
Najran came to be within the dispute area as a result of the competition between 
the two parties to expand their authorities. Yemen captured it with other parts of Asir in 
June 1933 and demanded the return of all the dominions of Idrisi, who had already 
44 As the sovereignty of the Rulers in the Arabian Peninsula depended on the allegiance of the tribes, their 
territories used to extend and shrink according to the tribes' allegiance and their boundaries overlapped 
most of the time. See supra part I, chapter I, 1. 
45 Ibid, also in Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., p. 1039. 46 Ibid. 
47Akili, The History ofA1-Mik1afAl-Su1aimani, op., cit., p. 1046.1049-53 48 Al-Ra'ies, Asir in the Saudi-Yemeni Relations, Cairo, 1989, pp. 182-252. 
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abandoned all his agreements49 with the Saudis when he fled to Yemen. 50 However, 
King Abdulaziz expressed his willingness to resume the negotiations, and put forward 
three subjects which the negotiations would cover, namely, the defining of the 
boundaries, the extradition of Idrisi and the determination of Najran sovereignty. 51 He 
also expressed his willingness to modify the boundary line slightly in the Najran area in 
order that all the inhabitants of one tribe would be placed together in one country. 52 
While King Abdulaziz insisted on resuming the negotiations, Imam Yahya continued to 
delay them53 until he finally agreed to resume them on 25.9.1352 (late 1933) and the 
two parties nominated their delegations which held their first meeting in Abha to 
discuss four things, namely, the Najran question, the boundaries, a 20-year friendly 
agreement and non-intervention in each other affairs. 54 
As a result of the capture of Najran by Yemen, they returned to the last Saudi 
suggestion according to which each side would keep the territory they had in order to 
keep Najran. 55 Therefore, the boundary line would be drawn to the south of Najran to 
leave it within the Yemeni territory. Saudi Arabia strongly rejected this and proposed 
another suggestion that Najran would become a neutral zone, as a buffer zone between 
the two countries. 56 According to this suggestion, the two parties would undertake not 
to intervene in the interior affairs of Najran. 57 However, Yemen rejected this suggestion, 
49 Those of 1920,1926 and 1930, see supra chapter I. so Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, op., cit., pp. 150-1, for further details see Akili, The History of 
41-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., chapters 17,18. s1 Telegrams from King Abdulaziz to Imam Yahya dated 21.7 1951 & 8.8.1351(6 December 1932), 
official documents reproduced in Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., 1059. sz Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., pp. 1037-39. ss See the correspondence between King Abdulaziz and Imam Yahya between 16.4.1352 and 25.9.1352, 
in ibid, pp. 105 1- 1092. 
54 Ibid., pp. 1094-5. 
ss A telegram from Imam Yahya to King Abdulaziz dated 1.9.1952, official documents reproduced in 
Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., pp. 925-1075. 56 Two telegrams from King Abdulaziz to Imam Yahya dated 8.8.1352 and 15.8.1352, official 
documents reproduced in Akili, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., pp. 1063-65. 57 Ibid 
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insisting in keeping Najran under its authority. 58 Therefore, Saudi Arabia submitted its 
last proposal, that Najran would be partitioned equally between the two countries and 
Idrisi would be returned to Saudi custody, but Yemen, again, rejected it, and as a result, 
the last chance for a diplomatic solution collapsed and the negotiations reached an 
impasse. 59 
As a result of the Yemeni procrastination, Saudi Arabia set up a date by which 
the Yemeni troops would be withdrawn from Najran in order to avoid any military 
actions on the ground that Najran belonged to Saudi Arabia. 60 When Yemen failed to 
withdraw, war erupted between the two countries, and in May 1934 the Saudis 
succeeded in recapturing the occupied area, including Najran, which up until then had 
been outside the Saudi domain. 61 In addition, the Saudi troops penetrated into the 
Yemeni territory from the west and reached Hodeida, by the Red Sea. 62 Such an armed 
attack, however, was like the capture of Al-Aur and Monabih Mountains by Yemeni 
troops, a violation of the principles of international law regarding both the prohibition 
use of force and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means embodied in 
the 1928 Pact of Paris. Both Saudi Arabia and Yemen were bound to observe the 
provisions of the Pact of Paris, and to seek a peaceful solution to their boundary dispute 
instead of resorting to war. 
58 The Imam ignored the Najran question and did not mention it in all his telegrams to King Abdulaziz 
after the date of King Abdulaziz's suggestion, while keeping Najran, see the Imam's telegrams to King 
Abdulaziz after 9.8.1352 until the eruption of the war between the two states, official documents 
reproduced in Akili, The History ofAl MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., pp. 1066-1116. 
59 In telegrams from Ibn Saud to Imam Yahya dated 16.4,8.8,15.8,27.11,6.12,10.12,11.12,17.12 
1352. Leatherdale, Britain and Saudi Arabia, op., cit., p. 153. 60 See the correspondence between King Abdulaziz and Imam Yahya of Yemen dated 16.4,8.8,15.8, 
6.12,10.12,11.12,17.12 1352, official documents reproduced in Akili, The History of Al-Miklaf Al- 
Sulaimani op., cit., vol. II, pp. 1051-4 &1063-5&1068-70 &1103-5 &1108-10. 6' Gregory Gause III, Saudi-Yemeni Relations, New York, Columbia University Press, 1990, pp. 57-8. 
62 Umm Al Qura, No. 491 dated 11.5.1934. 
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Following the Saudi attack, the Imam appealed for outside aid. Britain, Italy and 
France, none of whom wanted the Saudis to be close to their colonies, Aden, Eritrea and 
Djibouti, sent warships to impress upon the Saudis the virtues of moderation. 63 It could 
be argued that the intervention of Britain, Italy and France was not justifiable because 
the Saudi attack did not extend to include their colonies and was never intended to do 
so, because the dispute was between Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. Another argument 
which might be put forward is that their intervention might be explained on the ground 
of collective self-defence which took place after the Imam's request for their aid. The 
1928 Pact of Paris, which was the law of that time, remained silent regarding the 
machinery for collective action against a state that violated its provisions. The question 
now is whether or not the right of collective self-defence existed in customary 
international law at the time of the case in question prior to the UN Charter. The word 
"inherent" in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter suggests that the law of the 
Charter incorporated pre-existing customary international law, and the right of 
collective self-defence, therefore, exists in general international law. 64 As a result, states 
have been granted the right of collective self-defence by the inherent law, not by Article 
51 of the United Nations Charter, which was merely declaratory of an existing right. 65 
The existence of the right of collective self-defence in customary international law dated 
back to the emergence of the Monroe doctrine in 1823.66 Warning the European states 
against the extension of their policy of the suppression of any revolutionary regime to 
the Western Hemisphere, the United States President Monroe said in his annual 
message to Congress of 2 December 1823: 
63 Gregory Gause III, op., cit., p. 58. 64 Bowett, Self-defence in International Law (Manchester, 1958) p. 200. 
65 Ibid 
66 For further details regarding the Monroe doctrine see, Hyde, international Law, 1945, vol. 1, p. 281, 
quoted in Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, op., cit., p. 208. 
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"We owe it to candour, and to amicable relations existing between the 
United States the those powers [European States], to declare that we 
would consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any 
"6 portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. 7 
Acting under the same principle, the United States Senate, fearing that Japan might 
indirectly acquire a footing in territory adjacent to Magdalena Bay, adopted in 1912 a 
resolution that: 
"When any harbour or other place in the American continents is so 
situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military purposes 
might threaten the communications for the safety of the United States, 
the government of the United States could not see without grave 
concern the possession of such harbour or other place by any 
corporation or association which has such a relation to another 
government, not American, as to give that government practical power 
of control for naval or military purposes. " 68 
The aforementioned two examples show that the United States, although no 
action might have been taken against it, considered its security so dependent on the 
security of the American continent as a whole that any attack on that continent would 
endanger its peace and safety, and as a result, it had the right to defend its endangered 
security. 
The Monroe doctrine shifted from being a merely right of individual self- 
defence to become a right of collective self-defence of the continent as a whole when 
the American states in December 1938 agreed on "Declaration on the Principles of the 
67 Moore, Digest of International Law, vol. 6, pp. 401-3, for the full text of the message see Hyde, 
international Law, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 284-6, quoted in Bowett, Self-defence in International Law, op., cit., 
208.. ýs 
Hyde, international Law, 1945, vol. 1, pp. 289 quoted in Bowett, Self-defence in International Law. p. 
209. 
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Solidarity of America" known as the Declaration of Lima. 69 Although the Declaration 
contained nothing more binding than an obligation of consultation at the initiative of 
any one of the signatory states, 70 further emphasis on the right of collective self-defence 
took place in the first and the second meetings of the American Foreign Ministers at 
Panama and Habana respectively. At the first meeting in October 1939, they adopted a 
resolution providing for consultation should any region of America subject to the 
sovereignty of non-American state be obliged to change its sovereignty and thereby 
produce a danger to the security of American Continent. 71 At their second meeting in 
July 1939, the Foreign Ministers adopted a Convention72 which took into consideration 
the European war which might give rise to situations in the American colonies 
possession of the belligerent powers and create a state of danger to the peace of the 
continent. They declared that: 
"Any transfer ... of the sovereignty [of] any such region to another 
non-American state would be regarded by the American Republics as 
against American sentiments and ... 
[the] American states [have the 
s73 right] to maintain their security and political independence. 
Like the United States, Britain recognised the Monroe doctrine and maintained that its 
security demanded a claim of special interests in regions such as Afghanistan, Persia 
and Egypt, which were not under its territorial jurisdiction. 74 The British stated in a note 
69 The text of the Declaration is found in Hyde, international Law, 1945, vol. 1, p. 303, quoted in Ibid., p. 
210. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., pp. 210-11. 72 This Convention was additional to the Final Act which was adopted in the same meeting and which 
included a resolution Known as the "Act of Habana concerning the Provisional Administration of 
European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas". The text of both the Final Act and the Convention 
are set forth in the Department of State Bulletin, August 240" and 145 respectively. Quoted in Bowett, 
Self-defence and International Law, op., cit., p 211. 71 Quoted in Bowett, Self-defence and International Law, op., cit., p 211. 74 Pearce-Higgins, "The Monroe Doctrine" (1924) 5 BYIL 103, at 114. 
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sent in May 1928 to the United States government in connection with the Pact of Paris 
of 1928 Treaty that: 
"There are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of 
which constitute a special and vital interests for our peace and safety. 
... Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure 
of self-defence. "75 
As these regions were not subject to the sovereignty of the British Empire, the British 
claim could only be justified as self-defence if an attack on these regions was proven to 
be a threat to Britain's security and safety. 76 
From the above discussion, it could be said that the right of collective self- 
defence was well established under customary international law prior to the UN Charter. 
Further evidence of this is found in the Nicaragua Case, 77 when the international Court 
of Justice was obliged to reach a decision based upon the rules of customary 
international law by virtue of the United State's reservation. 78 The Court stressed that 
the right to collective self-defence was established in customary international law. 79 The 
Court stated three requirements for the exercise of the right of collective self-defence. 
The first requirement is the occurrence of an armed attack against the victim state. The 
second requirement is that there has to be a declaration by the victim state that it has 
been attacked. The third requirement is that the attacked state must request assistance 
from the state or states coming to its aid. 80 In the case of Yemen, it could safely be said 
75 Cmd. 3109, p. 25; Cmd. 3153, p. 10. 76 Bowett, Self-defence and International Law, op., cit., p 213. 77 Nicaragua case, ICJReports, (1986), p. 3. 78 The United States Declaration of Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction excluded disputes arising under 
a multilateral treaty, unless.. . all parties to the treaty affected by the 
decision are also parties to the case 
before the Court. Ibid. 
791bid, pp. 103-5. 
So Ibid. 
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that following the attack made by Abdulaziz, the Imam's appeal for the aid of Britain, 
Italy and France constituted both a declaration that Yemen was attacked and a request 
for aid from these three states. Yemen, therefore, had the right to request its allies, either 
within the framework of defensive pact or on an ad hoc basis, to help it defend itself, 
and Britain, Italy and France had legally exercised the right of collective self-defence. 
The requirement of a request by the victim state means that the action remains 
one of self-defence, and that all the states involved in an action of collective self- 
defence must have special substantive interest which had been violated by the original 
attack. 81 Indeed, Judge Sir Robert Jennings in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua 
Case suggests that in addition to the aforementioned requirements, the assisting state 
must be in some measure be defending itself and, in collective self-defence, there 
should be some real element of self involved with the notion of defence. 82 In the light of 
Jennings' suggestion, it could be said that the intervention of Britain, Italy and France 
involved some measures of defending themselves because Abdulaziz, by attacking 
Yemen, might have attacked or threatened their colonies, whose security was very 
important for the interests of the three assisting states. 83 
As a result of the a aforementioned intervention, King Abdulaziz announced on 
13 May, a cease-fire on all fronts after a seven-week war84 and both Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen resumed negotiations in Hijaz, as the Yemeni delegation which had already 
I McCoubrey and White, International Law ofArmed Conflict, op., cit., pp. 163-4. 2 Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports, (1986), p. 3, at p. 545. 
63 This is, as Jennings said in his dissenting opinion in the Nicaragua case the philosophy, which 
underlies mutual security arrangements, such as the system of the Organisation of American States, for 
which Article 51 of the UN Charter was specifically designed. Ibid. 
84 Al-Authaimin, The History ofSaudiArabia (Riyadh, 1995) 1" ed. vol. II, p. 286, (in Arabic). 
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arrived to Abha for negotiations before the war was still in Saudi Arabia. 85 These 
negotiations resulted in signing on 20th May 1934 a Treaty of Islamic Friendship and 
Arab Fraternity, known as the Treaty of Taif. 86 According to this Treaty, Abdulaziz 
would withdraw from Yemen in exchange for Yahya's recognition of Saudi sovereignty 
in Asir, including the disputed boundary areas of Najran and Jazan 87 (see map 12). The 
Treaty also defined part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundaries that contained the cities of 
Najran in Asir Al-Sarat and Jazan in Tihamat Asir and the surrounding areas. Generally 
speaking, the boundary starts at a point midway between the Saudi village of Al- 
Mowasem and the Yemeni village of Maidi on the Red Sea and runs eastwards to 
Najran. 88 However, the eastern boundary between North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, 
which runs from Jabal Thar southeastwards until Jabal Al-Ryan at the edge of the 
Empty Quarter, was not mentioned in the Treaty, although the allocation of tribes had 
been agreed. 
Not only did the Treaty of Taif, which was more than a boundary treaty per se, 
leave part of the Saudi-Yemeni boundaries undefined, but it also did not settle the 
boundary dispute between the two countries finally and permanently, even though the 
boundary was demarcated on the ground. Indeed, Article 22 of the Treaty called for 
renewal every 20 years. As far as international law is concerned, this treaty was to 
expire with the expiration of the period of 20 years unless it was renewed or prolonged 
for a further period. 89 This defect in the boundary-making process gave rise to boundary 
85 Note that the Yemeni delegations did not leave Abha to Yemen when the war erupted between the two 
states, but left to Jeddah and stayed there until the beginning of the current negotiations, see ibid., pp. 
286-7. 
86 Public Record Office: Foreign Office document 371/17929 and FO 905/6, reproduced in Tuson & 
Quick, (ed. ) Arabian Treaties, op., cit., pp. 323-346, Treaty Collection, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Riyadh, vol. I, No. 30. 
87 Article 2 of the 1934 Saudi-Yemeni Treaty (the Treaty of Taif). 
88 Article 4 of the Treaty of Taif. 
89 Article 54(a) of 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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disputes between the two countries for years. As a result, the recapture of territory given 
up under the Treaty long remained a goal of Yemeni national sentiment. In 1973, this 
Treaty was renewed by the issue of a joint communique by the Saudi Foreign Minister 
and the Yemeni Prime Minister, Abdullah Al-Hajri, during the latter's visit to Saudi 
Arabia. In this communique, the boundary established by the 1934 Treaty of Taif was 
described as "permanent and final as defined by Articles 2 and 4 of the 1934 Treaty of 
Taif of Islamic Friendship and Arab Fraternity. "90 However, since the assassination of 
Al-Hajri in 1977 in London, which was linked with the commitment he made in this 
communique, 91 this communique had never been ratified by any Yemeni leader until 
the final settlement of the boundary dispute between the two countries in 2000. 
However, the rest of the Saudi Yemen boundary which was not defined by this 
Treaty, which located, as already mentioned between Jabal Thar and Jabal Al-Ryan at 
the edge of the Empty Quarter, remained calm until after the unification of Yemen. 
2. The Saudi-Former South Yemen Pre-Unification Negotiations 
The Saudi boundary dispute with Former South Yemen or the Protectorate of Aden was 
first discussed between Saudi Arabia and Britain in their negotiation of the Saudi 
boundaries with the British colonies of Qatar, UAE, Oman and Aden over 20 years, 
from late 1934 until their breakdown in autumn 1955. Therefore, almost all the 
boundary lines which were proposed by both Saudi Arabia and Britain covered the 
boundary of the former South Yemen or Aden Protectorate starting from the "Hamza 
90 Al-Gabba, Saudi-Yemeni Relations (Riyadh, 1992) p. 237 and 435, (in Arabic). 9' Schofield, "Border and Territory in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century", 
in Schofield (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States (London, 1994) pp. 54-5. 
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Line" until the bilateral declaration of the British boundary line of 1955 with some 
slight differences here and there. 
However, before the "Hamza Line" of 1935, the British Chief Commissioner in 
Aden proposed a boundary line in March 1935 which aimed to push the Saudis as far to 
the north inside the desert of the Empty Quarter as possible in order for Britain to 
protect its political and economic interests. 92 According to the Aden proposed boundary, 
a straight boundary line would be drawn between the junction of longitude 52 Degrees 
East with latitude 20 degrees North and the junction of latitude 18 degrees North with 
the "Violet Line". 93 Aden justified its proposal on the ground that the Awamir and 
Manahil tribes extended to latitude 18 degrees North to the east end of its proposed 
boundary. 94 However, Saudi Arabia did not accept Aden's proposal and proposed the 
"Hamza Line" which, as already discussed, 95 covered its boundaries with the British 
colonies in the east of the Arabian Peninsula. With regard to the Saudi boundary with 
Aden, the "Hamza Line" began at the junction of longitude 52 degrees East with 
latitude 17 degrees North and ran southwestwards until it met the Violet Line96 (see 
map 10). 
The difference between the Aden boundary proposal and the "Hamza Line" was 
that the latter left a wide strip to the south of the sand of the Empty Quarter within the 
Saudi territory. The width of this strip was approximately 160 miles at its eastern end, 
and it became narrower as it ran westwards. It would seem that the "Hamza Line", in 
92 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 199. 
93 ibid. 94 A telegram from the British Political Agent in Aden to the Colonial Minister in London dated 29 March 
1935 in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, Buckinghamshire 1988, vol. 20, p. 123. 95 See supra part II, chapter II, 1. 96 Saudi Memorial, p. 385, Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundaries, Primary Documents 1853- 
1957, Archive Editions, 1988, vol. 16, p. 6., Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 190-4. 
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general, was a moderate one in comparison with the "Violet Line" and the Aden 
proposal, as it left Sina'aw and Thamoud wells in the Saudi territory and the remaining 
territory of Al-Kathiri, Al-kutai'i and Muhrah within Aden's territory. The "Hamza 
Line" was based on two grounds, namely, the list of tribes which belonged to Saudi 
Arabia that Fuad Bey Hamza, the Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister, had submitted to 
Britain in the course of the negotiations, as already mentioned, 97 and the loyalty of the 
same tribes to the Saudi Government. 98 Support for the Saudi claim is found in a 
report" produced, later, by the Research Department of the British Foreign Office 
which stated that the Saudi authority extended up to the south of the sand of the Empty 
Quarter with an area between longitude 51 and 53 degrees East. The report confirmed 
the traveller, Bertram Thomas's information that many of the wells on the margins of 
the sand desert were held in common. 100 However, Britain rejected the "Hamza Line" 
because it did not accept that Sina'aw and Thamoud wells belonged to Saudi Arabia. '°' 
As a result, Fuad Bey Hamza implied to the British that his government was ready to 
make concessions by negotiating a boundary line to be somewhere between the "Hamza 
Line" and the Aden Proposal, but Britain ignored it. 102 
The Aden Government considered that they had gone too far in the concessions 
from the Violet Line in their first proposal, for they subsequently found that certain 
Hadrami tribes extended further north than they had originally believed. Therefore, the 
97 See supra part II, chapter II. 98 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., p. 189, Wilfred Thesiger, Arabian Sands, p. 212. 
99 The Report produced on 19 December 1954, in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary 
Disputes, op., cit., vol. 20, pp. 200-4. 100 In Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, Archives Edition, 1992, vol. 19, pp. 121-32, 
Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 199-200. 101 FO E 3783/77/91, Aide-memoir from Sir A. Ryan to Saudi Government, 9 April 1935, also in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, p. 71, in Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, pp. 385-6. 102 Britain later regretted its neglect of the Saudi proposal when it wanted to go back to the "Hamza 
Line", see supra part II, chapter II (the Dammam Conference). 
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Chief Commissioner in Aden, Sir Bernard Reilly, suggested a straight line from the 
intersection of parallel 18 with the Violet Line to the intersection of parallel 20 degrees 
with meridian 55 degrees; a line so drawn would provide a safer margin for the British 
sphere of influence, as it pushed Saudi Arabia as far away as possible. 103 This new line 
would give Aden more territory to the north, as it was moved from meridian 52 degrees 
according to the first Aden proposal to meridian 55 according to this proposal. The 
Aden Government argued that the boundary should not join the Violet Line below 
parallel 18 because it would cut into the Seiar steppe country. 104 However, Aden's 
argument was to be refuted by evidence from the travels of Bertram Thomas, who 
showed that a line below the 19th parallel would similarly cut into Mahra and Manahil 
territory in the east. '°5 
The Colonial Office reevaluated the British position regarding the boundary 
dispute on the light of the report of the Research Department of the British Foreign 
Office and the traveller Thomas's information, just mentioned. Britain was very 
concerned to maintain good relations with Saudi Arabia at a time when the Italian 
influence was increasing in Yemen and the area of the south Red Sea. In July 1935, the 
Colonial Office suggested that a modification of the aforementioned Aden proposal 
would be made. According to this modification, the Saudi Aden boundary would begin 
from the intersection of 22 degrees North and 55 degrees East, down that meridian to 
the intersection with parallel 20, thence to the intersection of meridian 52 degrees and 
parallel 19 degrees, thence in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 19 degrees and 
the Violet Line. 106 This boundary conceded to Saudi Arabia a narrow strip of territory to 
103 A telegram from the British Foreign Office to the British Political Agent in Aden dated 22 November 
1935 in Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 20, pp. 141.2. 104 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 199. 10s In Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, Archives Edition, 1992, vol. 19, pp. 121-32. 106 Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 20, pp. 143-144. 
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the south of the previous Aden boundary proposals, to include the common wells, 
mentioned in the Foreign Office's report and the traveller, Bertram Thomas's 
information, such as Shanna Wells. Nonetheless, it did not meet the Saudi claims, as it 
left more territory within Aden than that offered by the "Hamza Line". 
So, the British Minister at Jeddah, Sir Andrew Ryan proposed what was 
described by the British as their final offer, known as the "Riyadh Line". 107 With regard 
to Aden's boundary with Saudi Arabia, the "Riyadh Line" began at the junction of 
longitude 53 degrees East with latitude 19 degrees North and ran in a straight line from 
this point to meet the Violet Line at its intersection with latitude 18 degrees North. 108 
Although the "Riyadh Line" left a narrow strip of territory to the south of the previous 
British boundary proposals, it was deliberately defined to cut 20 or 30 miles into the 
Empty Quarter, so as to provide a defensive buffer for the Aden protectorate. 109 Saudi 
Arabia rejected this line on the ground that some wells, which were included in Aden 
territory, were part of the Murra's 161 wells, already submitted to Britain. ' 10 
In 1937, in order to appease the Saudis, particularly in the area requested, the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies pressed the Aden Government to see if it could not 
make some concession between parallel 17 and 18, particularly to the west of meridian 
51. According to this new suggestion, the great sand of the Empty Quarter would be left 
to the north of new boundary line, that is to say, within Saudi territory. However, the 
Aden Government proposed a boundary line that contained only limited concession in 
07 See supra chapter II. 1. 
108 Saudi Memorial, vol. 1, chapter V, para. 28, p. 390, The Memorial states incorrectly that the line 
passed through the junction of longitude 53 Degrees E with latitude 19 Degrees N. (pp. 385-6). 09 Schofield, "Border and Territory in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century", 
in Schofield (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States, op., cit., p. 16. 10 See supra part II, chapter II, 1. EO: E 4314/77/91, Statement by Fuad Bey Hamza, 8 July 1935, in 
Schofield, (ed. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 18, pp. 459-63. 
190 
Part Three: Southern Boundaries 
comparison with the previous proposals. It grudgingly conceded a twenty-mile wide 
strip parallel to the Violet Line, starting at meridian 48 degrees and terminating, some 
three hundred miles further east, at meridian 52 degrees. Since, however, it was felt by 
the Foreign Office that an offer of some six thousand square miles of desert in an area in 
which Ibn Saud was not really interested would not be looked on as a major concession, 
the offer was never put to him. 111 This proposed line was far away from the real British 
sovereignty in the area. Therefore, the Colonial Office emphasised that more 
information about the boundary area and the British sovereignty in it should be 
collected in order to be able to make a strong and real claim. 112 However, the outbreak 
of World War II put off the negotiations for a decade. 
The aforementioned boundary suggestions put forward by both parties indicated 
that a solution for this boundary dispute was close. While there was divergence in the 
Saudi eastern boundary dispute which was discussed in the previous chapter, the Saudi- 
Aden boundary dispute was going to some extent differently. Indeed, in a very 
important step in the way of solution, both parties reached an understanding regarding 
the location of tribes. 113 This understanding reassembled the Treaty of Muhammera114, 
which was signed in 1922 between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and defined the allegiance of 
the tribes, becoming the ground on which the final Saudi-Iraqi boundary settlement was 
based. Nonetheless, in the case of Aden, this understanding did not seem to be sufficient 
by itself to be the ground of any settlement, as further investigations regarding the tribes 
seemed to be essential. Indeed, it was necessary to agree on a definition of the dera (the 
tribe's territory) before any further progress could be made. However, the British did 
111 Ibid., p. 315. 
112 Wilkinson, Arabia's Frontiers, op., cit., pp. 225-30. 
113 Schofield and Blake, (eds. ), Arabian Boundary Disputes, op., cit., vol. 20, pp. 169-77. 
114 See supra part I, chapter 1,3. 
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not seem to have understood this point, or else they might deliberately have ignored it, 
as they confused between the dera (the tribe's territory) and the movement of the tribes 
within each others' dera. The tribal dera is an exclusive territory for a tribe over which 
its emir exercises its authority and determines who has the right of access, and this is 
what gives the tribes the right of movement within each others' dera. Consequently, 
movement within each other's territories does not mean that the moving tribes have any 
territorial right in such territory; they are only visitors for a period of time. The 
allegiance of the tribes of a certain territory to certain rulers gives such rulers legitimate 
right over these tribes' territory. This should be taken into consideration when 
attempting to define boundaries in the Arabian Peninsula. Indeed, any confusion or 
ignorance of the definition of the tribal territory would lead to ill definition of such 
boundaries, and as a result they would not be accepted by the parties to the dispute. 
In 1937, the Aden Government was able to make a concession to the line already 
conceded to the Foreign Office, over such common wells as Shanna, and even then it 
would be more appropriate that they formed part of a common desert zone. Such a 
concession would modify that line so as to read: from the intersection of 22 degrees 
North and 55 degrees East, down that meridian to the intersection with parallel 20 
degrees, thence to the intersection of meridian 52 degrees and parallel 19 degrees, 
thence in a straight line to the intersection of parallel 19 degrees and the Violet line. A 
modification was also sought, in British favour, of the Violet line between Beihan and 
the neighbourhood of the Hadrami Sei'ar, where their margin was too narrow. These 
concessions, including Shanna, reluctantly wrung out of Aden, were then more or less 
incorporated into the offer to be made to the Saudis, but Reilly was assured that no other 
major concessions would be made in his area. 
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3. The Saudi-Yemeni Post-Unification Neuotiations 
Prior to the unification of Yemen in 22 May 1990, much of the undefined Saudi-Yemen 
boundary from Jabal Thar to Jabal Ryan was not inhabited or exploited by either side. 
Therefore, all the proposed or claimed boundary lines, already discussed, had no 
particular legal weight, and most of the legal arguments rested in vague assertions of 
who has had constructive control over the area. However, after unification, the Yemeni 
Government accelerated its search for oil to support development efforts, and granted 
oil concessions in this area to several western oil companies. 115 As a result, Saudi 
Arabia protested against the Yemen action and sent several warning letters to these oil 
companies in March 1992 and August 1993 informing them that they were working in 
Saudi territory. 116 At the same time, Yemen asserted that its boundary claims included 
even more territory than those in which oil concessions had been granted. 117 Yemen 
lodged an official protest with Saudi Arabia after Saudi weather reports had indicated 
that the Kharkhir region belonged to Saudi Arabia. Yemen said that the Kharkhir region 
belonged to it. Therefore, Yemen stated that it would not renew the Treaty of Taif, 
according to which Kahrkhir belonged to Saudi Arabia, which would expire in 
September 1994.118 
However, the Gulf war of 1990/91, along with the unification of Yemen, 
resulted in the increased desire of both parties to settle their boundary disputes, both 
from Jabal Thar to Jabal Ryan and from Jabal Ryan until Muhra at the junction of 
Saudi-Yemeni-Omani boundaries. As a result, Yemen resurrected its claims to Asir and 
its Pike, "Cross-border hydrocarbon reserves", in Schofield (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf 
States (London, 1994) p. 187, at p. 193. "6lbid., pp. 194-5. 
117 Ibid 
"$ Yemeni Republic Radio, 17 May 1993. 
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Najran. 119 Therefore, the two parties became more desirous of settling their boundary 
dispute than ever. Indeed, the countries resumed negotiations when the Saudi and 
Yemeni Foreign Ministers held several preparatory meetings in July 1992 (between 17- 
22) in Geneva to exchange views on future arrangements to begin negotiations between 
the countries on the boundary dispute. 120 The negotiations, which were held in a cordial 
and fraternal atmosphere, were followed by several meetings on the level of bilateral 
technical committees during 1992.121 With regard to the issue of Article 22 of the 1934 
Treaty of Taif, mentioned earlier, an important stance was expressed by the Yemeni 
Foreign Minister Abdul Karim Al-Iryani in a press conference held in San'a, the capital 
of Yemen, on 30 July 1992, in which he stated that: 
"The Taif Agreement is a fact. It was signed by King Abdulaziz 
and Imam Yahya. A border demarcation committee was 
established and delineated the border from north of Maidi to the 
Thar mountains. A demarcation committee prepared a 
memorandum which was handed to King Abdulaziz and Imam 
Yahya and they both ratified it.,, 122 
This statement removed any doubt about the finality of the Treaty of Taif and paved the 
way for more understanding and efforts towards the settlement of the boundary dispute. 
Indeed, in this optimistic atmosphere, Saudi and Yemeni technical experts continued 
their negotiations in Ta'izz in Yemen for two days beginning on 16 August 1993.123 
Although no official communique emerged from the negotiations, the Yemeni side 
announced that they remained optimistic of a settlement similar to that between the 
19 Schofield, "Border and Territory in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the Twentieth Century", 
in Schofield (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States, op., cit., p. 54-5. 
120 Yemeni Republic Radio, 20 July 1992. 
121 Yemeni Republic Radio, 10 August 1992. 
122 Quoted in Schofield, "Border and Territory in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula during the 
Twentieth Century", in Schofield (ed. ), Territorial Foundation of the Gulf States, op., cit., p. 55. 
123 Al-Riyadh, No. 9184 dated 16 August 1993. 
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Yemen and Oman. 124 The sixth round was held between 25 and 28 October 1993 in 
Riyadh, in Saudi Arabia and the committee issued a communique stating that the 
seventh round of talks would begin on 20 November 1993 in San'a. 125 
However, the seventh round was not held in the time defined by the joint 
communique just mentioned, as the negotiations did not resume until January 1994 
when the seventh round was held in San'a on 18 January 1994 in a cordial and fraternal 
atmosphere. 126 Although several differences arose between the two parties along with 
some boundary clashes in the borderland in the beginning of December 1994, both sides 
expressed their desire to solve their boundary disputes by amicable means. 127 As a 
result, the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding 128 on 26 March 1995, as 
the first step towards ending the 60-year boundary dispute. 129 The Memorandum, which 
was ratified on 15 May, 130 reaffirmed the finality of the 1934 Treaty of Taif, 131 and set 
up six Joint Commissions in order to settle all the boundary disputes between the two 
countries as follows: 
(1) Joint Commission for the re-establishment of border markers set up following the 
1934 Treaty of Taif; 132 
124 ibid. 
125 Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh, 28 October 1993, AI-Riyadh, No. 9258 dated 29 October 1993. 
'26 AI-Riyadh, No. 9339 dated 18 January 1994. 
127 A statement made by a Saudi Official Source, AI-Riyadh, No. 9664 dated 9 December 1993. 
'29 Boundary Agreements, Archives of the Border Guards. 
'29 Also in AI-Hayat, No. 11696 dated 27 February 1995 
130 Umm at Qura, No. 3552 dated 19 May 1995. 
131 Clause I of the Memorandum. 132 Clause 2 of the Memorandum. 
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(2) Joint Commission to negotiate the delimitation and demarcation the remainder of 
the land boundary from Jabal Thar until the end of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary to 
the east, and to agree on the arbitration procedures when needed; 133 
(3) Joint Commission for negotiating the determination of the maritime boundary 
between the two states in accordance with international law; 134 
(4) Joint High Military Commission charged for preventing military incidents on the 
boundary; 135 
(5) Supreme Joint Commission for supervising other commissions' work, facilitating 
their tasks and removing any obstacles that may challenge their ways. 136 
Generally speaking, the boundary dispute between the two countries was over 
two points. The first was the boundary which was demarcated by the 1934 Treaty of 
Taif. This dispute concerned certain disputed landmarks, which Yemen considered to be 
at certain location while Saudi Arabia maintained that they were elsewhere. 137 The 
second concerned the undefined boundary from Jabal Thar up to the intersection of 
Saudi-Yemeni-Omani boundary. The main problem in this dispute was over the 
ownership of Sharurah and Al-Wadi'ah and the areas surrounding them, at the edge of 
the Empty Quarter. 138 While Yemen claimed these cities on the ground of its historical 
rights, Saudi Arabia based its claim on both historical rights and the exercise of the state 
133 Clause 3 of the Memorandum. 
134 Clause 4 of the Memorandum. 
135 Clause 5 of the Memorandum. 
136 Clause 7 of the Memorandum. 
137 Declared by the President of Yemen in an interview with Al-Hayat, dated 21 June 1998, in Al-Hayat, 
No. 12892 dated 21 June 1998. Also Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani, the Yemeni Prime Minister explained in a 
newspaper interview on 12 August 1998, Al-Bayan, Dubai, 10 October 1998, AI-Sharq Al-Awsat, 
London, No. 7277 dated 29 October 1998 & No. 7302 dated 23 November 1998. 
138 Declared by the President of Yemen in both an interview with AI-Hayat, dated 21 June 1998, in Al- 
Hayat, No. 12892 dated 21 June 1998 and in a press conference held dated 20.7.98, in Al-Hayat, No. 
12922 dated 21 July 1998. 
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authority over the disputed area. 139 It has already been mentioned140 that the exercise of 
the state authority overrides any kind of historical claim. Both Sharurah and Al-Wadi'ah 
and the area surrounding them had always been subject to the Saudi authority and 
sovereignty. It could be said, therefore, that such peaceful display of the Saudi 
sovereignty over the disputed areas was as good as title. 141 
On May 1995 the President of Yemen visited Saudi Arabia and had several 
meetings with the Saudis in order to define the representatives of the Saudi-Yemeni 
Joint Commission which would implement the Understanding Memorandum. 142 On 15 
May 1995, the first meeting of the Joint Commission established for delimitation of the 
undefined boundary was held in Jeddah, and on 16-17 June a meeting was held over the 
necessary measures and steps to be taken in the delimitation and demarcation process. 143 
Prior to the meeting of the Joint Commission, the military committee charged with 
preventing military incidents on the boundary met on 1-3 April and again on 1-3 
May. 144 Both meetings were reported to have been characterised by a "fraternal spirit 
and common understanding with regard to the way to implement the foundations and 
tasks agreed upon". The committee charged with locating the border markers on the 
basis of the Treaty of Taif held its first meeting on 13 July. '45 
The Memorandum was also discussed during wide-ranging negotiations between 
King Fahd and President Salih in Jeddah on 5-7 June. The talks were characterised by 
19 Al-Jazirah , No. 9428 dated 22 July 1998. 140 See supra part I, chapter I (the Saudi-Kuwait Boundary). 
141 Island of Palm as Case, op. cit. at 876. 
142 The President of Yemen in a press conference in Jeddah on the last day of his visit, Al-Riyadh, No. 
9845 dated 8 June 1995. 
143 Yemeni Republic Radio, San'a 3 April 1995,6 June 1995; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia TV, Riyadh I 
May 1995,7 June 1995. 
144 Ibid. 
1451bid. 
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expressions of brotherhood, cordiality, cooperation and good neighbourliness, and 
concluded with a statement of commitment to the memorandum. Following the 
negotiations, President Salih mentioned the "splendid model" of the demarcation 
between Yemen and Oman, and noted that prior to Yemeni unity there had been an on- 
off dialogue for over ten years but, once unity had been achieved, agreement was 
reached in just four sessions. 146 It should be noted here that in April 1998 Saudi Arabia 
expressed its concern to preserve its national interests regarding the Omani-Yemeni 
boundary agreement through a memorandum submitted to the UN and Arab League 
because it was believed that this agreement included some of the Saudi territory. 147 The 
Saudis emphasised that they sought the "preservation of its national interests in keeping 
with the provisions of the Treaty of Taif. i148 Although this Saudi preservation seemed 
to have precluded the negotiations for a while, 149 the Omani Foreign Minister, on a visit 
to Saudi Arabia clarified the point for the Saudi government. '50 
However, both parties were willing to settle their disputes by amicable means. 
Indeed, although several boundary incidents occurred during the negotiations, '51 Prince 
Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, the Second Deputy Prime Minister, stated that tribal differences 
in the area of the boundary would not affect the negotiations, which were proceeding 
well for the benefit of the two sides. 152 Moreover, the Deputy Prime Minister of Yemen, 
Dr Abd al-Karim al-Iryani stated that the success of the Saudi-Yemen demarcation 
meetings has become a reliable guarantee against the recurrence of any tension. ' 53 
146 Yemeni Republic Radio, San'a 3 April 1995,6 June 1995; Kingdom of Saudi Arabia TV, Riyadh I 
May 1995,7 June 1995. 
'47 AI-Hayat, No. 12919 dated 18 July 1998, AI-Riyadh, No. 10981 dated 19 July 1998. 
149 Ibid 
149 A statement made by an Official Yemeni Source, AI-Hayat, No. 12921 dated 20 July 1998. 
ISO Ibid. 
151 The Guardian, London 12 December 1995. 
152 Saudi Press Agenc 
153 ibid. 
y, Riyadh, 16-17.12.1995 
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In May 1996, the Joint Yemeni-Saudi boundary Committee ended consultations 
in San'a and issued a communique in which both sides expressed pleasure over the 
progress made. 154 Although there had been no developments, and concrete progress still 
seemed unlikely, both parties expressed their satisfaction with the end of the sixth round 
of negotiations over the placement of new boundary markers along the boundaries 
defined by the Treaty of Taif. 155 They also felt that their viewpoints during their long- 
running wrangle over the demarcation of their undefined boundaries were coming 
closer. 156 Indeed, before the end of the year, both parties exchanged opinions on how 
the boundary line should be demarcated beyond Jabal Thar, so it would meet with the 
Saudi and Omani boundary. 157 Moreover, both parties signed a security cooperation 
agreement158 on 27 July 1996 and a cooperatio agreement159 on fighting drug 
trafficking and other types of smuggling. A trade agreement160 was also reached on 10 
October 1996, and Yemen removed import duties from some Saudi Arabian goods. 161 
These agreements were expected to improve and facilitate the negotiations over the 
boundary disputes even though they were not linked with them. 
However, up to 1997, no significant progress had been achieved, as each party 
held its own position and was not able to make any concessions, although the committee 
working on the undefined boundary beyond Jabal Thar had already been upgraded. 162 It 
would seem, therefore, that all three joint committees negotiating over the two 
countries' northern maritime boundary, the demarcation of the defined land boundary 
154 Yemeni Republic TV, San'a, 23 May 1996. 
155 Yemeni Republic Radio, San'a, 8 August 1996 
156 Yemeni Republic Radio, San'a, 30 August 1996 
157 A1-Hayat, No. 12283 dated 10 October 1996 
158 Boundary Agreements, Archives of the Border Guards. 159 Boundary Agreements, Archives of the Border Guards. 160 Boundary Agreements, Archives of the Border Guards. 1611bid. 
162 Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, 15 January 1997. 
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and the defining the former South Yemen's boundary with Saudi Arabia had failed to 
reach any positive results. 163 As a result, the resumption of meetings between the two 
sides was now dependent on the arranging of a summit meeting between the leaders of 
the two countries, the outcome to be referred to the committees for implementation. 164 
Furthermore, relations between the two countries were in their worst state in more than 
a year following several boundary incidents and disagreements over perceived Saudi 
demands. The row began after Saudi Arabia objected to Yemeni moves to change the 
administrative divisions in Kitaf, Sa'dah Governorate and Hadhramaut Governorate, 
areas claimed by Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia claimed that most of the inhabitants of the 
areas concerned had actually taken out Saudi citizenship, to which the Yemen press 
responded by saying the Saudis were trying to annex the regions by winning over the 
inhabitants. The moves came after a Saudi request in 1994 that a referendum be held in 
the disputed regions; the request was turned down by the Yemenis, their Foreign 
Minister Al-Iryani saying that the dispute with Saudi Arabia was over land, not people. 
165 But it is those people who have the right to determine the sovereignty of the land 
where they live through referendum which, as discussed in detail in the previous part, 166 
involves the right of self-determination where the inhabitants vote in order to choose 
their government or state. The inhabitants of the disputed region had taken Saudi 
citizenship which indicates that they were integrated into the Saudi state. The Yemenis, 
therefore, opposed a referendum, because they were sure that the inhabitants would vote 
for Saudi Arabia. This, however, might be evidence of the exercise of the Saudi 
authority and sovereignty over the said disputed area otherwise the inhabitants would 
163 The President of Yemen in a press conference, Al-Hayat, No. 11696 dated 27 February 1995 
Al Quds Al Arabi, London, 27 June 1997. 
164 lbid 
165 Al-Quds Al Arabi, London, 5 June 1997. 
166 See supra part II, chapter II. 
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not have taken Saudi citizenship. Such an exercise of effective control is considered by 
international law as being as good as title. 167 
The Saudis were exerting particular pressure on Yemen to hand over the Ra's 
'Ali area; it was claimed that they intended to build an oil pipeline along a 2km "land 
passageway" through the area to the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, the Yemenis 
claimed that the negotiations had so far not progressed because the Saudi government 
was making wide demands without being prepared to offer concessions. 168 
Moreover, Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Understanding of 1994 stipulated 
that both parties would refrain from establishing any new construction in the 
borderlands. This was reaffirmed by both the High Joint Committee in its first meeting 
and the Joint Military Committee in its seventh meeting. 169 However, it would seem 
that neither party observed this, as the Joint Military Committee stated in its seventh 
meeting that any constructions taking place after the signing of the Memorandum 
should be removed. 170 Despite this statement, this issue seems to have remained 
unresolved, as the Joint Military Committee repeated its statement in its ninth meeting 
and, in an indication of the high tension between the parties, stated that both parties 
should refrain from the use of war or the threat of use of war for resolving any 
differences that may arise between them. 171 
167 Island of Palmas Case, op. cit. at p. 876, see also Clipperton Island Case, (1932), 62 AJIL, p. 390, 
Eastern Greenland Case, PICJReports, (1933), series A/B, No 53, p. 151. 
168 Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, 5 June 1997. 
169 Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, No. 6958, dated 16.12.1997, Al Hayat, No. 11922, dated 13.12.1994 & No. 12693 
dated 30.07.1997. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
201 
Part Three: Southern Boundaries 
Moreover, there was a dispute over the ownership of Al- Muhrah, to the utmost 
eastern end of their boundary. 172 In this respect, Yemen suggested that in the event of 
the two sides being unable to reach an agreement through bilateral relations, there was 
an agreement to take the issue to arbitration. 173 It would seem that Yemen aimed to put 
pressure on Saudi Arabia to accept the Yemen boundary suggestion, which had already 
been submitted to Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Yemen suggested that the 
negotiations should be postponed for an unlimited time accusing Saudi Arabia of not 
being able to negotiate the boundary dispute any more. 174 Saudi Arabia, however, 
responded by issuing a very calm announcement in which it gave an assurance of its 
concern to resolve the rest of the undefined boundary between the two neighbours 
without any delay, especially as Saudi Arabia had already settled most of its boundary 
disputes with other neighbouring states by amicable means. 175 
In May 1998, the negotiations between the two countries seemed to be likely to 
be resumed after the new Yemeni Prime Minister, Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani, who was 
the Yemeni Foreign Minister, showed interest in focusing on the Saudi-Yemeni 
boundary dispute. 176 In addition, Saudi Arabia expressed a wish to settle the boundary 
dispute and reinforce relations with Yemen. 177 However, a few days later, Saudi 
172 A1-Hayat, No. 12709 dated 16.12.1997. 
173 Yemeni Foreign Minister Dr'Abd-al-Karim al-Iryani in an interview with the London-based Al-Quds 
al-: Arabi, on 5 May 1997. It should be noted that both the 1934 Treaty of Taif and the 1995 
Memorandum of Understanding contain clauses indicating that the issue should be taken to arbitration in 
the event of non-agreement. 
174 President of Yemen in a phone call with King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, Al-Sharp Al-Awsat, No. 6953, 
dated I IDecember 1997 & no. 6958 dated 16 December 1997, Al-Hayat, No. 12708 dated 15 December 
1997. 
175 A1-Hayat, No. 12709 dated 16 December 1997, it should be noted that by that time, Saudi Arabia had 
settled all its boundary disputes with its neighbours except its maritime boundary dispute with Kuwait, 
which was settled later on 2 July 2000 when both parties signed the Saudi-Kuwaiti Maritime Boundary 
Agreement. For further details, see AI-Riyadh, No. 11697 dated 3 July 2000. 
17 Al-Quds Al Arabi, London, 18 May 1998. 
177 Prince Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, the Saudi Deputy premier, in a press conference following a Saudi 
Military Exercise, in AI-Hayat, 12860 dated 20 May 1998. 
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military forces were reported to have invaded one of the Yemeni Islands, "Huraym" in 
the Red Sea. 178 Such use of force by Saudi Arabia was a violation of international law 
in respect of the prohibition use of in inter-state force179 and the settlement of 
international disputes by peaceful means. 180 
Negotiations were resumed between the two parties when Saudi and Yemeni 
legal and military experts met in Riyadh on 2 June 1998, with the aim of putting the 
final legal touches to the text of the final international boundary demarcation 
agreement. '81 In the event, delegates from both sides agreed that the meeting was not to 
work out the legal formula of the agreement and that negotiations would have to 
continue, due to a divergence of opinions between the two sides. 182 Therefore, the High 
Joint Committee held a meeting in Sana'a on 17-19 June 1998, which was described by 
the leader of the Saudi delegation Dr al-Nufaysah as having been conducted in a 
friendly atmosphere. 183 In addition, another meeting was held in Saudi Arabia between 
29-30 June, in which both parties agreed to continue the negotiations in keeping with 
the report of the Joint Military Committee in which they set up regulations for 
preventing border incidents between the two sides. ' 84 
However, another incident took place in Al-Duwaimah Island in July 1998 when 
both parties opened fire and tried to occupy the island. Both sides claimed the 
ownership of the island and accused each other of starting the aggression and occupying 
178 Al-Quds Al-Arabi, London, 26 May 1998. 
179 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 180 Article 2(3) of the UN Charter provides that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means". This principle has been developed by the 1970 Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, which includes the use of peaceful methods for the settlement of international disputes. 
Article 33 (1) of the Charter describes the methods by which international disputes may be settled. 
191 Al-Sharq Al Awsat, London, No. 7129 dated 3 June 1998. 
182 ibid. 
183 Yemeni Republic Radio, San'a, 19 June 1998. 
184 A statement by a Saudi Official Source, in Umm al Qura No. 3707 dated 24 June 1998. 
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the island. The Saudi Minister of the Interior confirmed that the Saudi Army had not 
started the exchange of fire on Duwayyimah island, but were in the position of self- 
defence. 185 As far as international law is concerned, the right of self-defence was well 
formulated both in customary international law before the 1945186and under the United 
Nations Charter. Article 51 of the Charter, which is the basic reference resorted to by 
states in justifying their use of force as self-defence, reads as follows: 
"Nothing in the present charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against 
a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain International peace and security. 
Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self- 
defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such 
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore 
International peace and security" 
Although this article clarifies the circumstance in which the right of self-defence should 
be exercised and that is when an armed attack occurs, it does not elucidate when the use 
of force by one state against another can be regarded as constituting an actual armed 
attack. Nevertheless, more elaborate clarification of this matter is found in Article (3) of 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (3314) of the Definition of 
Aggression adopted on the 14`h December 1974, which reads as follows: 
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in 
accordance with the provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
'85 Al lazirah, Riyadh dated 22 July 1998. 
186 See the Caroline case, Jennings, "The Caroline and McLeod Cases" (1938) 32 AJIL 82. 
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(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a state of the territory of another 
state, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or 
attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another state or part 
thereof. 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a state against the territory of another state 
or the use of any weapons by a state against the territory of another state. 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a state by the armed forces of another 
state. 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a state on the land sea or air forces, or marine 
and air fleets of another state. 
(e) The use of armed forces of one state which are within the territory of another 
state with the agreement of the receiving state, in contravention of the conditions 
provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in such territory 
beyond the termination of the agreement. 
(t) The action of a state in allowing its territory, which it had placed at the disposal 
of another state, to be used by the other state for perpetrating an act of aggression 
against a third state. 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, irregular or 
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another state of such gravity as 
to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein. 187 
197 Djonovich, United Nations Resolutions (New York, 1984) pp. 392-394. 
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Although the General Assembly used the term "aggression" in lieu of "armed 
attack" in the definition above, it is said that the concept of the term "aggression" in the 
definition is equivalent to the term "armed attack" used in article 51188, inasmuch as an 
armed attack is a form of aggression'89. Hence, whenever a state is subject to any of the 
actions classified in the definition, it has the right to resort to the use of force under self- 
defence. Boundary incidents, however, are not classified as an armed attack in the 
definition of aggression in the aforementioned United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution. On this issue, Dinstein believes that there is no reason to separate small- 
scale armed attacks from more extensive armed attacks, because frontier incidents do in 
many situations involve a large scale of battle; therefore, it would be erroneous to 
separate them from other types of armed attacks. 190 Dinstein's point of view is shared 
by Kunz, who believes that if what is meant by armed attack is an illegal armed attack, 
then this would include any illegal armed attack, even a small boundary incident'91. On 
the other hand, McCoubrey and White disagree with the opinions mentioned above, 
declaring that boundary incidents do not amount to the level of an armed aggression 
within article 3(g) of the definition of aggression; and a state subject to such a situation 
is entitled to resort to limited counter measures instead of resorting to its right of self- 
defence. 192 The International Court of Justice, in the Nicaragua Case, 193 distinguished 
between an armed attack and a mere boundary incident on the basis of their scale and 
effects. It held that the concept of an armed attack does not consist only of actions 
committed by regular armed forces across a states boundary but also the sending by or 
188 McCoubrey and White, International Law ofArmed Conflict, op., cit., p. 52 
189 Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence (Cambridge, 1988) p. 173. 
90 Ibid. p. 182. 191 Kunz, "Individual and collective self-defence in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations" 
(1947) 41 AJIL 872, at 878. 
192 McCoubrey and White, International Law ofArmed Conflict, op., cit., p. 90 
193 Nicaragua case, ICJ Reports, (1986), p. 14. 
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on behalf of a state, of armed groups which commit acts against another state of such 
gravity as to amount to an actual armed attack 194 Turning to states' practice, in the 
1979 China-Vietnam conflict which resulted in the loss of 20,000 lives and the 
occupation of five provincial Vietnamese towns by Chinese forces, although it may be 
possible to admit that the scale and effects of the Chinese actions may have amounted to 
the level of an armed attack which would entitle Vietnam to resort to its right of self- 
defence, instead, Vietnam resorted to counter measures to drive the Chinese troops out 
of its occupied territory. 195 With regard to the past two examples and McCoubrey and 
White's point of view, it would appear an exaggeration to classify a boundary incident 
as an actual armed attack which calls for the victim state to resort to its right of self- 
defence, because not all boundary incidents involve large-scale military engagements. 
Therefore, by classifying a boundary incident as an actual armed attack, this may 
indicate that this includes small-scale boundary incidents as well. In the case of 
situations which may involve the exchange of fire between a small minority of military 
forces from two neighbouring states, for the victim state to resort to its right of self- 
defence under article 51, if the attack could be repelled by the use of counter-measures, 
would be an excessive response by the victim state. So, whether the victim state resorts 
to the right of self-defence or to counter-measures depends entirely on the scale of the 
boundary incident. It must be stressed, however, that certain conditions are to be 
observed when exercising the right of self-defence. First, the right of the use of force by 
a state under self-defence is authorised only when an armed attack occurs. Secondly, the 
right of self-defence must be the only alternative for the victim state to end the 
aggression committed against it. Thirdly, the victim state must respond to the armed 
1941bid., at p. 103. 
195 McCoubrey and White, International Law ofArmed Conflict, op., cit., p. 65 
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attack immediately and without any delay by using force to repel it and any unjustified 
delay to the victim state's response may expose it to the possibility of being denounced 
as an aggressor itself. 196 Finally, the proportionality condition is that the victim state of 
an armed attack resorts only to sufficient use of force to repel the armed attack. 197 In the 
light of the above discussion, it could safely be said that the incident of Al-Duwaimah 
Island was not a large scale incident, as although involved the occupation of the island 
by Yemeni troops, only involved the exchange of fire between small army forces from 
both sides which did not amount to an "armed attack". In addition, since the boundary 
between the two states was disputed, the war could be seen as a mere boundary dispute 
rather than an "armed attack" by Yemen. Saudi Arabia, therefore, did not have the right 
the resort to the right of self-defence, but it did have the right to take counter-measures 
to expel Yemen out of the Island. 
If, however, it is accepted that Saudi Arabia has the right to resort to its right of 
self-defence, the question, which arises now, is whether it might have lawfully obtained 
title to the territory of Al-Duwaimah Island in self-defence. Some writers have argued 
that the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force applies only in the case of an 
aggressive, unlawful war and that a state may lawfully obtain title to territory acquired 
in self-defence. 198 This view is rejected by both state practice and resolutions of the 
United Nations. 199 The General Assembly Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with 
1961bid, pp. 96-97. 
197 Ibid, p. 96. 198 Schwebel, "What Weight to Conquest? (1970) 64 AJIL 344; Oppenheim, International Law, op., cit., 
703. p; 
9 Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law, op., cit., pp. 54-6, Bowett "International 
Law Relating to Occupied Territory, A Rejoinder" (1971) 87 LQR, 473. 
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the Charter of the United Nations of 1970 draws no distinction between the lawful and 
unlawful use of force in providing: 
"The territory of a state shall not be the object of acquisition by 
another state resulting from the threat or use of force. No territorial 
acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognised 
as legal". 20° 
Although no United Nations resolution has described Israel as an aggressor in the Six- 
Day War of 1967, resolutions of both the Security Council201 and the General 
Assembly202 have condemned Israel's purported annexation of East Jerusalem and the 
Golan Heights on the ground that "the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible" 
with no distinction drawn between the lawful and unlawful use of force. The non- 
recognition of Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights support the 
view that territory may not be acquired in war of self-defence. In the light of the above 
discussion, it could be said that Saudi Arabia could not acquire Al-Duwaimah Island on 
the ground that the acquisition had taken place in a war of self-defence. Therefore, the 
question of this island had to be settled peacefully through negotiations between the two 
parties. 
Both parties emphasised their willingness and desire to deal with the incident 
with patience and to seek a solution through amicable means. 203 Therefore, on the next 
day, some military members of both states held a meeting at a place near Al-Duwaimah 
200 Resolution 2625(XXV), in Rausching, Wiesbrok and Laiacn, (eds. ), Key Resolutions of the United 
Nations General Assembly 1946-1996 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 3. 201 See Security Council Resolutions 242 (1967) 21 UNYB at 257,252 (1968) 22 UNYB at 264,298 (1971) 
25 UNYB at 187,476&478 (1980) 35 UNYB at 358, and 497 (1981) 35 UNYB at 312. 202 See, for example, General Assembly Resolutions 34/70 (1979) 33 UNYB at 375, ES-7/2 (1980) 34 
UNYB at 391,37/123 A (1982) 36 UNYB at 516 and 39/146 A (1984) 38 UNYB at 261. 203 President of Yemen in a press conference and the Saudi Interior Minister in a press conference on 20 
July 1998, For further details about this incident and both parties' claims and accusations, see Umm a! 
Qura No. 3707 dated 24 June 1998, Al-Jazirah No. 9428 dated 22 July 1998, Al-Nayat, No. 12922 dated 
21 July 1998. 
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Island in order to contain the problem. 04 The meeting resulted in evacuation of the 
island and an agreement to wait for a final boundary settlement. Moreover, the Yemeni 
Foreign Minister visited Saudi Arabia in order to discuss with his Saudi counterpart the 
Al-Duwaimah Island incident. 205 As a result, on 28 July 1998, both Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen signed an agreement206, which aimed to prevent any future border incidents and 
to activate the work of the Saudi-Yemeni Joint Commission, as well as prohibiting any 
military constructions in the disputed area until a final boundary agreement was 
reached. 
In June 1999, further negotiations took place in Saudi Arabia by a Joint Saudi- 
Yemeni committee for renewing boundary markers for those boundaries which were 
already defined by the Taif Agreement. Four locations needed to be identified for the 
remaining 29 markers during this 15th session of the committee. The two sides agreed 
on 23 June, at the end of the negotiations, that the technical teams on the ground would 
continue their surveying work, and said that the discussions had been held in an 
atmosphere of amity and understanding. 207 Both parties exchanged letters relating to the 
two states' views on their decades old boundary dispute. 208 Although the precise 
contents of the letters were not revealed, it seemed that the boundary problem was 
approaching its end. Nevertheless, although it had been over three years since the 
signing of the Memorandum, this complicated problem could not be resolved in a short 
space of time. 209 
204 Ibid. 
205 Al-Hayat, No. 12924 dated 23 July 1998 
206 Al-Hayat, No. 12930 dated 29 July 1998 & No. 12931 dated 30 July 1998. 
207 Al-R yadh, No. 11318 dated 20 June 1999. 208 Ibid. 
209 The Yemeni Information Minister 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Akwa' said on 30 June 1999 in a press 
conference relating to the boundary dispute, Al-Bayan, Dubai, 30 June 1999. 
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In June 2000, the President of Yemen, accompanied by a high-level delegation, 
made a state visit to Saudi Arabia. During the visit, official negotiations on the 
boundary dispute were held between the two sides under the co-chairmanship of the 
King Fahd bin Abdulaziz and President ali Abdullah Saleh. 210 The two sides sincerely 
desired to reach a fraternal and amicable solution to the boundary dispute between 
them. 211 As a result, a final and permanent agreement was reached in the boundary 
dispute, both that defined by the 1934 Treaty of Taif and the remaining boundary from 
Jabal Thar to the end of the Saudi-Yemeni-Omani boundary to the east. Indeed, the 
Saudi-Yemeni International Boundary Agreement212 was signed by the Foreign 
Ministers of the two countries in Jeddah in Saudi Arabia in 12 June 2000. According to 
the Saudi-Yemeni joint communiqu6, which was issued on this occasion, "the two sides 
agreed on the demarcation of the geographical sites at the border, including the part 
covered by the Treaty of Taif, the border reports annexed to it" 213 The Agreement was 
endorsed by the Consultative Council in 18 June214 and ratified in 19 June 2000.215 Not 
only did the Agreement settle the Saudi-Yemeni land boundary dispute, but it also 
defined their maritime boundaries to put an end to more than 66 years of boundary 
dispute and conflict between the two countries. According to this agreement, the two 
sides agreed on the demarcation of the geographical sites at the boundary, including the 
part covered by the Treaty of Taif, the boundary reports annexed to it and the part 
uncovered by the Treaty of Taif 
210 Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh, 12 June 2000, Al-lazirah, No. 10119 dated 13 June 2000. 
211 ]bid 
212 Boundary Agreements, Archives of the Border Guard. 213 Saudi Press Agency, Riyadh, 12 June 2000, Allazirah, No. 10119 dated 13 June 2000. 
214 A letter from the President of the Consultative Council to King Fahd No. 219/1/3S dated 16.3.1421AH 
(18 June 2000). Archives of the Consultative Council. 
215 Council of Ministers Resolution No. 73 of 17.3.1421 (19.6.2000), Archives of the Council of 
Ministers. 
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Saudi Arabia was prepared to make concessions and to give up some of its 
territory to Yemen. The first part of the boundary which was defined by the 1934 Treaty 
of Taif begins from a point at the Red Sea at the junction of longitude 42 Degrees, 46 
Minutes East with latitude 16 degrees, 24 minutes North and stretched eastwards until 
Jabal Thar at the junction of longitude 44 degrees, 21 minutes East with latitude 17 
degrees, 26 minutes North. 216 From this point, the line of the second part of the 
boundary, which had not been defined before, begins and run eastwards until it ends at 
the junction of longitude 52 East with latitude 19 North. 17 The Agreement stipulated 
that the identity of the villages located at this line would be according to the Treaty of 
Taif and its annexes, and if the line passed by any village, its identity would be 
determined according to its loyalty to either side, and as a result the boundary line 
would be changed accordingly. 218 The two parties also agreed that a specialist company 
would demarcate the boundary on the ground, carry out the survey and prepare detailed 
maps according to this Agreement, and after being signed by the two parties, these maps 
would be considered as an integral part of this Agreement. 219 
As tribal clashes and border incidents had been of major concern for both 
parties, as they had been going on for years, the Agreement made provisions for 
maintaining peace and security in the borderland by keeping the parties away from each 
other as much as possible. Indeed, with regard to the first part of the boundary, the 
Agreement reaffirmed the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Taif which stipulated 
that both parties would refrain from establishing any constructions within five 
kilometres from the boundary line. 220 Therefore, both parties would have to evacuate 
216 Article 2(a) of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 
217 Article 2(b) of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 218 Article 2(a) of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 
219 Article 3(1&2) of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 220 Article 4 of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 
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and withdraw from any construction or military post, which had been established since 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif 21 As to the second part of the boundary defined by 
this Agreement, Annex 4 which was considered as an integral part of the Agreement 
regulated the pasture rights and the positions of the military forces on both sides of the 
boundary. Both parties would enjoy pasture rights within an area stretching not more 
that 20 kilometres from the boundary. 222 The positions of the military forces of both 
sides were to be beyond 20 kilometres from the boundary line, and the only military 
activities allowed within these 20 kilometres would be security patrols with light 
weapons, to guard the boundary and prevent smuggling into the countries. 223 In 
addition, both parties, with the aim of reducing tension between them and preventing 
any future dispute, agreed that if any exploitable natural sources are discovered in the 
boundary regions, both parties will negotiate their joint exploitation. 24 
Both Ministers of Interior of the two states held the fifth meeting in Saudi 
Arabia between 3-4 April 2001 attending by military members of the joint committee to 
discuss the implementation of the boundary demarcation as well as the joint security 
patrols and coordination between border authorities. 225 In a statement to Al-Hayat 
newspaper, Prince Naif, the Saudi Minister of Interior, asserted that both parties worked 
as "one team" and there were no points of difference between them. 226 He also called 
for continuity of cooperation between the states in order to fight crimes of all kinds, 
blamed the tribal elements for armed clashes in the border region and praised Yemeni's 
cooperation in the matter. 227 After the meeting, both sides signed a joint communique in 
221 Ibid. 
222 Article 1(a and b) of Annex 4 of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 223 Article 5 of Annex 4 of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 
224 Article 6 of Annex 4 of the 2000 Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Agreement. 
223 Saudi Gazette, No. 8657 dated 4 April 2001. 
226 AI-Hayat, No. 13898 dated 4 April 2001. 
227 Arab News, vol. XXVI No. 129, dated 5 April 2001. 
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which they announced that they had signed, in a signing ceremony in Jeddah, a contract 
worth $986 with the German Hanza Company, to carry out the demarcation of the 
boundary. This would take four years from the commencement of the work, which 
would be within 90 days 228 It should be noted that the length of the boundary to be 
demarcated is 1318km, most of which lies in a naturally difficult terrain, with 
mountains and sandy areas. However, the said German company has good experience in 
demarcating this kind of boundary, as it has already demarcated the Saudi-Omani 
boundary and the Omani-Yemeni boundary. 229 The two sides also agreed on setting up a 
border commission to follow up issues that might arise from time to time and suggested 
the names of representatives on a panel, which would set up the border commission and 
hold its first meeting in San'a in Yemen shortly. 230 In this meeting, they also discussed 
the exit points and agreed to set up four exit points along the boundary line. 231 
The 2000 Saudi-Yemeni International Boundary Agreement was a breakthrough 
in the settlement of boundary disputes between the two countries. Indeed, the 
Agreement was final and comprehensive because it covered everything related to the 
boundary settlement and did not leave any ground for future conflict. Both parties were 
aware of their mutual interests and needs. Saudi Arabia wanted to settle the last 
boundary disputes that remained, because they caused it many troubles in terms of its 
internal security. Indeed, many border clashes had occurred over the past years, in 
which tens of soldiers and innocent people were killed on both sides. 232 In addition, 
evidence showed that those who blew up the American Military camp in Riyadh in 
1998 brought the explosives from Yemen and smugglers helped them to get them across 
228 Ibid 
229 AI-Hayat, No. 13899 dated 5 April 2001. 
230 Arab News, vol. XXVI No. 129, dated 5 April 2001. 231 Ibid. 
232 See Saudi Border Guard Annual Statistic, Archives of Saudi Border Guard. 
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the border. 233 Security in the borders was loose because the boundaries were not defined 
and it was quite easy to cross the border in the absence of any cooperation between the 
competent authorities in both countries. In addition to the security element, economic 
and political factors were also involved. Yemen is the only state in the Arabian 
Peninsula that is not a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council. 234 Following the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq in 1990, the Arab Cooperation Council, in which Yemen 
was a member beside Iraq and Egypt, collapsed. As a result, Yemen found itself isolated 
and then moved to improve its relations with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. 
Following the Gulf War of 1990-91, some two million Yemenis who migrated to Saudi 
Arabia and settled there for years had to return to Yemen. The reason for this was that 
the said Yemenis were exempted before the War from any procedures that other 
nationalities had to follow, such as obtaining a visa or a working contract etc., as they 
were treated by the Saudi Government in the same way as its own citizens. After the 
war, however, such exemption was abolished and the Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia 
were given three months to settle their problems or leave the country. 235 The return of 
the Yemenis affected the Yemen economy and became a heavy burden on the Yemen 
Government's shoulders. 236 Yemen gained economic benefits as a result of the 
settlement of the boundary disputes, since Saudi Arabia promised Yemen to help it to 
resolve its economic problems by encouraging its businessmen to invest some $300 
million in Yemen in order to employ those who were not employed. 237 Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia rescheduled the Yemen debt and proposed to write off some of it. In addition, 
233 A1-Jazirah, Riyadh No. 9569 dated 18 December 1998. 
234 See supra (general introduction). 235 Saudi Arabia took this stance because the Saudis believed that Yemen had politically sided with Iraq 
when the latter invaded Kuwait in August 1990. 
236 A1-Riyadh, No. 9184 dated 16 August 1993. 
237 A statement by the Yemeni President All Abdullah Salih in an interview with the MBC television 
dated 20.2.2001. 
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the Saudi Government promised to help Yemen to carry out some development plans in 
order to improve the Yemen infrastructure. 238 The greatest benefit which Yemen gained, 
however, was its acceptance as a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which it had 
been promised by the Gulf states, once its boundary disputes with its neighbours were 
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settled. 
Following the settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary dispute, the definition 
of the check and exit points and the agreement of the security cooperation between the 
various competent authorities in both countries, both Saudi Arabia and Yemen hoped 
that they would eliminate border smuggling and incidents and improve their relations 
and mutual interests and understanding. Consequently, this settlement would contribute 
in maintaining international peace and security through maintaining internal ones, as 
both internal and international security are related to each other and it could be said that 
an improve in one of them would result in improvement in the another. By the 
settlement of the Saudi-Yemeni boundary disputes, Saudi Arabia has completed the 
settlement of its land boundary disputes with all its neighbouring states. International 
boundaries as understood in international law, separating states from each other and, as 
a result, defining their sovereignty and jurisdiction, are now applied in the Arabian 
Peninsula and widely accepted by its inhabitants, whose fathers and grandfathers 
opposed this kind of boundary. 
238 Ibid. 
239 Saudi TV news, 12. December 200 I. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Following the end of the First World War, Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states 
emerged in the Arabian Peninsula, as a result of which their former internal boundaries 
became undefined international boundaries. This enlarged the area in which boundary 
controversies occurred. Indeed, such boundary disputes constituted one of the major 
threats to international peace and security. It is clear that the greater the interaction 
between states, the more opportunity there is for disagreement. Consequently, the nature 
of the regional environment and boundaries between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours 
was extremely significant. Here, the social factor was important because of the 
inhabitants' reactions and involvement in the boundary disputes. This study has shown 
that the boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring states arose as a 
result of the expansion of Abdulaziz's territory at the expense of that of his neighbours. 
Most of the Saudi territories were acquired by conquest which took place between 1902 
(when taking Riyadh) and 1924 (when capturing Hijaz). It is, however, clear that title 
acquired by conquest before 1928, when war was outlawed by the Paris Pact, must be 
recognised as lawful in accordance with the principles of international law. Some 
territories which were terra nullius were acquired by occupation, while acquisition of 
territory by cession took place through exchange of territory between Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan by the 1965 Treaty of Amman as part of the settlement of their boundary 
disputes. 
Another cause of Saudi Arabia's boundary disputes with its neighbours was the 
controversial inherited boundary lines, which were defined by the 1913-14 Anglo- 
Ottoman Conventions. The assertion of the validity of these boundary lines by Britain 
and their successors and the denial of accepting such validity by Saudi Arabia, the 
successor of the Ottoman Empire, gave rise to boundary disputes between these states 
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for years. The evidence showed that the consequences were fights between Saudi 
Arabia and its neighbouring states over their disputed boundaries, to gain a piece of 
territory, as well as inter-tribal clashes and frequent accounts of border incidents. Apart 
from the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence, both individual and collective, 
the use of force, which unfortunately occurred very frequently in boundary disputes, is 
no longer compatible with the modem international law. The threat to international 
peace and security, therefore, called for urgent settlement of boundary disputes. To this 
end, in conformity with the United Nations Charter and in order to achieve stability and 
finality and reach permanent and final settlement of their boundary disputes, Saudi 
Arabia and Britain and representatives of the states concerned conducted a series of 
conferences and rounds of negotiations. As Saudi Arabia's neighbours were British 
mandates, the boundary disputes between them and Saudi Arabia were discussed 
together, most of the time. After the mandate period, however, further separate 
negotiations and agreements took place between Saudi Arabia and its neighbours, 
separately, by which the final settlements of their boundaries were reached. 
It is obvious that the task was quite difficult because defining international 
boundaries means that certain limits of the states' jurisdiction would be imposed. From 
a practical viewpoint, the transfer of a piece of land from one state to another, as a result 
of the alteration and definition of international boundaries, may have far reaching 
consequences. Therefore, both the peaceful methods of settlement of boundary disputes 
applied by the states concerned and their consequences varied according to the 
circumstances and conditions of each case. 
But what are effective peaceful means and what made them so? This thesis 
sought to answer this question by assessing and evaluating the practice of Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbours regarding the settlement and definition of their boundary disputes 
and the peaceful methods they have applied in this respect. The answer to this key 
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question is obtained from the answers to the following three questions. First, what are 
the factors that affected these peaceful methods and what made them either effective or 
ineffective? Secondly, were the practice and attitude of Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbouring states towards the settlement of their international boundaries in 
conformity with international law? Finally, have Saudi Arabia and its neighbours 
contributed to international law? 
As parties' success in settlement of their boundary disputes varies from case to 
case, it depends very much on several elements and factors, which make up the whole 
process which, in turn, helps the parties to find an acceptable solution for their dispute. 
All disputes discussed in this thesis involved negotiations, but as a method of settlement 
it was evidently subject to some limitations, as will be seen shortly. The evidence 
showed that negotiations between parties to boundary disputes offered the widest 
opportunity for reaching an effective settlement of all forms of boundary disputes. 
Without doubt, the atmosphere for reaching an acceptable settlement is more readily 
attainable under diplomatic means which do not suffer from the constitutional 
limitations of adjudication. Such constitutional limitations made judicial settlement 
impossible between Saudi Arabia and the UAE in the Buraimi Arbitration. Both parties 
were under severe pressure and became very suspicious of each other, which led them 
to behave in bad faith. Judicial settlement usually takes the disputes out of the parties' 
hands, and as a result, the atmosphere is not as good as in the amicable methods. 
Litigation in international law is very much a matter of last resort when what is wanted 
is a binding decision. 
Multilateral negotiations were carried out through conferences, which provided 
the framework for the negotiating process. Negotiations were successful when Britain 
acted as an arbiter in the Uqair Conference, and put pressure on the parties to the 
dispute and imposed the boundary settlement. The parties to the dispute in that case 
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were encouraged by economic factors, because they were in need of Britain's economic 
aid and they did not want to lose such aid by rejecting the Britain's proposed 
boundaries. Although the Western-style boundary imposed by Britain resulted in 
friction between Saudi Arabia and Iraq and caused raids and counter-raids between the 
tribes in both countries due to the nature of the inhabitants' life at the time, its 
shortcomings were offset by the neutral zones created by Britain between Saudi Arabia 
and both Kuwait and Iraq. These neutral zones were the only practical solution to the 
potential discovery of oil there and the inevitable dispute that would arise as a result, as 
well as the prevention of inter-tribal clashes. Without these neutral zones, boundary 
questions in the area would never have been settled. The Uqair Conference resulted in 
the acceptance of the principle of the boundary demarcation between the Arab states. 
Indeed, for the first time in history, an international boundary, as understood in 
international law, was drawn on maps and established in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Negotiations, moreover, were successful when the parties were willing and determined 
to settle their boundary dispute such as in the Haddah and Bahrah negotiations. The 
mutual understanding and flexibility, which prevailed during the negotiations, led to 
settlement of the Saudi-Jordan boundary dispute. Each party was prepared to make 
concessions and a compromise settlement was finally reached. 
Needless to say, some negotiations which were successful in settling the Saudi 
boundary disputes with its neighbouring states took place when their relations were 
most cordial. Among such negotiations, are the unilateral direct negotiations between 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, Iraq and Jordan following their independence. These 
negotiations were motivated by the mutual interests of the parties and the need to 
maintain good relations and peaceful coexistence with Saudi Arabia, especially after the 
Arab conflict with Israel. The result was the partition of the Saudi-Kuwaiti and Saudi- 
Iraqi Neutral Zones, as well as exchange of territory between Saudi Arabia and Jordan 
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in their northwestern boundary, by which Jordan gained its only outlet to the sea. 
Furthermore, the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, UAE and Oman 
following their independence were also successful for the same reason. The Saudi 
boundary disputes with these states had not been resolved before independence, despite 
years of negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Britain, which was responsible for the 
foreign affairs of these states, because oil was discovered in the area. Their negotiations 
following their independence were a continuation of uncompleted negotiations before 
independence. When their relations with Saudi Arabia improved after their 
independence and they became aware of their mutual interests, their boundary disputes 
were settled within a very short time. 
However, it must be realised that the right moment cannot emerge all by itself 
without positive efforts on the part of the parties concerned. Therefore, it is always 
incumbent on them to strive to achieve that critical moment, while being able to 
recognise it as soon as it becomes apparent. For this reason, it is advisable for parties to 
boundary disputes to keep themselves constantly alive to the urgency of resolving their 
boundary disputes. To this end, it is suggested that one or more joint boundary 
commissions might be created, composed of equal members of members from each 
party to the dispute, like those created by the Memorandum of Understanding agreed to 
between Saudi Arabia and Yemen in 1995. This body would be advisory in nature. Its 
function would be to build up the parties' confidence and mutual understanding through 
frequent meetings in each state in rotation. In the meetings, their interests related to the 
boundary disputes would be discussed. Such an action would help to clear the picture 
and pave the way for successful negotiations. This commission would report to their 
governments about any progress or difficulties, in order that they may take the 
necessary procedures to enhance the commission's work. 
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In addition to good relations, economic and political factors also played a vital 
role in the settlement of the Saudi boundary disputes with its eastern and northern 
neighbours. Such disputes were likely to be settled when the Gulf states were about to 
be politically and economically integrated. Indeed, to prepare themselves for such an 
integration, which took place when the Gulf Cooperation Council was established, there 
had to be a high degree of readiness to lay aside their historic animosity, a high level of 
economic prosperity and no dominant state. In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that they made every effort to settle their boundary disputes and to avoid any further 
disputes. This is not to suggest that the states concerned had settled all their boundary 
disputes by the time the Gulf Cooperation Council was established, but rather, most of 
their boundary disputes had been settled and others were ready for settlement because 
the advantages of their settlement outweighed the disadvantages. The case of the 
settlement of the boundary disputes with Yemen may also be explained on the ground 
of economic and political factors along with security one. Following the Gulf War of 
1990-91, Yemen's need for economic aid from Saudi Arabia helped to create conditions 
conductive to settlement. The security factor and the need for tight security measures 
along the Saudi-Yemeni border also helped to define their boundaries. 
Negotiations, on the other hand, were unsuccessful between Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan in the Kuwait Conference and between Saudi Arabia and UAE in the Dammam 
Conference. Evidence showed that the reason was that the parties had no good faith 
because negotiations were carried out at a time of very high tension between the parties. 
Indeed, bad timing accounts for many of the failures in diplomatic negotiations. During 
hostility is a most unsuitable time for effective and satisfactory diplomatic settlement, as 
illustrated by the Kuwait and the Dammam Conferences, when tribes from the 
negotiating states were engaged in raids and counter-raids. In addition to this, Saudi 
Arabia's boundary disputes with its eastern neighbours, discussed in the Dammam 
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Conference, were heavily influenced by the discovery of oil in the area. This economic 
factor caused the delay of the settlement of the boundary disputes between Saudi Arabia 
and its eastern neighbours for years. 
In addition to negotiations, mediation played a vital role in settling the Saudi- 
Qatari boundary dispute following the latter's independence. In this case, the two 
parties were unable to settle their dispute directly between themselves by negotiation, 
because diplomatic relations were severed. Here, the intervention of the Egyptian 
president succeeded to break the impasse and bring the parties back to the negotiation 
table. He participated in the negotiations and directed them in such a way that a peaceful 
solution was reached. This mediation was successful because the mediator was accepted 
by both parties, as he was a friend of both of them. In addition, the power of the 
mediator, as the president of one of the most important states in the Arab world, helped 
to achieve a peaceful settlement of the boundary dispute. 
Evidence shows that lack of geographical knowledge of boundary areas and, as a 
result, inaccurate prescription of the boundary sites on which the boundary treaties were 
based, led to faulty boundary delimitation or ill-defined boundaries. This happened 
three times in the settlement of the Saudi boundaries with its neighbours: first, the 
Saudi-Jordan boundary defined by the Haddah Agreement which was later arbitrarily 
amended by the British in the mid 1930s; secondly, the contradiction which was found 
between the Haddah Agreement and the First Uqair Protocol regarding the intersection 
where the Saudi-Iraqi-Jordan boundaries met; finally, the amendment of the "Riyadh 
Line" in December 1937 by the British in favour of Saudi Arabia, as a result of the 
discovery of the correct location of the Sufuq Well. Such ill-defined boundaries were a 
source of boundary and territorial disputes. These cases illustrate the need for exact 
information on the boundary site, not merely when a boundary is being demarcated on 
the ground, but also prior to its delimitation in a treaty. Documentary information such 
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as those relied on while defining the aforementioned ill-defined Saudi boundaries with 
its neighbouring states, is not enough. Prior inquiries and investigations regarding the 
boundary sites are essential, as through such inquiries and investigations, negotiators are 
in the long run better equipped to speak authoritatively about the alignment of the 
boundary region that is the subject of negotiations. It is, therefore, advisable that the 
representatives of parties to boundary disputes should, where applicable, visit the 
boundary and territorial area in dispute in person. An alternative would be to create 
several competent boundary commissions to carry out inquiries and investigations about 
the boundary site and furnish the negotiators with the boundary information they need. 
Such boundary commissions might be a geographical survey commission to deal with 
geographical matters such as the description of the boundary site; and a military and 
security commission to deal with military and security issues such as the positions of 
the military and security forces after the settlement of boundary disputes. The 
advantages of the boundary settlement, which will follow personal experience and good 
information on the boundary area, will outweigh the financial expense which such visits 
and creation of such commissions may involve. 
As regard for international law is an integral part of boundary stability, the 
importance of the aforementioned geographical considerations is derived from the 
obligation of general observation of international law, which primarily entails 
compliance with exact boundary definition. Indeed, pre-negotiation investigations may 
reveal portions of a proposed boundary, where the interests of a third state would be 
affected by decisions taken by the negotiating parties. This usually happens when 
boundaries of three or more states meet, as in the case of the Saudi-Jordan-Iraqi 
boundaries, the Saudi-Oman-UAE boundaries and the Saudi-Qatar-UAE boundaries 
which meet at a tri junction. Instances have been discussed in this study, where 
boundary settlement was precluded by a third state which was affected by the definition 
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agreed on by two states, because the third state had not been consulted about the matter 
that would affect it. The British Government, for example, challenged the 1965 Saudi- 
Qatari Boundary Agreement on behalf of the UAE, which was affected by the said 
Agreement because the three states' boundaries met at a tri junction. The result was a 
delay of the boundary demarcation for years until the UAE was happy with the 
boundary agreement. In this respect, it might be advisable for parties to boundary 
disputes to give notice of the procedures to the state concerned, and if possible invite it 
to attend sessions at which matters affecting its interests are likely to come up. In this 
way it is hoped that exact boundary lines can be defined and potential sources of future 
boundary disputes be eliminated. 
On the question of agreement between the practice of Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbouring states and international law, evidence shows that observance of the 
general principles of international law by them has been generally a cornerstone in both 
the settlement of their boundary disputes and the conclusion of the boundary 
agreements. In their negotiations at the Uqair Conference, for example, Sir Percy Cox, 
explained to the parties how "earnestly desirous was His Majesty's Government, the 
friend of both parties that an agreed and amicable settlement should be reached'. ' 
Similarly, King Abdulaziz expressed his willingness to settle all the outstanding 
problems between him and his concerned neighbours by amicable means. Responding 
to Knox's invitation to attend the Kuwait Conference, he declared that: 
"Nothing would give me more pleasure than to be in agreement and 
on friendly terms with my neighbours. s2 
1 Dickson, Kuwait and her Neighbours, op., cit., pp. 270-2. 2 The Green Book op., cit., pp. 5-6. 
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Moreover, when he was informed by the British about the boundary line between Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan regarding Ma'an and Aqaba, although the boundary had not been 
mentioned to him before, he offered to negotiate with Britain `at any time and place 
convenient to them'. 3 Further evidence of the commitment of Saudi Arabia and its 
neighbouring states to the principles of international law is clear from their emphasis 
while concluding their boundary agreements on "respect for the principles of 
international law". In addition, Saudi Arabia was influenced by international law. 
Indeed, when concluding the 1934 Saudi-Yemeni boundary agreement (the Treaty of 
Taif) the two parties agreed to refer any boundary disputes between them to arbitration 
if they were not settled by other peaceful means. They also concluded an arbitration 
agreement, which was appended to the Taif Treaty. There were, also, references in their 
boundary agreements to their desire to maintain international peace and security by 
settling any disputes that might cause any conflicts in the future. 
As the principles of international law crystallised and became clearer on certain 
aspects of territorial sovereignty and defined territory, Saudi Arabia modified its 
position on some issues to reflect these principles. In this respect, starting from the 
Uqair Conference until it was formally founded in 1932, it had refused to accept the 
idea of defined territory and fixed boundary and preferred tribal ones, which were based 
on tribal allegiance. However, Saudi Arabia modified its position and in the early 1930s 
sought to define its boundary with Yemen to be in conformity with modem political 
boundaries, in King Abdulaziz's words, "such as those applied by western countries". 4 
Furthermore, Saudi Arabia's territorial claims were based on historical rights until the 
3 Foreign Office 371/10013, a letter from Abdulaziz dated 8th November 1924, and a report by the 
Political Resident in Bushire to the Secretary of State for Colonial dated 25th November 1924, P. 71. 
4 King Abdulaziz's Instructions to his delegation to San'a in 1932 for discussing the Saudi-North Yemen 
boundary dispute, The History ofAl-MiklafAl-Sulaimani, op., cit., p. 1039. 
226 
General Conclusions and Recommendations 
early 1930s when the Saudis started to speak about the terra nullius and to base their 
territorial claims on the ground of effective occupation of such terra nullius, and 
effective and peaceful display of the state's authority. This can be seen as evidence that 
Saudi Arabia has been influenced by the principles of international law, because there 
were no place for other principles such as allegiance of tribes, which would not stand 
before international law. 
On the question of its contribution to international law, evidence shows that 
Saudi Arabia has indeed, through its attitudes and policy while settling its boundary 
disputes, played a noticeable role in the theory of peaceful coexistence between 
neighbouring states. All its boundary agreements with its neighbours recognised and 
emphasised the mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, 
mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's affairs and the principle of 
sovereign equality, as well as a condemnation of rebellious activities carried out from 
one state and aimed against another. These principles are already known and accepted 
as rules of international law. 
Furthermore, in its boundary agreements with its neighbouring states, Saudi 
Arabia has established a number of legal precedents. The first and the second Uqair 
Protocols between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Kuwait and Iraq on the other 
respectively provided for the establishment of two neutral zones between Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait and between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. These neutral zones would remain 
ungarrisoned and the tribes living on the borders between the two countries would have 
access to grazing and water in the area. With regard to oil, the parties agreed that when 
it was exploited each side would have a half-share. These neutral zones, which were the 
first to be established in the Arabian Peninsula, were very successful in settling the 
boundary disputes between the states concerned. This precedent was subsequently 
supported and followed in conventional law and cases alike. Indeed, it was followed by 
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many Gulf states, which found that these zones were an ideal solution to their boundary 
disputes. 5 In addition to neutral zones, Saudi Arabia in its boundary agreements with its 
neighbouring states established another kind of neutral zone, a buffer zone in which 
activities were restricted. In such zones, drilling and military constructions were 
prohibited. They also defined the area in which they would enjoy pasture rights, as well 
as the area in which the military forces of both sides should be posted. The purpose of 
these alternative territorial strategies and procedures was to keep the parties as far away 
from each other as possible, in order to prevent any potential future boundary clashes, 
which may lead to armed conflict between them and, consequently, threaten 
international peace and security. To enhance these procedures, Saudi Arabia's boundary 
agreements with its neighbours were either immediately followed or accompanied by 
agreements on security cooperation and the extradition of criminals. By these 
agreements, they aimed to combine their efforts to create appropriate security measures 
which would subsequently eliminate or at least reduce factors that could lead to 
international boundary disputes between states. 
Thus, this brief review suggests that Saudi Arabia has not only accepted the 
principles of international law regarding the pacific settlement of territorial and 
boundary disputes but it has also effectively contributed to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. It could be said that Saudi Arabia and its neighbouring 
states succeeded in defining their boundary disputes by amicable means although 
conflicts and tribal clashes were going on. Indeed, all their boundary disputes have been 
settled through negotiation, because of its flexibility, as it was applied to all kinds of 
disputes, whether political, legal or technical, since only parties to the dispute were 
s The Abu Dhabi-Dubai neutral zone established in 1950, The Bahrain-Saudi Arabia maritime neutral 
zone established in 1958, The Abu Dhabi-Qatar maritime neutral zone established. in 1969. 
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involved. Although the Buraimi dispute was submitted to Arbitration and a joint fact- 
finding Commission was created to determine accurately the loyalties of the tribes 
inhabiting the dispute area between Saudi Arabia and UAE, these two disputes were 
finally settled through direct negotiations between Saudi Arabia and the UAE after the 
latter's independence. 
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Map 1. International boundaries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom is 
surrounded by seven countries and three bodies of water. 
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Map 9. The Blue, the Violet and the Red Lines introduced by the 1913-14 Anglo- 
Ottoman Conventions as part of defining the boundaries between their 
sphere of influence in the region. 
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Map 10. The Saudi Hamza Line and the British Riyadh Line of 1935. 
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Map 11. The Saudi-Qatar boundaries according to the 1965 Agreement. 
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Map 12. The Saudi-Yemen boundaries. 
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